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Ph.D. Dissertation of City Planning

# The Politics of Identity Building

– The Case of Kizilay Square and Taksim  
Republican Square –

공공 공간을 통한 정체성 구축의 정치: 터키  
크즐라이 광장과 타aksim 광장을 사례로

February 2019

Graduate School of Environmental Studies  
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# Abstract

This dissertation explores the role of ideologies in the production of space while constructing national identity. In this regard, Kizilay Square and Taksim Republican Square, which have been dominated by two contending ideologies in return in two different periods, have been chosen for the case study. On the one hand, the secular nationalist ideology of the Republican regime constructed these two squares as the symbolic spaces of secular, modern, and westernised identity. On the other hand, in the following years political Islam created visible religion-related identities in these two squares. Moreover, these two squares have been witnessed to several uprisings, social movements, political tensions and in accordance to those have been transformed regarding in form, function, and meaning. In the Early Republican Era, the dominant ideology has tried to build a national identity by crowning the city squares with monuments as the culmination of commemorating and celebrating a patriotic history for national purposes. To represent the new regime and its ideals, Ankara was declared as the new capital city of the Turkish Republic, and following this decision, various serious initiatives were undertaken to design the new capital city. Moreover, Istanbul, as a representative of the old regime of the Ottoman Empire, was slated for a redesign in which its Ottoman-Islamic heritage was deliberately denied.

More specifically, Kizilay Square in Ankara and Taksim Republican Square in Istanbul are the prominent squares of those periods where the dominant ideology works to rebuild the national identity. In the Early Republican Era from 1923 until the 1950s when secular Turkish nationalism dominated other contending ideologies, state and religion were separated, and the state claimed for itself a hegemonic status in interpreting and representing the national history and identity by constructing the national space. With the rise of political Islam in the 1980s, Islamic ideology became the dominant



one. While attempts were made to rebuild the national identity as a synthesis of Turkish and Muslim in the squares, the built environment changed dramatically. In this respect, the role of ideologies in placemaking the experience to fit national identities will be discussed and the competing strategies of these two contending ideologies will be illustrated. In order to elevate some histories privileged over others, urban squares with monuments can be powerful agents of erasure, forgetting or remembrance. This thesis addresses how national identity works through and on urban squares and how aspects of such spaces and their landscapes reflect on to the national identity. This includes the role that ideologies and their spatial policies play in the representation and performance of such identities through the use and construction of those spaces. This dissertation tries to bring together three overlapping arguments about the relationship between national identity, ideology and the production of public space. First, the discursive meaning is constructed by spatial context. In this respect, with its landscape and spatial narration, urban squares are used to connect individuals to the nation. Second, ideologies keep struggling over and on the public space in order to take command over society. Finally, the official and practical uses of urban squares in ways both reinforce the dominant ideology and undermine the contending ideologies. These arguments are supported by examples from two squares, with a focus on how they have been built and rebuilt by ideologies to define or promulgate the national identity.

**Keyword :** ideology, the production of space, national identity, public space, secular nationalist ideology, Islamic ideology

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

## 1.1 Background to The Study

Turkish citizens have experienced a deep identity crisis for a long time. Besides Turkish national identity, religious identity, different ethnic identities and radical nationalism have defined distinct identities in society as well. After the Turkish Republic was established, the secular nationalist ideology dominated in society and built a national identity that was able to cover all different ethnic groups, religions and sects in order to build the nation–state. According to Karal (1981 cited in Gulalp, 2002), Turkish does not refer to any ethnic or religious group but refers to people who live in a certain geographical area, the territory defined as Turkey. While the nation–state and national identity have been built through modern urbanism, architecture and spatial practices, the role of ideology is significant enough to be worth discussing in detail. Here it is significant to emphasise that the idea of the construction of the Turkish national identity is a part of the nation–building project. So, their construction went hand in hand and nurtured each other.

However, socio–political circumstances and different ideologies have continuously transformed the identity. As being the founding ideology of the Turkish Republic, the secular nationalist ideology positioned itself as strongly separated from any other ideologies such as Ottomanism, Islamism, or conflicting national ideologies by cutting all ties with them and successfully suppressing them. Yet on any convenient ground, contested ideologies have never missed the chance to question the national identity or try to negotiate with it the twentieth century. Ongoing conflicts in the political arena today still have roots in those times (Cinar, 2007). More precisely, modern national identities, particularly in Muslim geographies, have negotiated with the traditional ones from the beginning. Especially by the rise of political Islam and the wide criticism of modernity, Turkish



modernisation and secular Turkish nationalism also began to be questioned. In this process, while micro identities rise, in Muslim geographies the Muslim identity reasserts itself. All around the Muslim geographies, with the reassertion of Muslim identity, socio-economic, structural, and spatial changes have been experienced from Malaysia to Indonesia to Iran (Bozdogan, n.d.; Bazik, 2014). However, what Turkish society has experienced in this process is quite unique in terms of its economic, political, cultural and socio-spatial reforms. Therefore, Turkish modernisation in the general overall social transformation and the construction of the capital city, in particular, can be accepted as one of the most radical and successful models of the modernisation process (Bozdogan and Kasaba, 1997; Koker, 2000; Lewis, 2001; Tekeli, 2001, cited in Sargin, 2004). In the context of nation-state building, the Early Republican Era gave effort to constitute national architecture, urban planning, and urban design. However, with the rise of political Islam, the effort to create national, representative and symbolic spaces was replaced with rent-based projects that were garnished with an Ottoman-imitation mosque as a representation of Islam. The gains of the Early Republican Era in terms of urban planning, urban design and architecture were ignored, and rather than creating a characteristic, specific approach to all these concerns, Islamists preferred to imitate Ottoman and Islamic elements. The success of the Turkish Republic which was achieved in the Early Republican Era, since as Bruno Taut (1880–1938) declares that “all nationalist architecture is bad, but all good architecture is national” , was put aside in favour of a nostalgia for the Ottoman times and for the sake appealing urban projects. Since the 1980s, the modernisation project of the Turkish Republic has been destroyed, and the national identity, which was previously defined by secular nationalist ideology, was officially redefined as being Muslim and Turkish. The new definition of national identity created an Islam and Turkish synthesis, which did not correlate with the secular national identity at all. In the following decades, besides the Islam and Turkish synthesis, the reassertion of the Muslim identity became more visible in the public sphere. In order

to give a better understanding, it is necessary to emphasise that, although the secular nationalist ideology did not totally reject Islam and used its social power for the nation state (Dox, 2000, Balci, 2009), in the public sphere the visibility of Islam was restricted. However, with the rise of political Islam and Islam as an ideology, the Islamic identity began to be visible in the public sphere.

The reason behind this change was the ongoing conflict between the secular nationalist and Islamist nationalist ideologies. The Ottoman heritage of the Turkish Republic was a traditional community with Islamic features in every aspect of daily life. During the Early Republican Period (1923–1950s), out this traditional society the Kemalist revolution tried to create a modern society with a modern, secular, westernised national identity. According to Batuman (2005), the biggest challenge to the newly established secular nation–state was to attempt to build a modern national identity within an Islamic society. In order to do it, all the Ottoman elements and symbols of Islamic tradition were replaced with secular and modern values. However, the conflict between traditional and modern continued in the public sphere. The Early Republican Era, in which the ideology of secular nationalism and the Kemalist revolution transformed the public sphere, creating its own spaces by using modern urbanisation, architecture and spatial practices. Yet, the conflict between modern and traditional never ever ends. At the very first chance, traditional forces tried to dominate over the society again. This chance emerged during the 1980s when all around the world neo–liberalism gained momentum. In Turkey neo–liberalism was accompanied by political Islam. Since then, the oppressed ideology of Islam became stronger day by day and began to extract revenge against modernism. While Islam has been rising as a political ideology, it has tried to via urban policies and spatial practices to make the Muslim identity visible by destroying the spaces of the Early Republican Era, which are the symbols of national identity defined by secular nationalism.

These are well-known facts of ideological conflicts. In this dissertation, what I am trying to do is to discuss how different ideologies relate to space in the modern Turkish context. The Islamic or Ottoman city concept belongs to traditional times. However, political Islam in Turkey expresses itself through urban space by imitating the architectural style of Ottoman cities. Then, why political Islam eagerly tries to imitate Ottoman architecture and urbanisation, or else why it destructs the national architecture and urbanisation, become significant questions. The answer is related not to naive nostalgia but the desire to have power, resources and domination over other ideologies. The conflict and struggle between distinct ideologies take place in urban spaces. In order to dominate other ideologies and society, ideologies deconstruct the meaning, form, and function of existing urban spaces which were created by ex-ideologies, and construct its own new spaces. Teber (2004) argues that naturally none of urban planning and design is neutral or independent of power struggles, especially in the production of public space. There are always power relations, cultural hegemonies and economic concerns in this process and they have the impact on planning and design processes of public spaces. Ideologies and powers try to maintain control over public spaces whether it is a park or a square. In this process, the dominant ideology or power creates the urban images over which struggles between distinct ideologies are always undertaken. In this respect, I am going to discuss how the Kemalist revolution with the ideology of secular nationalism and Islamist nationalism create urban space, to build the national identity for the desired society. Two different ideologies, their spatial practices and social organisations will be the focus of this dissertation.

This dissertation focuses on the cases of Kizilay Square and Taksim Republican Square in two different eras. These two squares symbolise the political ideals of the two different eras when two contested ideologies dominated. The main focus of this study, rather than addressing the placemaking experiences of urban squares, is to examine the role of ideologies and their spatial policies in order to

create their desired national identity through the urban squares. More precisely, with a particular focus on Kizilay Square and Taksim Square, this dissertation explores how Turkish nationalism dealt with the Islamic–Ottoman heritage through building the modern identity of its citizens, and also how Islamist ideology negotiated with the Republican cadre by building the Muslim identity. There are several studies about these two squares that generally focused on the socio–spatial, and economic changes of their features. Beyond previous ones, this study tries to investigate the identity building through public spaces at two distinct periods when different ideologies dominated, and the spatial policies of these different ideologies along with their ideological inclinations.

The reason behind choosing these two squares as a case study is to discuss the Early Republican Era’ s socio–spatial practices through two locations: the newly announced capital city of Ankara and its centre, Kizilay Square, and the last capital city of Ottoman Istanbul and its centre, Taksim Republican Square. Moreover Taksim Republican Square offers a chance to discuss how the Ottoman Empire’ s heritage dissolved into Republican spatial practices and how political Islam, via mimicry of Ottoman architecture under the influence of neo–liberal urban policies, has deconstructed this heritage. The ideological and identity wise changes in the form, function and meaning of these two squares, the ideological and identity changes is discussed or vice versa. More precisely, urbanism, architecture, and spatial practices have always been used by ideologies in order to create their desired society. There are many different ways used by modern nation–states to construct a national identity: creating national history, anthems, flags, national emblems, and symbols are some of those that nation states use. Urban space, national architecture, and spatial practices are also significant tools of which nation states take advantage. These two distinct ideologies have different spatial expressions to give people a sense of national belonging in everyday life. The focus of this dissertation will be these spatial expressions of two distinct ideologies, and their role in

creating representative landscapes. In order to clarify the theoretical background, Lefebvre' s conception of the production of space and the formation of the nation–state through the concept of the invention of culture are used.

## 1.2 Research Questions

Each and every power builds the public sphere according to its ideological inclinations builds public sphere where the power struggle takes place, in order to have the consent of society, and, thereby, permanent power. In modern and postmodern times, different ideologies have dominated over the societies. The foremost effort among various ideologies to gain power was to (re)build the national identity at the dawn of modern times from the emergence of nation–states onwards. Since then, the effort of creating a national identity and politics became interlinked with the consideration of constructing a modern national identity through urban planning. However, with an increase in criticism of modernity and modern national identity, Turkish society began to experience the reassertion of Muslim identity as an alternative to the modernist idea of building a national identity. Islam, as a political as well as religious ideology started to build its own space, spatial practices and social organisation while redefining the national identity.

In Turkey, this shift has manifested over two distinct periods, the Kemalist revolution and political Islam. The Kemalist revolution, with the assertion of secular nationalism, attempted to build a modern national identity in the Early Republican Period (1923–1940s). However, the Islamist practice of positioning itself against Kemalist secularist activism reconstructed the national identity with the reassertion of a Muslim identity over the last 20 years, during which Turkish society has become postmodern. The power struggles between these two groups have taken place in the public sphere, especially in symbolic urban spaces. To have a better understanding about the distinct ideologies and their engagement in the process of

national identity building, it is crucial to analyse and formulate the way urban squares were constructed materially and discursively, because they often became the focal sites of the power struggle. More precisely, the successful display of power depends on its ability to command national space, which, in turn, utilizes spatial practices to consolidate a sense of belonging in the public. This thesis addresses how national identity works through and on urban squares and how their landscapes reflect back on to the national identity, including representation and performance through spatial practices. Public space/urban squares have been used to bond individuals to the nation by narrating the past, present, and future. These arguments are underpinned by examples from the two prominent squares of two significant cities with a focus on how they were designed and transformed over time and also used to build a national identity.

Based on this research statement, the main research question is the following:

What is the role of ideologies and their spatial practices in the social production of space?

Several questions also arise with regard to this; how have the struggles between ideologies over symbolic spaces taken place, in order to disseminate different values and propagandas, while constructing the national identity constantly renegotiated among proponents and citizens? As the centres of social and political events, public spaces contain the collective memories of society, which are apt to be proliferated and fragmented by political interference. Regarding this tendency, what are the relationships between space and politics in ideological contests in the context of national identity building?

Why are public spaces in general, urban squares in particular, so significant in the context of national identity building?

According to Castells (2010), national identity and religious

identity are two different types of identities. Therefore, it is not quite complicated to merge Muslim identity with national identity. In that case, other significant questions for this dissertation present themselves: how Muslim identities can survive national identities, or else, if religious identity and national identity are distinct, then how can religious identity be part of the definition of national identity?

The last question depends on the close relationship among politics, ideology, architecture and urban planning. Tekeli (2001) argues that architecture and urban planning have been playing major roles to represent the ideology of political regimes. Specifically, nation states have used architecture and urban planning as tools to symbolise their power through spatial existence. Although this dissertation is questioning the role of ideologies in placemaking experiences, the role of architecture and urban planning in representing the ideology of a political regime is also significant. The relationship among different approaches therefore, needs to be examined.

In order to develop a comprehensive explanation for this phenomenon, it is necessary to have a deep look at the turning points of national identity building processes according to ideological inclinations. Moreover, for exploring the debates over the projects applied to these squares, it is necessary to deal with the competing discourses on the identity of the squares, which is legitimised by alternative historical narratives. Thus, in this dissertation it is examined how different ideologies uses different readings of the past in order to re-create national identity.

### **1.3 Research Methods**

The squares as city centres have played a significant role in the spatial production of nation-states. In this respect, two monumental squares in two metropolitan cities have been chosen. The city of Istanbul and Ankara, from the very beginning of the Turkish Republic,

has been the representative of two distinct ideologies. While Ankara, as the capital city, has been the symbol of the modern nation–state of secularists, Istanbul has always been considered as an alternative cultural capital by Islamists. Two squares in these two prominent cities are selected: Kizilay Square in Ankara and Taksim Republican Square in Istanbul. The transformation of the spatial narration of these squares occurred along with the distinct ideologies, which in turn played a key role in national identity building.

In order to provide a better understanding about the role of ideologies in building a national identity through urban squares and answer the research questions, the spatial policies in different time periods of Turkish urbanisation are examined. For the analysis of the case studies, including key concepts such as ideology, space and national identity; various sources were reviewed. Two important historical periods in Turkish urbanisation were selected for analysis in this dissertation: The Early Republican period (1923–1950) during which the secularist national ideology was dominant, and after 1980 during which Islamism rose as an independent force. The transformation of the squares is analysed and discussed according to this historical shift. Written sources such as journal articles, theses, books, reports, laws and institutions, legislation, official documents, various urban projects and plans and their reports, maps, newspaper articles, and documents of relevant professional chambers have been reviewed. These resources have been classified in terms of time and space in related periods. In order to grasp two distinct ideologies that dominate two different time periods of Turkey, their initiatives to construct, reconstruct, or deconstruct the national identity and the features of urban squares in terms of meaning, structures, and functions, Kizilay and Taksim Squares as case studies are analysed with the guidance of these resources. Besides written resources, personal experiences and observations of the selected areas are also incorporated into a conceptual framing of ideological conflicts and the changes in spatial narrations. In order to clarify the parallelism among the breaking points in urban planning practices, promoted national



identity, and change in dominant ideology, a comparison of two distinct periods is useful. Besides those materials, newspaper archives, posts and ongoing online debates on social media (Twitter, Facebook etc.), photographs which were taken in different time periods, some legal cases in court trials and related documents are analysed for further detailed information about the transformation of urban squares. Online sources were mostly downloaded from web pages<sup>①</sup>. Moreover, press statements are evaluated, especially on the controversial projects lead by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a key politician, a former Mayor of Istanbul (1994–1998) and Prime Minister (2003–2014) who finally became the president of Turkey in 2014. In addition, important institutional actors such as the Turkish Union of Chambers of Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) and its member institutions including the Chamber of Architects of Turkey and Chamber of City Planners are comprehensively analysed, with particular focus on conflicts between Ankara Metropolitan Municipality’ s ex–Mayor Melih Gokcek and the Chamber of City Planners, which turned out to be a good representation of the conflicts between Islamists and secularists.

These materials have been analysed and evaluated to produce the knowledge of the transformation of national identity through the spatiality of the squares during two different periods: 1923–1950s and 1980s–2018. In these two different time periods, to analyse the projects, urban plans, court decisions, discussions between different actors, news from social media and also local and global newspapers help to answer the major and minor research questions. Moreover, to analyse all these materials, a theoretical framework about ideology and space is suggested (next chapter).

In the light of these findings, the primary objective is to examine the social production of Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares in the context of identity building through the spatial construction of public

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<sup>①</sup> <http://www.arkiv.com.tr>, [www.mimdap.com](http://www.mimdap.com), [www.arkitera.com](http://www.arkitera.com), etc.

spaces.

## 1.4 Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation has 7 chapters. The introduction gives brief information about the background of the study, research statement questions, the main methods of research and its limitations. The second chapter introduces a conceptualisation of basic concepts and a related theoretical framework. Especially, the spatial theories of Lefebvre' s and Foucault' s theorisation of power and, finally, Harvey' s theoretical and empirical research will be the focus of this chapter. These all together will provide a better understanding of the relationship between spatial production and ideological construction. Moreover, national identity building in different time periods, especially right after World War I and the 1980s, will be discussed in terms of economy–politics nexus. Marxist theories provide useful insights in this regard. However, it is necessary to note that a whole comprehensive discussion of the connections between the ideological initiatives, which serve the aim of economic models and their reflections on the urban context or the complete political history of the Turkish Republic, and its spatial policies is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Finally the trilogy of space, ideology and national identity will be examined in detail. In other words, what is significant in this study is the ideological context of the national identity building through using public spaces.

The third chapter presents a historical framework to examine the ideological conflicts in public space. It discusses of the evolution of urbanisation practices in the Turkish Republic in the context of ideological differences. It will also give the basic understanding of the case study. This chapter is dedicated to the effort of building national identity through public spaces.

The fourth and fifth chapters will focus on the case study of Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares. These two chapters will

concentrate on the power struggles and ideological conflicts in terms of national identity building at these two squares since their construction. The struggle and conflict will be examined in two distinct periods and ideologies. The very first period is defined as the Early Republican Era, in which the Kemalist revolution and ideology of secular nationalism dominated society, when these public squares were built with modern urban planning inclinations. The second period covers from the 1980s to 2018 when the ideology of Islamist nationalism dominated society. The desire of Muslim identity to be visible in the public space became prominent in this era and Islamic practices began to transform the spatial practices from modern to Islamic. From this point, spatial projects, legal arrangements, rules and regulations of local authorities and the central government will be discussed.

Following chapter deals with case findings. The last chapter consists of two parts, which are the contribution of discussions and further implications. Dynamics and mechanisms behind the production, destruction and re-production of these two squares in terms of national identity building with respect to the consent ideologies struggle will be concluded.

## Chapter 2: Theoretical Background to The Study

This chapter considers how the notion of national identity, power and ideology tie in with urban public space. Since the nation and national identity are highly related to everyday life, they are constructed through urban space. Thus, ideologies solve the identity–building issue with space. On the one hand, they destruct the spaces which other ideologies build while, on the other, they reconstruct the spaces which are symbols of their ideological inclinations. It also gives them a chance to change everyday life practices. This makes subsequent generations not only remember the prevailing social order but also forget previous ones. It is a way of achieving permanence. As ideologies, Islam and secular Turkish nationalism are not free from this manifestation. While these two distinct ideologies struggle for power and offer conflicting worldviews, they both change urban space to create their desired society and nation. They (re)/(de)construct the urban space constantly according to their ideological inclinations. According to Vale (2014), the effort of building a new identity asserts itself on space through urban planning, design and architecture. In other words, space has a political character, and so the production of space is not independent of the social, political and ideological context. Moreover, the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’ not only refer to the people who share common roots, culture and history but also to the people with the shared ideology (Dean and Butler, 2012).

In this chapter, the fundamental concepts of this dissertation will be addressed.

## 2.1. Space, Ideology and The Social Production of Space

Different theories have been developed to explain the theory of space. One of the most common conceptualisations of space is that it is dependent on the relationships between power, ideology and space. This has been a focus of both academics and practitioners, although the notion that the various backgrounds of scholars and practitioners have resulted in different interpretations of these concepts (Merrifield, 1993). In this study, rather than the (chronological) history of space, a history of the representation of space and its relationship with power and ideology will be discussed in consideration of Lefebvre's conceptualisation of space. Moreover, his theory will help to develop a comprehensive discussion of how different powers and their ideological approaches (re)construct national identity through urban space through the use of urban planning. Lefebvre's approach focuses on space as being a social product filled with ideologies; it also provides a lens through which to understand the relationship between space, power and ideology. Lefebvre's main point is that the process of production of space is not independent of the power relations between different ideologies. Lefebvre (1976) argues that to understand the knowledge of space, it is necessary to focus on means, practices and uses of space—all of which are significant elements in the production of space—since how space is produced is the most crucial question. In order to make it entirely concrete, the following questions ought to be considered:

‘What is the role of power and ideologies in the production of space?’ , ‘Who produces space?’ , ‘What are the spatial practices under distinct ideologies?’ , ‘How do different ideologies construct spaces?’ , ‘How does space have ideological content?’ and ‘How is public space constructed socially?’ . All these questions address the process of space production. Since urban space is a social product, discussions on space and the production process offer a starting point in tackling these questions.

## The Social Production of Space:

In his study, Tony Ward argues that “all the concepts, theories and meanings that shape our lives are socially constructed” (Ward, 2006). This is to say that nothing around us is granted. Space is also mostly taken for granted as a ‘natural’ part of the routine of everyday life, and so it is not questioned at all. Yet space does not have meaning in and of itself, but only that meaning that is given or ascribed (Ward, 2006: Kant, 1781). To Lefebvre (1991: 26) ‘(social) space is a (social) product’ . He defines social space as “neither a ‘subject’ nor an ‘object’ but rather a social reality…a set of relations and forms” .

As noted, Lefebvre, for the comprehensive understanding of space and its production, it is necessary to analyse ‘the anatomy of space’ that is used for the physical representation of space. And he defines spatial concepts in the production of space. Lefebvre explains his triad as follows:

1. Spatial practice, “which embraces production and reproduction, and the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation. Spatial practice ensures continuity and some degree of cohesion. In terms of social space, and of each member of a given society’ s relationship to that space, this cohesion implies a guaranteed level of competence and a specific level of performance.”
2. Representations of space, “which are tied to the relations of production and to the ‘order’ which those relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, to codes, and to ‘frontal’ relations.”
3. Representational spaces, “embodying complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life, as also to art (which may come eventually to be defined less as a

code of space than as a code of representational spaces)” .  
(Lefebvre, 1991: 33)

He notes that the relationship between spatial concepts “must account for both representational spaces and representations of space, but above all for their interrelationships and their links with social practice” (Lefebvre, 1991: 116). His conceptual triad was designed to reveal the relations between spatial practices and socio-spatial organisation to allow for the analysis of planning as an operation of power and ideology in creating representations of space (Zieleniec, 2007; 61). Lefebvre defines his triad as three moments of social space (Lefebvre, 1991: 40). The three moments of social space as perceived, conceived and lived are involved in space altogether, and thus it is not possible within the space concept to categorise them separately. In other words, these three concepts refer to three different facets of the same place (Zhang, 2006). At this point, it is necessary to define these relationships as contradictory as well as dialectical. For instance, the main focus of this dissertation is that social space is not free from ideology; however, conflicts and contradictions over the ideological significance of a social space, and its perception by society, does occur. In his article, Lefebvre discusses this through the different concepts of space. According to him, physical and social space is the outcome of human beings’ actions, and state occupies the mental space representations of the state which is also constructed by human beings. Therefore, mental space is a different entity to the physical or space; yet it cannot be separated from them (Lefebvre, 2003).

To give a better understanding of the relationship between these three moments of space, Lefebvre in his book uses a mirror as a metaphor. The ‘subject’ stands in front of a mirror that represents space. What the subject perceives is the same as what is reflected. When the ‘subject’ passes through the mirror, lived abstraction occurs. (Lefebvre, 1991; 313–314). When he explains his triad, his

approach to the knowledge of space is to comprehend the ‘anatomy of space’ , and he explains it through the human body. According to him, representations of space refer to ideology and knowledge of the human being, representational space constitutes the culture for the body, and finally, spatial practice refers to the reactions and perceptions of the body to the outside (Lefebvre, 1991: 40).

In Lefebvre’ s reinterpretation, it is considered that representational space (lived space) happens in between spatial practice (perceived space) and representations of space (conceived space) (Wright, 2000; Elden, 2004). Representations of space refer to the conceptual and technical conceptions for master plans, zoning etc. produced by bureaucrats and professionals of urban space like urban planners and architects. Dogan (2007) argues that representations of space are designed and so they designate a sphere under the control and hegemony of the state. Representational space, however, in a specific time and space refers to hegemonic or conflicting interests. Activities, images and memories shape its frontiers (Dogan, 2007). Therefore, it is also called lived space—the space of inhabitants. According to Shields (1999), urban space is reproduced through the relationship among these three facets of Lefebvre’ s spatial triad. In emphasising the significance of this intricate relationship, Lefebvre (1991: 116) notes that “the long history of space, even though space is neither a ‘subject’ nor an ‘object’ but rather a social reality...must account for both representational spaces and representations of space, but above all for their inter–relationships and their links with social practice.”

In practice, therefore, how a citizen perceives and lives within an urban space and how ideologies construct such spaces become essential questions. Lynch (1990) argues that pattern, symbols, paths, nodes, boundaries and regions make it possible to read and understand urban space. In the built environment, these concepts play a central role in public spatial practices and perceptions. Moreover, these concepts together shape the image of the



environment. According to Lynch (1990), the images of the environment “are the results of a two-way process between the observer and his environment. The environment suggests distinctions and relations, and the observer –with great adaptability and in the light of his own purposes – selects, organizes, and endows with meaning what he sees. The image so developed now limits and emphasizes what is seen, while the image itself is tested against the filtered perceptual input in a constantly interacting process. Thus, the image of a given reality may vary significantly between different observers” (Lynch, 1990: 6). This dissertation seeks to reveal how an urban image is created in practice by ideologies. Of course, every individual has his/her own image; however, it is not free from influence by the societies in which (s)he lives. Members of the same society share common or collective images. The images of the case study in this dissertation will be analysed and their evolution discussed, with a consideration of how they were created and reproduced in the context of national identity building.

Therefore, the issue of social production of space is a significant topic among scholars exploring different geographies and the socio-cultural and economic-political circumstances in the production of space. For instance, in his seminal book Watson (2011) discusses how space was produced in Seoul, Taipei and Singapore and the transformation of them through Lefebvre’ s spatial triad. According to him, Lefebvre’ s focus is to show that the essence of social space only becomes true once it exists at all levels: material, practical, historical, ideological and imaginative. More precisely, space transcends physical structure or geographical location; it is a social product related to different realities—material, practical and ideological. Giesecking et al. (2014) argue that social practices—not only material conditions—play a central role in the construction of space, which means the process of space production is affected by macro-scale policies and developments, everyday routines and the cultural background to those societies. Moreover, social patterns, relationships and cultural values are also produced according to the

structuring of space. Gottdiener (1993: 132) argues that “space is both a medium of social relations and a material product that can affect social relations.”

Moreover, Andrzej Zieleniec focuses on the production of space through urban planning according to Lefebvre’ s conceptualisation. Zieleniec (2018) argues that it is necessary to discuss and comprehend all aspects of the production of space since Lefebvre’ s statement that ‘politics of space’ brings a challenge to the planning and design of the built environment. The assumption that space is political drives us to consider planning, design, architecture, and the landscape of the cities which are not free from any political processes. To Zieleniec (2018: 4–5), architecture, urban planning and design can serve the purpose of creating more liveable, accessible cities only if it is accepted that space is a social product. More precisely, among technocrats, practitioners, and theorists there is a common effort that how Lefebvre’ s spatial theory, analyses and approach can be developed and associate with other fields in terms of practice and theory (Harvey, 1978, 1985, 1990, 2012; Merrifield, 1993, 2006, 2014; Elden, 2004). Zieleniec (2018) argues that, according to Lefebvre, there is a need to acknowledge that space comes not only from the abstract principle of space or its relation to ideological control, but that everyday life and practices can create meaning, values, signs and symbols. To understand these intricate relations, it is needless to say that the historical, social, political and economic context of the production of space should be considered.

The production of space is mostly discussed through Lefebvre’ s conceptualisation. However, in recent times, scholars have argued different angles of space's production deserve to be considered. In their article, Wolf and Mahaffey (2016) criticise the professionals of design and urban planning and argue that, rather than letting culture happen, they fix the culture through their representations of space by using their power over people and environment. Moreover, Mee–Kam Ng (2014) discusses the roles of intellectuals in the process of

space production. According to him, Hong Kong and Taipei witnessed social and political movements and following it spatial restructuring and production of space of those cities are managed under the leadership of intellectuals. Wiese et al. (2014) argue that in the contemporary urban context and newly developed conception of space make us rethink the production of space which requires an understanding distinct from space. From the point of production of space, they discuss the place-making experiences in two German cities regarding social, economic and physical aspects of the cities. In his seminal article, Dhananka (2016) discusses the slum areas in Bangalore. According to him within the context of third world countries' housing problems, especially low-income classes living in the slum areas, the production of space is highly related to the state. Therefore, the production of space process can only happen between space, community and government. In his article, he argues that for his case study governmentality became a significant issue. Foucault's concept of governmentality and Lefebvre's concept of the production of space are analysed through a case study from India. Moreover, Buser (2012) questions the politics and spatiality of municipal governance, and also argues that Lefebvre's conceptualisation of the production of space can be used to examine socio-economic and governance relations. Giesecking et al. (2014) argue that while space is a very significant component of modern life, it is subject to manipulation and change; thus, space and social relations not only shape the multiple layers of identity but are also shaped by them. Unvin, however, criticises Lefebvre's concept. According to him the idea that space is a social construction has become a fundamental assumption of contemporary social and cultural geography and it causes professionals to think less about more essential problems like the conceptualisation of space (Unvin, 1999).

### **The Politics and Ideology of Space, and Power:**

With modernity, space which is the outcome of architecture and

urban planning began to be referred to as not being only physical structures but also structures which have their own peculiar social, political and economic features. In this respect, the definition of space in modern times becomes vital although there are several definitions for space; yet the most significant and comprehensive belongs to Lefebvre. According to him, space is: “a whole set of errors, a complex of illusions, which can even cause us to forget completely that there is a total subject which acts continually to maintain and reproduce its conditions of existence, namely the state (along with its foundation in specific social classes and fractions of classes)” (Lefebvre, 1991: 94). In other words, besides having physical features, other dimensions of space began to come to the fore, and the theory of space gained importance in different fields. In this respect, distinct disciplines besides architecture and urban planning, sociology, political science, geography have developed a deep interest in space to analyse the relations among space, society, environment, politics, power and ideology. The focus of modern philosophers most likely concentrates on the demonstration of space being political. According to Busquet (2013), the reason behind space being political cannot be considered without discussing the complex relationship between spaces and societies, which prompted the development of a politically oriented representation of space called “the vision of the world” or “the future of societies” .

After all, space cannot be considered without the political realm, since how space is represented and how it is used are not independent of the decision-making processes like what purposes, by whom, when and why those spaces are produced. Space similar to other socially constructed things like culture and identity etc., is a social construct and so it is highly bound up with power and authority (Knox and Pinch, 2010). To understand what the social construction of space is, it is necessary to discuss the relationship between space, power and ideology. According to Lefebvre, in modern times, space is not neutral or spontaneous; it is subject to any action of power. He draws attention to the political and ideological nature of space and

argues that “space has been shaped and moulded from historical and natural elements, but this has been a political process. Space is political and ideological” (Lefebvre, 1977: 341). Harvey, while following in his footsteps and taking his studies further, offer an in-depth analysis of the work of Lefebvre showing its relevance to society and power with this argument: “spatial and temporal practices are never neutral in social affairs. They always express some class or other social content and are more often than not the focus of intense social struggle” (Harvey, 1990: 239). According to Lefebvre (1976: 29), it is not easy to separate ideology from practice since any representation of space is ideological as long as it contributes to the reproduction of the relations of production.

In order to exercise control over societies, ideologies need to have the ability to control over space. At a national level, any ideology can be successful only if it has the ability to consolidate national power through spatial practices. Harvey puts it through the experience of working-class movements in Paris. To him (1989: 236); “working-class movements are, in fact; generally better at organising in and dominating place than they are at commanding space. The various revolutions that broke out in Paris in the nineteenth century foundered on the inability to consolidate national power through a spatial strategy that would command the national space.”

In this complex relation, ideologies dominate space and society in order to reproduce themselves. Spatial policies, practices, rules and regulations are arranged accordingly to serve this purpose. Besides, reproduce themselves, be visible at space is so significant for ideologies to create the society which they desire. Since being visible at space give them the power to control over society, and hence dominate all other conflicting ideologies which try to be also visible at space. Therefore, to dominate space, the power struggle between different ideologies occurs continuously in space. Space becomes the tool by which the dominant ideology represents itself.

In other words, space cannot be thought of without society and social life; ideologies use space as a tool to construct their desired society and social order. More precisely, ideologies reproduce themselves through the built environment. The crucial goal of ideologies is not only control over the society or space but also domination over other ideologies. Therefore, those who have the power to decide spatial practices, not only define the basic rules of social life but also eliminate the impact of other ideologies on social life. In other words, in any given society, ideological hegemony depends on the ability to command space and spatial practices. At any period, the ideology which dominates the others changes spatial practices and discourses for being permanent. Thus, the old is constantly facing destruction by the new for reproducing itself and being permanent. Moreover, the new one produces its own space while destructing the existing space which is the outcome of old ideology. According to Harvey (1989, 239) “during phases of maximal change, the spatial and temporal bases for reproduction of the social order are subject to the severest disruption” . In other words, while power struggle takes place between different ideologies, they have struggled over to reorganise their spatial bases. They change the space, create it from the beginning. To be permanent; be remembered ideologies express themselves on urban spaces in different ways according to their ideological inclinations. More precisely, each society has its own peculiar space and spatial practices while producing space. This process of producing space is imbued with ideological inclinations because any ideology has the power to change society via space. Thus, in any society, the conflict and struggle between different ideologies takes place on/at space either changing the space or creating it from the beginning while creating the society which they desire. The one which dominates space, dominates the others. For this reason, space and the process of producing space are significant for ideologies. As noted by Gregory (1994: 403) “constellations of power, knowledge, and spatiality – in which the dominant social order is materially inscribed (and, by implication, legitimised).” Therefore, plans of cities, buildings, landscape, monuments and sculptures etc.,

or anything related to spatial practice not only represent space but also represent the prevailing ideology. To Merrifield (1993) space is full of hidden elements like jargon, codifications and signs which are produced by professionals and technocrats; thus, ideology is always naturally embedded in space's practice. Any changes in these elements or spaces itself, refer to a new ideological approach.

In his influential article, Harvey (1979) discusses the radical transformation in the economy, institutional structures and social order of France and corresponding to these transformations the power struggle among French Republicans and Monarchists and their intransigent Catholic allies through the symbolic significance of construction process of the Basilica Sacre-Coeur. In the process of French nation-state building, the US was taken as a role model. However, French Republicans considered the Monarchists and Catholics as an enemy that prevented the possible development of French society. As the symbol of the power of the Monarchists and Catholics, the Basilica of Sacre-Coeur, which was completed in 1919, was considered a provocative political symbol that had caused civil war for so many years. For Christians, it is not more than a religious, sacred place. yet others argue that it was inspired by politics and that it symbolised the intolerance and fanaticism of the right. It was built and completed; however, it has always been the focus of struggles. Harvey (1979, 381) argues that "The building hides its secrets in sepulchral silence. Only the living, cognizant of these histories, who understand the principles of those who struggled for and against the "embellishment" of that spot, can truly disinter the mysteries that lie entombed there and thereby rescue that rich experience from the deathly silence of the tomb and transform it into the noisy beginnings of the cradle." The ongoing struggle over the construction of Basilica was continued with the proposal of a 'colossal statue of Liberty' just in front of the Sacre-Coeur on the land of Paris. The statue would serve as a symbol of liberty, democracy, and republicanism which The French Republicans deeply attached to their principles. However, it was donated to the US. The authors of this

proposition argued that a monument would decrease the people's hatred towards the Sacre-Coeur.

## 2.2. The Structural Transformation of Public Space regarding Ideologies

The history of public space in Turkish cities dates back to the times of the Ottoman Modernisation. The Ottoman Empire's private and public space had their peculiarities. As a public space, commercial zones never became entirely secular places and Islamic elements like mosques and the Islamic practices dominated. However, modern public spaces began to emerge for the first time with the modernisation efforts of the Ottoman Empire. With the reform movement, which began around the 19th century, the organisation of space showed itself similar to European counterparts with the opening of wide avenues, plazas and squares, more significantly very first time the organic pattern of Ottoman cities were replaced with geometric rules (Bilsel, 2007). The transformation of the public spaces in Ottoman cities continued with the establishment of the Turkish Republic in the context of a nation-state and national-identity building.

First of all, the construction of the capital city played a central role in the structural and ideological transformation of public spaces all over the country generally, but in Ankara in particular. At this point, it is necessary to recall that in order to create national spaces, in the context of the nation-state, the state uses its power to create its own capital city. Prominent examples of creating politically motivated national capital cities over the world are Ankara (Turkey), Islamabad (Pakistan), Chandigarh (India), Canberra (Australia) and Brasilia (Brazil)<sup>②</sup>.

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<sup>②</sup> Although it is common to design a city as a capital for a newly established nation-state, Ankara is unique in that in terms of affecting the strategies of governments (Cinar, 2005). Ankara is the city which allows us to understand the mainstream transformations of Turkey's political history in general and in



Second, the public spaces of any capital city are so significant in order to build “representations of space” where socio-cultural practices are constituted. According to Zieleniec (2018: 8), public space that shapes the lived experience of the city is continuously “codified, regulated, surveilled and policed.” The reason behind the importance of this control over public space is related to the inhabitants of the city and their interaction with public space. Zieleniec (2018: 8) argues that “we learn who we are and where we belong by how our lives are structured, ordered, regulated and controlled in time and space. That is how or if, when and where we are allowed to express our values, aims, identities, dreams to claim or make space for ourselves.” In other words, what public space means to different people and groups at different times and how they become to represent ideals of culture, identity and society are not the same.

Further, Habermas points out the construction process of a democratic regime and argues that public spaces are the most significant tools in the construction of a democratic regime and a modern society’s capital city (Sargin, 2002:11). The planning issue of Ankara and its public spaces were designed and developed similar concerns. Kilinc (2002) argues that the emergence of public spaces in Ankara was significant for Republican ideology and its representation in two reasons. First of all, public spaces are considered urban elements which would make public life viable. In other words, the new capital city of Ankara—similar to its European counterparts—would have modern streets, large boulevards and modern citizens by evoking the new age and civilisation. New economic and social circumstances created its new spatial

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particular local governments. It was planned as the capital city of the Turkish Republic according to the republican ideology of creating a secular, modern society. All efforts behind this purpose can be easily observed in Ankara’s spatial pattern.

organisation. The modernisation project of the Republican ideology would be realised only if the production of public spaces was achieved where modern life was practised. Therefore, even though traditional lifestyle and its socio-spatial organisation continued, it could not be at the very centre of social life at all. In Ankara with its socio-spatial organisation, there was an attempt to construct a new lifestyle. Another reason is the metaphorical relations between public spaces, public buildings and the socio-cultural projects of republican ideology. More specifically, concerning creating a new modern lifestyle from society to family to individual as a part of Turkish modernisation project; Ankara, its planning issue, and public spaces of it were very significant concerns of state (Kilinc, 2002: 123–124). Thus, in the production of public spaces, state planning became prominent, and Ankara was planned with a system of public space consisting of squares, parks, boulevard, streets and other open and closed spaces. In this respect in his influential article Abrahao (2016) discusses how public space plays a role in political expressions which gives clues also why state interferes the space and planning issue. He argues that “the role of our streets, squares and avenues, as spaces of political expression within the urban context, seeking to demonstrate that such a political expression comes into being when there is evidence of contradictions in the process related to dominating those spaces by the ruling classes, and calls into question the idea of urbanity, as a system of good civic practices, repeatedly conveyed through planning and policy management submitted to the interests of the ruling minority” (Abrahao, 2016: 292).

Besides Ankara, other cities and their public spaces also experienced this transformation. Although there was little investment, the public spaces of Istanbul also underwent transformation. The change of Istanbul was quite controversial. It was the representative symbol of the Ottoman and Islamic cultures; however, it was essential to construct national spaces. The development of Taksim Republican Square (Chapter 5 offers a detailed explanation of its ideological base and spatial organisation) was the most crucial placemaking

experience of this era. During the early Republican Era, public spaces were developed with the ideology of secular Turkish nationalism in the context of nation–state building. The modernisation project of Turkey showed itself on space not only for reflect its power but also transform the society. However, this transformation continues under the influence of contending ideologies. Here, it is necessary to recall that the early Republican Era, the transformation of spaces aimed to be created modern spaces similar to spaces of European cities in a reaction to the traditional pattern of Ottoman–Islamic cities. Thus, when Islamic ideology became dominant, a backward transformation occurred. That is to say that the primary motivation to make public spaces secular was replaced by the visibility of Islam in public spaces. One of the leading research concerns is to investigate how this transformation impacts national–identity construction.

To that end, this study will focus on the urban squares as being significant elements of public space and will investigate their socio–spatial transformation under the effect of distinct ideologies in (re)constructing national identity. Urban squares as being significant elements of public spaces where creative social and cultural interaction occurs in harmony with everyday life practices among citizens are important components of the planning issue. In a built environment, squares are one of the most important public spaces which reflect the identity of cities, everyday life practices of masses, and the cultural background of society. Levy (2012: 157) explains it as “on square citizens are connected to the heart of urban culture, history and memory.” Although details change, identity building through placemaking experiences of the squares is similar. Since, besides their function as places where citizens gather for various activities and events, they also contribute to social cohesion and identity (Memluk, 2013). More specifically, squares are the places where social interactions happen, not to mention that they offer an appropriate environment for different socio–economic and cultural groups to mingle. Further, squares can easily establish an existence in the collective memory, and they are significant components of a

city and citizens' identity. Therefore, in the production process of them, the role of ideologies is significant. The production process of public space in general and urban squares, in particular, is also characterised by continues struggles, rivalries and conflicts between distinct ideologies. Moreover, the production of public space also is not free from the everyday life practices that take place there. In this sense, Massey (2005) argues that public space is the outcome of complicated social processes which include several forces and actors communicate, conflict and oppress. It is necessary to recall that the production of public space should be considered in the context of nation-state building of state's modernisation project in order to ensure social control, regime prestige and the future aspirations of society. For instance, in Turkey in the early Republican Era, public space was used as a means to create desired public and legitimatise the state's policies and guarantee the success of reforms. In this period, urban squares were "spaces of representation", constituting a spatial representation of a nation state's power.

To summarise, squares have constantly transformed within their (historical) meaning, (urban) function and (spatial) form accordingly ideological changes within a political, social and economic context. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, urban squares were designed and developed similar to the squares of European cities and became representative symbols of the Republican ideology. However, over the last two decades, Turkey has witnessed the dramatic transformation of its public spaces and urban squares in particular, in terms of socio-political and economic dimensions as well as design issues (Catterall, 2013; Civaner, 2013, Gul et al., 2014). With the rise of political Islam, cities and spaces have undergone transformation, stimulated by changing spatial patterns.

### 2.3. The Formation of Nation–States in the Third World Countries

To be independent and maintain development, the formation of the nation–state is essential and is prioritised by the majority of Third World countries. Contrary to other western, modern and capitalist countries; the formation of nations, national consciousness of Third World countries is constructed through top–down social engineering projects led by the state. There are different approaches and theories about the formation of the nation–state. In order to give a deep understanding about the nation formation, first nation and nationalism are discussed and following two important approaches how to construct and create nation and nation–state ‘the invention of tradition’ and ‘imagined communities’ will be addressed.

#### Approaches to Nation and Nationalism:

The origins of the nation and nationalism are controversial among scholars regarding their ontological basis. On the one hand, some scholars consider them to be a natural part of society; on the other hand, some argue that those concepts are created and constructed. Guibernau (1996) while claiming that those concepts summarise the controversy between scholars as “there are two main positions: First, the assumption that the nation is something natural. Schleiermacher talks about the nation as a natural division of the human race, endowed by God with its character. Every nationality, he proclaims, is destined through its peculiar organisation and its place in the world to represent a certain side of the divine image. For it is God who directly assigns to each nationality its certain task on earth and inspires it with a determined spirit in order to glorify himself through each one in a peculiar manner. The second perspective holds that the nation and nationalism are modern phenomena. According to Gellner, nationalism is explicable as an inevitable, or at least as a natural, corollary of specific aspects of

modernisation. It is a phenomenon connected to the emergence of an industrial society. Giddens understands both the nation and nationalism as distinctive properties of modern states and locates the emergence of nationalism to the late eighteenth century and thereafter. Anderson also argues that nationality, 'nation-ness' and nationalism are cultural artefacts created towards the end of the eighteenth century" (Guibernau, 1996: 48–49). In this respect, contemporary theorists on nationalism are Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson, and their discussions will form the basis of this part. Both of them, from the Marxist tradition, argue that nations and nationalism are not naturally given but rather constructed. According to Smith (1991) in third world countries, the nation is something created and constructed, and Turkey which has imperial roots is also considered to be the outcome of nation formation. He argues that "in non-Western instances of the formation of nations, the specifically nationalist element, as an ideological movement, assumes greater importance" (Smith, 1991: 101).

During the early Republican Era, in the context of building the nation-state, the Turkish Republic was formed. In order to homogenise society, change everyday life practices and, most importantly, build a modern nation, many radical reforms were enacted. Guibernau (1996: 58) argues that the homogenisation of the population and reproduction and altering of culture, the media and education are the two elements controlled by the modern state. In the early Republican Era, these two elements are used to build national identity and culture. The main concern of Republican ideology was to build a modern, secular and Westernised nation-state and national identity to create social cohesion between citizens and make them develop an attachment to their homeland. In this period, secular nationalism dominated other ideologies and conceptualised the identity formation. Both Guibernau and Smith concentrates to identity building efforts of nationalism in their studies. According to Guibernau (1996), nationalism can be understood only if its political character and the role in identity building are analysed. Smith (1991:

74) argues that “nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'.” However, it is significant that with the assumption of nation, nationalism, and national identity are not naturally given, yet constructed conceptions, especially in third world countries they are open to negotiating in times according to ideological inclinations.

### **Invention of Tradition:**

In the introduction to *The Invention of Tradition*, Hobsbawm argues that, in order to give a deep understanding of the nation phenomenon which consists of constructs, it is necessary to scrutinize the invention of tradition. He discusses that “the invention of traditions as highly relevant to that comparatively recent historical innovation, the ‘nation’, with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation–state, national symbols, histories and the rest. All these rest on exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative, if only because historical novelty implies innovation” (Hobsbawm, 1983: 13).

His argument begins with the invention of tradition. According to him, even tradition is invented, constructed, regardless of whether societies tacitly or naturally adopt them. Thus, national traditions are also examples of invented traditions. He argues that ‘invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically imply continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past. A striking example is the deliberate choice of a Gothic style for the nineteenth–century rebuilding of the British parliament, and the equally deliberate decision after World War II to rebuild the parliamentary chamber on the same basic plan as before (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1). He gives attention to the efforts by people to

sustain historical continuity even by copying it. In Turkey, with the nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire and its power, hegemony over the world, the architectural style of many mosques continue imitate the Ottoman style, even if they do not serve the current needs of Turkish society.

According to Hobsbawm, the concept of a modern nation is filled with symbols and national history etc. Although modern nations claim to be natural (Hobsbawm, 1983: 14), they are not considered without an invented component of concepts of the national phenomenon, since all those concepts are related to the past and historiography. He claims that history cannot be discussed without considering the knowledge or the ideology of the nation. Moreover, what has been preserved in the popular memory and what the state or movement has selected, written, pictured, popularised and institutionalised are totally different from each other. Thus, history is invented according to ideology. According to him the modern concept of France or the French is not natural yet constructed or invented through history. For instance, in order to build a modern national identity in Turkey, the state rewrote history and being Ottoman and Muslim were denied while national identity of the new Republic was formed depending on the Hittites, Sumerians and Turkic tribes, who had migrated to Anatolia from Central Asian in the 12th and 13th centuries (White, 2002: 34). Moreover, the very famous and significant banks of Early Republican Era were named as Etibank (Hittite Bank) and Sumerbank (Seton–Watson, Nations and States) regarding Hittites and Sumerians as its ancestors by Ataturk (Anderson, 1983). In other words, in the context of nation–state building, what ideologies and power do is social engineering that constitutes national symbols, histories and national identities etc. related to historical circumstances. Moreover, invented traditions fill the gap between this created history and public sphere through other invented traditions such as flags, images, ceremonies and music etc. (Hobsbawm, 1983).



Moreover, in recent times the use of invented traditions has become widespread across Europe which is defined as mass-producing traditions by Hobsbawm. Especially with the standardisation of administration and state education, it was aimed to transform people into citizens like peasants into Frenchmen (Hobsbawm, 1983). New nation-states which recently gained independence from empires also used the invention of tradition, constructing capital cities, flags, national anthems and military uniforms. For example, in the Italian case, Italian statesman d' Azeglio was quoted as saying, "we have made Italy, now we must make Italians" . In this respect, the invention of tradition played a central role in maintaining the Republic while protecting it from socialism and the right (Hobsbawm, 1983). In France, to establish and maintain the republic, and also turn all Frenchmen into good Republicans, the invention of tradition was used as a tool in different steps:

1. Development of a secular primary education
2. The invention of public ceremonies
3. The mass production of public monuments (Hobsbawm, 1983)

Another significant example of the invention of tradition is the construction of capital cities. According to Cannadine, while ceremonies and rituals became significant, the conditions of capital city where these rituals and ceremonies took place, also began to be considered. For instance, the capital cities with "the grand buildings and splendid thoroughfares were monuments to the power of the state or the influence of the monarch" (Cannadine, 1983: 113). In 1868, the builder argues that " 'the stately magnificence of a capital city is one of the elements of national prestige, and therefore of national power and influence' , it was imperative that London' s architecture should become 'worthy of the capital of the richest nation in the world' " (Olsen, 1976 cited in Cannadine, 1983: 127).

### Imagined Communities:

In his influential book, *Imagined Communities*, Anderson argues that the nation phenomenon is not appropriately defined by different theories, especially Marxist theory, rather than dealing with, elided it because having anomaly (Anderson, 1983). With his conceptualisation of imagined communities, his main aim was to suggest tentative discussions for a more satisfactory interpretation of the 'anomaly' of nationalism (Anderson, 1983). Similar to Hobsbawm, Anderson also argues that nation and nationalism are cultural artefacts which arose at the end of 18th century. Moreover, he suggests a definition for the nation as "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 1983: 28). He explains the reason of being imagined as in a nation even the smallest ones, the members do not know, meet all other members or even hear of them, and so every single member of a nation has the image of his/her communion. Gellner (1964 cited in Anderson, 1983) points out the roots of nation and nationalism and his focus was falsity rather than imagining the character of the nation. He argues that nationalism does not mean that self-consciousness of nations to their existence yet the invention of nations where they do not exist. Anderson criticises this approach regarding the false or true concept since according to him if their falsity or genuineness distinguish communities, it does not refer to the imaginative character of the community.

Lastly, related to the imaginative communities, Anderson (1983) argues that the nation is considered a "deep, horizontal comradeship" so no matter if there is inequality and exploitation among the members of the nation, the fraternity makes each of them is willing to die and kill without any questioning. In the following chapter, he discusses the roots of nationalism since according to him, the "central problem posed by nationalism" can only be understood through an in-depth examination of the nationalism phenomenon.

While discussing the roots of nationalism, Anderson (1983)

indicates the close relationship between religion and nationalism concerning death and immortality which are neither concerned by Marxism nor Liberalism. From this point of view, he argues that nationalism cannot be understood without the large cultural systems which preceded it and caused it. However, nationalism also tends to be secure and finds a way to reproduce itself. For instance, arranging the ceremonies for tombs of the unknown soldiers and constructing memorial monuments are the reflections of national imaginings in the modern secular age (Anderson, 1983). He interprets it as a way of “transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning” through using collective memory and commemorations to make sure remembrance and forget. Moreover, all ceremonies, memorial monuments etc. symbolise the immemorial past and ensure a limitless future.

In short, Anderson (1983) indicates that the era of nationalism has continued and “nation-ness” is still so significant in modern political life.

### **National Identity:**

There is a common understanding among scholars that culture is a social construct. In the case of national identities, it is agreed that the nature of national identity is also socially constructed. The socially constructed nature of national identity means that they are open to re/deconstruction over time. To discuss the concept of national identity and how it is constructed through social and cultural practices, Anderson (1983 cited in Knox and Pinch 2010) developed the idea of an ‘imagined community’. According to him, before the modern age, in traditional communities, national identity, which makes people develop an attachment to a country, was not a fundamental conception. However, with modernity and the emergence of nation-states, in order to control a large number of people and make them be part of strong patriotic bonds, national identities which require to use of an enormous imagination became a

compulsory concept. Therefore, national identity is beyond each of our individual preferences, yet we are highly concerned about the issue of it which defines who we are. People want to know who they are and who others are. McCrone and Bechhofer (2010) argue that national identity gives a chance for people to choose how to present themselves and how to define themselves. For instance, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) defines national identity in the context of nation–state building as “the construction of a shared sense of identity and common destiny, to overcome ethnic, sectarian or religious differences and counter alternative allegiances” (DFID 2010: 18). Leach (2005: 178–179) defines national identity as “a ‘way of life’ , a somewhat mysterious practice that remains accessible only to a certain group, and that is consequently always under threat from those that do not belong to that group, and who do not subscribe to the same ‘way of thinking’ . It may be circumscribed by the various rituals and practices that hold that community together. It emerges out of a common commitment to a ‘way of life’ , and therefore shares certain properties with religion itself, in that its only real base is a ‘belief’ in or ‘commitment’ to certain shared values that are themselves no more than ‘beliefs’ .” More precisely, national identity helps to bring a community together which shares a common way of life, rituals and practices. However, Smith (1991: 21 cited in Bellamy, 2003) argues that national identity—rather than shared values related to an ethnic core—has six characteristics: a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. Billig (1995) proposes that national identity is not one identity among many; yet it is an ‘ideological consciousness’ that establishes nations, national identities and homelands, and embodies them to make them occur as ‘natural and ancient’ . Moreover, Radcliffe and Westwood (1996: 23) emphasise that how national identities are produced and reproduced through everyday practices in different places range from home to neighbourhood to the

workplace and the public sphere, and they argue that “national identities and nations are embedded in the material and imaginative spatialities of collective and individual subjects.”

The different definitions of national identity refer to common concepts such as nation, nationality, history, culture and shared values etc. In order to comprehend what national identity is, first, nation and nationality should be defined. The nation refers to a certain group of people being part of historical–cultural characteristics, while nationality is the condition of belonging to a nation. According to Guibernau (2013), there are five key elements of national identity: “psychological: consciousness of forming a community; cultural: sharing a common culture; territorial: attachment to a clearly demarcated territory; historical: possessing a common past; political: claiming the right to rule itself.”

Similar to identity, national identity is also always in process. From birth to death, accordingly social, cultural, geographical contexts, the identity of individuals keep changing. Edensor (2002; 29) argues that “identity is always in process, is always being reconstituted in the process of becoming and by virtue of location in social, material, temporal and spatial contexts. The fluidity of identity does not mean that there is no coherence, but rather that this has to be continually reproduced to ensure fixity.” In this respect, national identity also continually changes. However, since it is a kind of collective memory, any change in national identity is only possible both by remembering and forgetting. According to Hall (1995), national identity is something which is constructed, yet throughout history, it is open to being deconstructed and constantly reconstructed according to the will of the dominant ideology. Bozdogan (2014) argues that national identities are continually renegotiated.

In the process of creating, reconstructing national identity, national histories, national anthems, and flags, national holidays,

national languages, festivals, monuments, commemorations, representative landscapes, national landscapes play central roles. Ashworth and Graham (2016) argue that national landscape as a part of official collective memory is composed of the ceremonial axis, monuments, specific names given to streets, squares, significant buildings, monuments, etc., the victory arch. In the context of nation–state building, and constructing the national identity of a nation, to consolidate power, national landscapes are created. Ideology and power have always been in the centre in the process of national identity construction through affecting the place identity. Kenny (1992: 176) argues that “a planning document, possibly more than any other written text, articulates the ideology of dominant groups in the production of the built environment” . More precisely, dominant ideologies build place identities which symbolise their power and existence.

Urban space is most likely the place where power relations between competing ideologies are reconstructed. In this context, dominant ideologies which have power, reproduce themselves and assure their existence through the dominating urban space according to their own will. This domination of public space can occur in different ways such as the reconstruction of symbolic spaces, the naming of these symbolic spaces or renaming places etc. for strengthening their existence through changing the collective memory, redefining national history and national identity depending on their will. According to Sandercock (1988: 207) “memory, both individual and collective, is deeply important to us. It locates us as part of something bigger than our individual existences, perhaps makes us seem less insignificant... Memory locates us, as part of family history, as part of a tribe or community, as a part of city–building and nation–making.”

Ideology and power construct national identity by means of symbols. There are tools for creating symbols. Especially with the rise of capitalism within the context of nation building, the symbolism

of public and ceremonial architecture became more common. According to Knox (1982), the reason behind the giving of importance to symbolism is to legitimise and promote a particular ideology or power system by creating a sentimental national architecture. Whelan (2005) argues that if collective memory is preserved in the city, symbolic elements like public statues, commemorative monuments and places etc., are significant contributors to this memory. Therefore, buildings and structured environments became the most prominent tools in the process of creating symbols. Knox (1982) argues that to give a better understanding of the relationship between societies and the built environment, it is necessary to consider the symbolic role of buildings. According to Eco (1980: 12 cited in Knox, 1982; 109) "every usage is converted into a sign of itself", so that most structures have a "secondary function" which is connotative or, in other words, symbolic of something." For example, the buildings which remain from the time of Hitler's Germany are enormous, symbolising strength and power. Once they asked Hitler "why are the buildings always this colossal?" His response was quite predictable: "since I want to build self-awareness into every German" (quoted in Dal Co 1981:105 cited in Dovey, 1999; 58). According to Whelan (2005) meaning and memory together transform neutral spaces into ideological spaces, and in this process, symbolic structures do not only play a pivotal role in legitimising the authority and dominance but are used to cultivate alternative narratives of identity. Thus, in order to overthrow such regimes, ideologies and authorities these symbolic structures become easy targets which need to be removed or have their representative meaning destroyed. Leach (2005; 181) argues that "in terms of national identity it is perhaps more likely that the common, everyday buildings, the familiar streetscapes of our cities and villages, the farmsteads and the landscape of our countryside, will become the embodiment of what we know as 'homeland' ... national identity comes to be grounded in a reflection of the values assigned to aesthetic objects around us, in which architecture plays an important role." Behind all

the effort of these achievements is to be practical in everyday life. Since as Dovey (1999: 2–13) argues that “the more that the structures and representations of power can be embedded in the framework of everyday life, the less questionable they become and the more effectively they can work. This is what lends built form a prime role as ideology. It is what Bourdieu calls the ‘complicitous silence’ of place as a framework to life that is the source of its deepest associations with power…the struggle to make power visible has to deal with the fact that the exercise of power is slippery and ever-changing. Power naturalizes and camouflages itself, chameleon-like, within its context. The choice of the mask is a dimension of power.”

Besides architectural structures, naming is also a significant part of national-identity building. The naming of places cannot be interpreted as coincidental; names are the results of political struggles between different ideologies since place names are part of collective memory which is a significant component of place identity. While constructing national identity and narrating national history in nation states, (re)naming is used actively by political authorities to make the public forget one ideology and replace it with a new alternative. According to Azaryahu and Golan (2001), in the 19th and 20th centuries, national toponymies were systematically constructed for nation building and state formation. Naming and renaming practices have been an important part of this systematic construction. For expressing themselves on urban space, ideological values take advantage of place names’ symbolic role (Cohen & Kliot 1992). The renaming places as an outcome of revolutionary changes also introduce the political-ideological shift which directly has an impact on the everyday life experience of society. Right after any revolution, dominant ideologies focus on the construction of national identity and national history through renaming places. Another significant point for (re)naming places is that it is being a tool for reconstructed collective memory in the process of redefining national identity and national history. According to Light (2004), it cannot be denied that



renaming is part of the process of creating a new meaning of already existent place which consists of the values of current political views of time and for this case renaming can be considered as the effort of redefining national identities and national history and creating new collective memory. This means that any changes in dominant ideology have been mostly accompanied by the redefining of the national history and national identity. However, to redefine national history and national identity, ideologies have to destruct those already defined. National history and national identity are not only mentioned in history books, or take places on the identity card; otherwise, it would be quite easy to replace them with new well-defined ones. Their existence is embedded in everyday life experience, in the collective memory, in urban space, in place names.

Building and designing the urban landscape is also a significant tool in the process of identity narration. According to Whelan (2005) in order to comprehend the construction and reconstruction of urban space which has never been free from the political climate of those countries, it is necessary to discuss the intricate relation between ideology and landscape. Kenny (1992) argues that the planning document represents how the dominant ideology plays a central role in the production of the built environment.

In conclusion, to construct national identities in the context of nation-state building, there are several ways ideologies and power follow. One of the most significant tool ideologies uses while building national identity is to use space and spatial relations. Therefore, place identity is directly affected by ideological interventions. In this process, representative landscapes are created. Monuments, commemorative structures, memorial places, architectural artefacts, a national architecture, street names began to be representative of national landscapes. To impose their ideologies, power uses them. While dominant powers (re)construct the national identity, people define themselves and others. In Turkish geography, national identity discussions began with the collapse of Ottoman Empire; since the rise

of national identity concerns naturally coincided with the nation–state building, these two concepts mostly are defined and discussed with the reference one to another with a case study. The reason behind the choice of public space, the urban square is open and green spaces for recreation and leisure have been significant tools of ideologies in the changing of lifestyles as well as perceived urban identity, which profoundly impacts on self–identity and collective memory. According to Cengizkan (2002) in the nation–state, public spaces are the only places that make possible the development of identity by individuals. Urban squares, as one of the most important components of open spaces, have always been enjoyed the attention of competing ideologies. In this respect, activities, meaning, physical settings and content of squares in the eyes of the public, their transformation accordingly ideological inclinations and political preferences of governments, the relationship between square and surrounded structured environment happen such significant components of the national identity building. Cinar (2005) argues that in the context of nation–state building, alternative nationalist projects which promote national identity and a sense of nationhood began to be visible in cities, spaces and places. Thus, urban planning became a part of this construction. As Kostof (2011: 21) states “urban planning is never isolated from politics or social purposes” .




Figure 1 Literature Map (Personal Rendering)

## Chapter 3: The Ideological Transformation from Ottoman Empire to The Turkish Republic

In this chapter, the main aim is to unravel the spatial practices and policies while (re)production of public spaces regarding ideological bases at different times. As Smith (1991) argues the Turkish Republic was established when Ottoman Empire dissolved; hence, nation, nationalism, and national identity were constructed. Therefore, different ideologies reconstruct and modify them accordingly. I will begin to discuss these concepts in detail, together with their historical background, with the aim of providing a better understanding of the keywords.

**Secular Turkish Nationalism/Republican ideology:** This is a political ideology that promotes Turkish people. Its secularity is a little different from other countries. Rather than denying Islam totally, the Kemalist revolution accommodated Islam in their nationalist ideology (Asad, 2003) but strictly controlled it, restricting it to the private sphere and making it invisible within the public sphere.

**Islamic Nationalism:** In the political climate of Turkey, Islam manifests itself as political Islam or Islamic nationalism. Islamic nationalism can be termed as a phenomenon that fuses nationalism and religion. The central element of being Turkish regarding identity issue is defined through being Muslim, which is highly controversial among Turkish people especially seculars.

**Neo-Ottomanism:** It is also a political ideology that promotes and glorifies the Ottoman Empire. Islamic nationalism began to reflect the building of Ottoman-style influence.

**Ottoman Identity:** Ottoman Empire constituted several ethnic groups and thus in the modern context, it is difficult to explain this identity with a nation concept. In the economic system, the taxation

system was based on the religious identity. Rather than ethnicity, religion was prominent. However, Turkish and Islamic character is visible. But still, ethnic and religious aspects are not as significant as territorial hegemony.

**Islamic/Muslim Identity:** Islamic identity refers to major component that shape the Muslim' s mindset and shape his/her views towards the universe (n.a, 2018). It is not only related to culture (clothing, language etc.) but also to the intellectual identity that defines them.

### 3.1. Ideological Conflicts in Different Periods

Ideological conflicts in different periods of Turkish Republic coincided with the economic, socio–spatial changes. In this respect, this part is examined by looking at the extent to which these changes occurred. Historically, the studies related to economic, socio–spatial changes are mostly held according to different periods. There are different approaches for these periods, yet the most well–known belongs to Sengul who provides a long–term perspective to this phenomenon subject to the political– economic perspective, and Tekeli who distinguishes four different periods depending on the history of city' s modernisation. They both tried to discover these periods through spatial policies. In this study, ideological changes will also be examined through spatial policies.

‘Shy modernity’ defined the era when the Turkish Republic was declared and this period was between the 1860s to 1923 (Tekeli 2010). The author viewed it in the modernisation context. From Early Republican Era until the Second World War when Turkey acknowledged multiple–party policy is defined as ‘urbanisation of the state’ by Sengul (2003) and ‘radical modernity’ by Tekeli. Following period which is called as ‘urbanisation of labour–power’ by Sengul, and ‘populist modernity’ by Tekeli lasted from the

1950s till 1980s. Lastly, the period of ‘urbanisation of capital’ or ‘erosion of modernity’ began at the end of the 1980s when the military coup happened and the economy was opened to the neo-liberal incursion.

Table 1 Different Periods of Turkish Urbanisation and Ideological Conflicts

Time Period	1860s–1923	1923–1950s	1950s–1980s	1980s---
Definition	Ottoman Modernisation Shy Modernity	Radical Modernity Urbanisation of State	Populist Modernity Urbanisation of Labour–Power	Erosion of Modernity Urbanisation of Capital
Ideological Basis	Pan Islamism Ottomanism	Secular Turkish Nationalism (State controlled over Islam)	Nationalist–Conservative Ideology Islam embedded in it. Liberal approach in the 1950s, Marxist movements in the 1970s	The Rise of Political Islam

(Personal Rendering)

While Sengul’ s periodisation tells us about political economy perspective, Tekeli’ s periodisation gives us detailed information about the modernisation of cities under the impact of capitalism. In this dissertation, the same periods will be used; however, the focus will be the ideological conflicts between secular Turkish nationalism and Islamist nationalism. The conflict between distinct ideologies can be said to be based on these two different phases of Turkish urbanisation. Early Republican Era which is defined as Radical Modernity and urbanisation of state, and after the 1980s which are known as Erosion of Modernity and urbanisation of capital are the two periods of Turkish urbanisation. This will be the focus of this dissertation in the context of ideological conflicts. The Early Republican Era with the Kemalist revolution was shaped by the ideology of secular Turkish nationalism. According to Mardin (1981) Turkish nationalism as a predominant ideology in the Early Republican Era, was able to consolidate and legitimise the state

power. At this point, one must remember that this period should be considered in the context of nation–state formation where state tried to be only hegemonic power over society and take religion under its control to be successful. While the formation of the state was transformed from an Islamic Empire to a nation state, ideology was also transformed from Islam to nationalism by Kemalist revolution (Gulalp, 2002). Ahmad (1993) explains this phenomenon as Islam was inherited to the Turkish Republic from Ottoman Empire with its role as being political instrument; and since it would have conflicts with the ideology of secular Turkish nationalism, Kemalist revolution tried to eliminate its political feature. Analyses of these two ideological approaches will be done by comparing and contrasting conflicts between religion and state. One may wonder why religion is chosen as a bone of contention and how important is it in this discourse. The study of religion and state conflicts is a prerequisite for a better understanding of the urban experience of the Turkish Republic since its establishment. The Islamic ideology remained central in the planning cities and the creation of spaces in Turkey. According to Gulalp (2002), ongoing political struggles between different ideologies cause the rise or decline of religiosity, and rather than being religion, Islam should be comprehended through it being an ideology of a political movement. In this dissertation similar approach to Islam has been adopted to provide a better understanding of distinct ideological struggle on public space. Ali Shari’ati (1981) in his prominent work, puts the features of Islam as political ideology while comparing it with Marxism: “Islam and Marxism, are two ideologies that embrace every dimension of human life and thought...Each is keenly interested in the private and social lives of people in this world. But in all of these areas, the two ideologies are diametrically opposed and completely contradict each other in their ontologies and cosmologies.” (Shari’ati, 1981). Thus, behind the majority of reforms, the main target was to control Islam. Moreover, communities were defined according to their religion and ethnic bases at Ottoman Empire. More precisely, identity was related to religion and ethnicity. However, the first condition for building a nation–state

is to create a national identity. In order to create a homogenised society in this era, the Turkish identity was constructed. The features of this identity were defined as ‘secular, modern, and westernised’ . At this point, it is important to emphasise that both secular Turkish nationalism and Islamic nationalism ideologies have the power to transform the national identity through forming the urban spaces and cities in order to reproduce themselves and their desired societies accordingly their ideological inclinations. Cinar (2007) addresses this issue as although, not all of them were too strong to be in power or develop a discourse to be substitute for modernity through their political programs; during the twentieth century different ideologies such as liberal approach in the 1950s, Marxist movements in the 1970s and Islamist discourses in the 1990s were able to change the discourse of modernity in significant regards, and the traces of these changes can easily be observed in the transformations of cities in general. However, the massive transformation occurred in the 1990s by the rise of political Islam and its desire to develop Istanbul as the symbol of Ottoman and Islamic ideology as an alternative to Ankara being the symbol of Republican ideology.

In Turkish political history, religion has always been a significant determinant; yet it couldn’ t exist as an independent force until the 1980s. Modernisation efforts caused a conflict between religion and state which has continued since the Turkish Republic was established. As being a newly created nation–state, the Turkish Republic had to deal with religious issue actively till the 1950s. After the single–party regime, Turkey experienced the multiple–party policy regime, and the Democrat Party won the elections. Similar to the Conservative Party, the Democrat Party also consisted of the Islamic perspective of life; however, Islam didn’ t become a threat to the nation–state or its secularity. Thus, the effects of Islam were not as powerful as it is currently. With liberalisation in the 1980s, political Islam found a convenient ground to dominate the political environment of Turkey. This dissertation’ s focus will be the Early



Republican Era and the era after the 1980s, even though other phases also will be mentioned generally.

Briefly, this study will focus on the two different periods in order to comprehend how national identity is constructed. In Turkey, after the achievement of establishing independent nation–state in different periods, symbolic spaces proved to be significant in supporting narratives of national identity. First one is the Early Republican period which secular, modern, and westernised identity was the primary target after traditional, Islamic Ottoman Empire. Second is the period from the 1980s till today which global capitalism and neo–liberal urban policies accompany the rise of political Islam and directly reassertion of Muslim identity. These two different ideologies used urban planning, architecture, and urban space to build the national identity accordingly their ideologies.

### **3.2. Ideological Conflicts in Identity Building at Ottoman Empire**

Ottoman Empire which included almost three continents was multicultural, multi–ethnic, multi–religious community. Until the 18th century, the empire was able to manage to have its superiority over West outside. Moreover, in its territory, people from different ethnic groups went along together. However, the emergence of capitalism in Western society brought radical changes in political, economic, and social structures. In a short time, capitalism created its own institutions, legal rules and regulations which transformed the Western society radically. With capitalism on the one hand, socio–economic and ideological developments; on the other hand, the rise of nationalism, became a significant threat to the superiority of the empire over the West and more crucially the unity of empire’ s territorial integrity. With the effect of nationalism, different ethnic groups in the empire began to seek their identity through establishing

their nation states. Thus, in order to follow the socio-economic development of the West; a new ideology was created which could make all different ethnic, religious groups stay under the roof of the empire; and protect its territorial integrity. Majority of the administration class was agreed on the main reasons behind the decline of Ottoman Empire (which included the Islamic religion and traditional society) thus; they tried to open the country to the capitalist economy and be modernised. Moreover, with different ideological approaches, they were seeking to build an identity which helps them to keep different nations together.

Ottoman Empire tried hard, on the one hand, to follow the West regarding socio-economic developments; on the other hand, to find an ideological basis of the identity issue. Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Turkish nationalism began to be discussed for the first time in this period. These ideological developments changed the features of Ottoman-Islamic cities. While the Ottoman Empire adopted the westernised way of life, nationalism kept rising in Europe. The identity of the empire was Islamic, and ethnic communities were addressed subject to their religion. One of the most potent reform to find a cure for this fragmentation, prevent any Balkanisation and keep having unity was to create an ideology which covers every person living in Empire. Ottomanism was developed as an identity which covered all religious and ethnic groups living in the territory of empire. According to Karpas (1982), Ottomanism brought the idea of equal citizenship no matter what ethnic or religious groups people belong. Pan-Islamism also was discussed to create social cohesion through the unifying Muslims in the empire; yet both of them were unsuccessful (Akcura, 1904, cited in Karpas, 1982) and Balkanisation of Ottoman Empire inevitably happened.

### Socio-Spatial Organisation of the Cities and Islamic Identity

The physical and social organisation of Ottoman cities was ideally designed according to Islamic rules and Ottoman elements, in order to offer a convenient life for Muslim people. More precisely, Ottoman cities were created out of the harmony of Ottoman elements and Islamic rules. Thus, they were peculiar to themselves and different from the rest of Islamic cities especially the ones residing in the Arab world. To understand and analyse Ottoman cities properly, the privacy issue which comes from Islamic tradition should be considered. Only then the physical and social landscape of the empire can be adequately explained. At this point, one must remember that on the contrary to general belief that Islamic cities are built randomly without any plan, Inalcik (1990, 7) argues that a traditional but certain type of plan was followed, while building the main religious complexes and commercial centres of the Ottoman cities. The most distinct feature identifying the Ottoman city is that it comprises two major parts as residential and commercial areas. Their social structure and spatial organisation are very different from each other. According to Inalcik (1990) the reason behind this division of urban space into two parts which are an unplanned residential area and highly well-planned commercial area, being a fundamental Islamic rule, was the privacy issue. However, both areas had the Islamic identity of the empire.

Not surprisingly the neighbourhoods of all Ottoman cities were also formed according to ethnic, religious, and sectarian differentiation which means people belong to the same ethnic group, religion, and sect lived in same neighbourhoods (Inalcik, 1990; Acun, 2002, Faroghi, 1984 cited in Sengul, 2003), parallel to its multicultural identity. The residential areas which were divided as non-Muslim and Muslim zone, were organised around a mosque, church, or synagogue depending on the religious inclination and religious identity of the neighbourhoods (Inalcik, 1990). At Muslim regions, a mosque located in the centre of each neighbourhood served as the centre where not only people pray, but also regular courses

related with Islam were held for the general public and also the law courts were located (Inalcik, 1990, pg6). More precisely, the mosque had functions more than being the only religious centre but also other urban services. Regarding socio-spatial practices, this settlement pattern, and the ethnic-religion difference became very significant problems for the Turkish Republic later on while trying to build a nation-state (Tekeli; 1973).

In Istanbul, several centres emerged alongside a well-planned complex of religious buildings which consisted of madrasa, hospital, library, hospice, the school for children, the convent for dervishes and fountain for ablution were supported by a waqf or imaret (Inalcik, 1990, pg 10-11). Contrary to neighbourhood pattern which was highly dependent on the ethnic and religion segregation, the planning of commercial areas did not reflect the above. Centres where non-Muslim and Muslim people mingled at public space, were the places of religious diversity became visible. However, a great mosque which was located in the very heart of commercial zone besides its role on religious, political and judicial affairs, had the role of being the public space where people socialise, entertain and also trade whatever their religions were (Inalcik, 1990). More precisely, although religious differences didn't make any difference in commercial centres, because of the hegemony of Islamic practices and Islamic identity over others, these centres never became entirely secular places.

Although the Ottoman Empire was a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious community, public sphere and public life were always formed according to Islamic rules and traditions in both residential and commercial zones accordingly reflecting Islamic identity. In terms of the architectural style, the features of cities also were dominated by Islamic and traditional elements such as minarets and domes.

### 3.3. Ideological Conflicts in Identity Building at The Turkish Republic

#### 3.3.1. Building a Modern, Secular and Westernised Identity at Early Republican Era

After World War I, following the collapse of empires the world witnessed the emergence of modern nation–states all over the world. While a new page of history was opening with the emergence of nation–states, national boundaries were redrawn. The Turkish Republic is also one of the modern nation–states which arose out of the collapses of Ottoman Empire in 1923. Similar to Turkey, nation–states which were established right after the collapse of empires, experienced different circumstances from nation states of its European counterparts did. The nation states which occur after the dissolution or balkanisation of an empire referred to the fragmentation, not an integration; so states have to be built through the creation of national identity and nation consciousness (Tekeli, 2003). Therefore, not surprisingly nation–state building coincides with national identity building. This target was achieved in Turkey by secular nationalist ideology. While fulfilling this mission, considerable attention was given to strategies for the spatial organisation which was planned in two different levels. First of these levels was to transform space of country into space of nation–state, and the second was to organise cities as the central place where modernism project of the state was brought into action. The real struggle of Turkish Republic just started right after Independence War as Said (1994: 6) once underlined, ‘the struggle over geography is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings’ . The Turkish Republic had to deal with on the one hand strengthening modern nation–state idea, and on the other hand erasing the remaining of Ottoman Empire.

The Turkish Republic from the ashes of Ottoman Empire was

established in 1923. However, the Turkish Republic had to confront socio-spatial issues as a heritage of the Ottoman Empire, in which it was necessary to build and promote a sense of national identity and belonging for embodying future-oriented aspiration. In order to build national identity, a top-down modernist social engineering project was held by Kemalist Revolution with the ideology of secular nationalism.

Although ideological changes and identity transformation began with the modernisation of the Ottoman Empire, they could find a convenient ground for radical evolving with the establishment of the Turkish Republic. From 1923 till the 1950s when Turkey acknowledged a multi-party policy and conservative party won over the elections, secular nationalism, as founding ideology, was dominated over all other contending ideologies and national projects. Kemalist revolution adopted “high modernist faith” (Bozdogan, 2002: 6) and secular nationalism. In order to build national identity which was defined as secular, modern, and western by ideology of secular nationalism; professionals and technocrats using limitless state power had been in social engineering project which changed people’s lifestyle, vision of the world, working pattern, and ethical behaviour according to the ideology of high modernism (Bozdogan, 2002). According to Gulalp (1995), what the Kemalist revolution did was to on the one hand build a nation state from an Islamic empire; on the other hand, legitimise laying the foundations of ideological transformation from Islam to nationalism. In other words, secular nationalism tried to be free from all other ideologies especially Islamism and Ottomanism, for building a modern, secular, and westernised national identity. Thus, as an official discourse, state, not only denigrated the Ottoman past and Ottoman-Islamic identity by accusing it as being traditional, Islamic, backward, unable to protect its territory; but also, positioned itself as secular, modern and more importantly able to protect the nation’s territory (Cinar, 2007). As a part of the nationalist project, national identity could only be built by the construction of hierarchically organised national space. It

is obvious that the process of national identity building can't be realised without the interference of state to create a consciousness of its new citizens, make their attention towards the nation-state. According to Cinar (2005), ideological interventions on urban space like creating new spaces, reorganising, repositioning, or recreating already existing ones, have different purposes. First of all, a nationalist project always needs these kinds of interventions which make them visible on urban space and enable them to organise the public life. It is the first step to nationalise public sphere. Following, such interventions make national ideology dominate over other alternative ideologies easily. Third, in order to create a sense of unified national territory, and to demonstrate the state's power; these interventions are necessary. Lastly, the very powerful way to reproduce itself is to create new spaces, destroy the others, placemarks and symbols of state power to spaces, organise urban space according to official national ideology, only through these interventions, the state becomes able to reproduce itself on urban space. Briefly stated, in order for hegemony over contending ideologies to reproduce, the state takes advantage of controlling space. Thus, nothing on the urban space is coincidental but the outcomes of strategically planned movements beforehand.

The very first and bravest step of the construction of national space was to announce Ankara as the new capital city, instead of Ottoman Empire's capital Istanbul. This decision gave lots of pressure to new nation-state since the capital change brought new challenges. Although there were entirely valid reasons behind this decision, it was an incontrovertible truth that building Ankara as new capital city would be so challenging since Istanbul had been the capital city of four empires, with its natural beauty, located on a significant bridge between Asia and Europe, while Ankara was only an insignificant small Anatolian town. One of the most significant reason was to cut the ties with Istanbul as being the centre of Ottoman and Islamic identity and to make a fresh beginning in order to create a modern national identity, it was necessary to build an

ideological space. Besides its geographical location and concerns of military security, the very acceptable reason behind choosing Ankara as capital to relocate and establish new capital city was to prove the Turkish Republic was able to formulate a nation–state (Tekeli 1973, Sargin, 2004, Batuman 2013,). In other words, out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire, a westernised and modernised nation–state need to cut all ties with Ottoman and Islamic past, and to enact carefully calculated several reforms were enacted (Huntington, 1996). The declaration of Ankara as the capital city which didn't have any relations with Islamic or Ottoman history, one the most significant reform that the Kemalist revolution did. The reason behind this is the declaration of Ankara as the capital city and giving too much effort to its planning process were all related with state' s ideological interventions.

The decision of moving the capital from Istanbul to Ankara gave a chance to the ruling elite an easy way to build a new identity for the Turkish nation. Also, the ideal way to deal with the inheritance of Ottoman socio–spatial inheritance was to create a new national identity and build centralised single entity. In its founding years, Ankara and its planning issue became one of the most crucial socio–spatial projects of Turkey which had conflicts with the socio–spatial inheritance of Ottoman Empire and so this period planning efforts focused on dealing with them (Tekeli, 1998). According to Sengul (2003), these conflicts are; the lack of hierarchically organised and centralised spatial system, ethnic–religious and sectarian differences on the pattern of cities, the organic urban structure which didn' t allow the national state to control over society. Therefore, this period state focused on building national identity through the using modern spatial practices including urban planning and architecture; yet it created national architecture similar to other contemporary European countries.

This notion made Ankara turn into an ideological space more than only being a capital city. With its ideological character, Ankara began



to play an important role to realise Kemalist revolution and the ideology of secular nationalism. The effort of building a national identity by transforming Ottomans into modern Turks made the government take very serious Ankara's planning issue. The government endeavoured to on the one hand build a modern Turkish identity which was the contrast to Ottoman and Islamic identity, on the other hand, strengthen newly adopted western, secular, and modern political system. In her influential article Kezer (2010b) argues that Ankara provided the need for ideological space to realise the structural transformation of the Turkish state for Turkish nationalists. While building a new nation-state, the effort of homogenisation of urban and national space was achieved with Ankara which later became a model for other Anatolian cities across the country (Tankut, 1993). In the middle of Anatolia, Ankara without any connection to Islamic or Ottoman identity was the symbol of a Westernised, modernised, and secular nation-state. According to Tekeli (1984, 10), the declaration of Ankara as capital city was "the rejection of cosmopolitan cultural values of Istanbul" and to Vale (1992, 98) "a search for an appropriate setting to nurture the development of Turkish national identity". In this respect, whatever plan decisions were taken they only served to create a unified national territory, homogenised nation space, and national identity.

### **3.3.2. The Rise of Political Islam and The Reassertion of Muslim Identity**

During the twentieth century, several ideological approaches became prominent, interacted with and influence each other in different periods such as the liberalism in the 1950s, the Marxism in 1970s and finally Islamism in 1990s. However, only some of them can be an alternative for the modernity project of Turkey and had a powerful impact on changing national identity. For sure, all these different ideologies made cities and spaces transform somehow in some respects. However, Islamist nationalism positioned itself right opposite to secular nationalism and in order to be permanent while

attacking the spaces of modernity project of Turkey, began to construct its alternative spaces. The scope of this dissertation is to focus on secular Turkish nationalism and Islamism in the context of building national identity through the making of the urban squares.

Since the Turkish Republic was established, Islam had not existed as an independent ideology but manifested itself within conservative ideologies. The third military coup d' etat in the history of the Turkish Republic occurred in 1980 which not only suppressed the ongoing conflicting/struggle since the late 1960s among the factions of leftist, nationalists, fundamentalist, and Kurdish separatists (Karpas, 1997 cited in Sargin 2004) but also economic structure and the political institutions transformed into new forms of strict control and discipline (Batuman, 2000).

When the military took control over the government, Islam was used as a prominent instrument for suppressing the growing socialist movements and bringing about social cohesion. According to White (2002), the military based government considered the leftist ideas of Turkish youth as a threat to the unity of the nation and so it must have been replaced with religious and cultural elements which had potential to be driving power for sustaining social unifying. Moreover, the 1980s world witnessed the dramatic changes within social, political, and economic which had an impact on each country with its transnational forces. These transnational forces embodied in the global market with neoliberal urban policies in general, and the rise of Islamism with the reassertion of Muslim identity in particular especially in the urban landscape of Muslim geographies (Bozdogan and Kasaba, 1997). Mert (1998, cited in Sargin, 2004: 675) argues that besides national policies, changes in the world and supporting pro-Islamic governments of the United States and Western allies for controlling Soviet influence empowered the Islamists in politics of Turkey. Moreover, Batuman (2016: 331) argues that in Turkey similar to the rest of the third world, as a populist response to neo-liberalism, Islam became a global identity. Although 1980' s military

coup paved the way for sprouting Islamic ideology, Islamism as an independent force didn't take the central role of Turkish politics until the 1990s. According to Karpas (1997) different from other military interventions which suppressed both the leftist and pro-Islamic growth, last military intervention in 1980 while suppressing only leftist, transforming the pro-Islamic indoctrination into more radical fundamentalism.

The reasons behind the re-emerge of Islamism in Turkey parallel to changes all over the world includes (1) to legitimise post-nationalist politics of identity (Gulalp 2002), (2) to follow global transformations, Islam was used as an antileft instrument of state (Sargin, 2004), (3) rise of Islam by the influence of military repression (White, 2002), (4) as a response to the failing of secular nationalist regimes (Gulalp, 1995), (5) coincided with the postmodern critique of Western culture and appreciating authentic local values with the Islamic critique (Gulalp, 1995). Here it is necessary to remember that although the post-modern critique of Western culture reflected itself in Third World countries as the ascendant of the Islamist critique (Gulalp, 1995), on the contrary to Islam which is "ultimately a total doctrine" (Bulac, 1991, cited in Gulalp, 1995), post-modernism denies universalism and affirms relativism.

Thus, the discussion between scholars about the Islamism either it is pre-modernist or post-modernist is highly valuable in order to give a better understanding of ascendant of Islamism and reassertion of Muslim identity and the results. On the one hand some scholars (e.g. Gulalp, 1995, Alam, 2009) claim that Islamism in Turkey is the outcome of the failure of the Western modernisation and coincides the critique of modernism, thus it is post-modernist manifestation, on the other hand, some other scholars (e.g. Yavuz 2005, Waxman, 2000) state that Islamism has always been a part of Turkish identity explicitly or implicitly. In this dissertation, what the author argues is that the rise of Islamism and reassertion of Muslim identity with

Ottomanism is nothing but a representation of post-modernist, post-nationalist ideology. It is not the representative of local elements but the marketing them for the sake of global capitalism. Global markets and neoliberal urban policies with the rise of Islamism and reassertion of Muslim identity express in the spatial structure of Third World geographies.

The outcomes of the military's intervention had a substantial impact on each and every institution of the state. For the first time after the Early Republican Era national identity was redefined. The military was confident that this new identity which was officially determined as Turkish-Islamic synthesis would be the solution for social division. The primary motive of the coup leaders was to construct the depoliticised Turkish-Islamic identity, in order to consolidate their authority on society. The three fundamental pillars of this identity are the family, mosque, and the military (Kafesoglu; 1985 cited in Yavuz; 2005, 73). According to Oktem (2008, 21) with 1980 military coup, a combination of nationalist rhetoric with the state-controlled version of Islam secular Turkish nationalism was replaced with Turkish-Islamic synthesis and shaped Turkey's ideological landscape for almost two decades. Mardin (1991; 1993 cited in Sargin, 2003) states that since the 1950s as a populist discourse of conservative ideologies the homogenised Turkish national identity should have been synthesised with religious motifs and military intervention succeeded this dream of conservatives and Islamist ideology found the suitable ground to be free from conservative ideologies and began to express itself freely. More precisely, Turkish-secular vision and the effort of creating a national identity which was defined as modern, secular, and western replaced with Turkish-Islamic vision. The declaration of national identity through being Turkish and Muslim does have conflicts with the national identity which was defined by Turkish nationalist ideology. More precisely, while Islamism rose on the new fraction of Islamic approaches which rejects modernisation, the intellectuals of new fraction dominated over the Turkish intellectual landscape during the

1980s and 1990s (Gulalp, 2002). Yavuz (1998, pg 32) states that “Islamic-oriented elite is pivotal in the re-examination of the Republican legacy and the construction of a new Ottoman-Islamic identity” . In other words, the Kemalist-secular vision of elites directed to Ottoman-Islamic identity.

Waxman (2000) argues that the rise of Islamism was considered a significant threat to the official concept of Turkish national identity. Moreover, Aras and Kirisci (1998) see Islamism as a tool on the one hand to construct a Turkish style of Islam and to make Turkish nationalist ideology transform into Islamist one. With these changes in the political stream of Turkish Republic, Islamic identity which was restricted to private space with Kemalist revolution began to be visible in the public sphere. Moreover, this convenient ground was taken as grantee by Islamists and with strong propaganda; they managed to be active in the political arena of the Turkish Republic by 1994 with the local elections. The results of local and general elections gave the power Islamism to expand its influence gradually. According to Batuman (2015: 893) Islamism owes its success to urban politics, the coexistence of neoliberal policies with social welfare mechanisms. Islamist movements finally became a significant political figure with successive electoral victories, especially in local government in 1994 when they took over the local administrations of the three major cities including Ankara and Istanbul. Moreover, in the 1995 general elections, the Welfare Party had the highest number of seats in parliament. In 1994, this new alternative nationalist ideology nurtured from Islamism and Ottomanism defined the Turkish nation through Ottoman-Islamic civilisation in contrast to official Turkish-secular national ideology (Cinar, 2005). With the success of local elections, Islamic ideology asserts itself in the public-political sphere (Alam, 2009). However, with the rise of political Islam, although there hasn’ t been any attempt to change secular law into Islamic law, public life tries to be transformed via Islamic law inspired rigid morality (Motika, 2006).

While Islamist practice positions itself against Kemalist secularist activism, the rise of Islamism reproduces itself through the eroding of the building environment of Kemalist inheritance (Huntington, 1996). More precisely, as being a rival ideology to secular nationalism, Islamism aimed to destroy secular Turkish nationalism and its modernity project. Secular Turkish nationalism defined the identity as modern, secular, western; however new Islamist ideology brought a challenging identity defined as local, Islamic, Ottoman, and Eastern. This alternative identity was powerful while Recep Tayyip Erdogan was mayor of Istanbul, yet in 1998 with his withdrawal from his position lost its ground. The success of Islam-inspired party also didn't last long, and after it was closed down with the reason of being the threat for secularity of Turkish Republic, in the 2000s two fractions of it remained. On the one hand, anti-capitalist; anti-western radical Islamists and the other newly established Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AKP which introduced itself as democratic, capitalist, western. According to Sayyid (1997, pg.17): "an Islamist is someone who places her or his Muslim identity at the centre of her or his political practice. That is, Islamists are people who use the language of Islamic metaphors to think through their political destinies, those who see in Islam their political future. This should not be taken to mean that there are no shades of opinion within Islamism, that it is some kind of monolithic edifice without variations or internal differences. Islamists are no more (or less) identical in their beliefs and motives than postmodern bourgeois liberals or socialists or nationalists." Moreover, the ideological basis of the Islamist movements both still nurtured from the Ottoman-Islamic identity (Cinar, 2005).

However, in Turkey, Islamist identity includes Ottoman elements. Islamists engagement to Ottoman, which is called neo-Ottomanism manifested itself in Ottoman practices, objects, architecture, etc. In other words different from other Muslim geographies, in Turkey reassertion of Muslim identity includes Ottoman elements. In order to build this new identity, urban planning and architecture have been

used as an effective tool since the 1980s. Thus, the national landscape has changed significantly.

In this dissertation, the changes on urban squares related with the rise of Islam in the public sphere will be examined in three phases. First phrase is under the military regime which lasted for 3 years, and the next years till Islamic-inspired party Welfare Party won over the local elections in 1994. From 1994 to 2002 is the second phase when Islamic ideology was dominated and became visible in the public sphere. Lastly, 2002 over 16 years when the Islamisation of public sphere began with the implementations of local governments and followed by the interference of central government.

The author proposed in this paper that Islamism in Turkey is a product of the frustration of the promises of Western modernisation and represents a critique of modernism. In this period especially Istanbul has been the focus of Islamist for constructing their desired identity. On the contrary to Ankara, Istanbul was declared as the cultural capital which represented Islamic-Ottoman elements. What Kemalism and Political Islam offer for the social model is entirely opposite to each other however both give an account of the struggle on urban space to legitimate their ideology while changing urban space through destructing the old one. According to Cinar (2005) both secular Turkish nationalism and Islamism used the cities and public spaces as their main stage for the construction of a new sense of nationhood. After establishing the Turkish Republic as an alternative for the imperial capital of Istanbul, Ankara was built for the creation of a modern, western, and secular identity. However, by 1990s the Islamists declared Istanbul the centre of Ottoman-Islamic civilisation which represents true identity of Turkish nation accordingly to their national ideology. The conflict between Ankara and Istanbul was redrawn by Islamists for the sake of Istanbul. On the one hand Ankara was pictured as representative of secularist state which was not only unsuccessful in governance but also alienated the traditions via modernity project; on the other hand,

Istanbul which was neglected intentionally by secular state, so it lost its true identity, and it would be able to be rebuilt only by the Islamist leaders (Cinar, 2005). So behind the physical construction of cities and spaces by Islamism was the concept of rebuilding the national identity.

In conclusion, the efforts of building national identity throughout the history of the Turkish Republic rose from the two opposite/counter-ideologies. The first one is the effort of creating modern, secular, and westernised identity at Early Republican period which secular Turkish nationalist ideology dominated and state controlled over the economy; the second one is the reassertion of Muslim identity with the rise of political Islam and global markets and neoliberal urban policies. Turkish Republic' s modernisation project deals with Islam accordingly bringing it under state control and announcing a secular state. To Gulalp (2002) Islam had been suppressed because of its ideology, yet secular nationalism with the global crisis of modernism caused the rise of political Islam. Modernity in the global level began to be questioned, rather than appreciate westernisation and western culture; authentic culture came to the front as the power for dealing with western hegemony. Gulalp (2002) argues that recent Islamists movements have become the most significant predicament of the modernisation project. In these three periods how the public sphere transformed is the very significant question for seeking how identity has been built through built environment especially on urban squares.



## Chapter 4: Case Study: Kizilay Square

### 4.1. Introduction to Cases



Figure 2 The map showing the locations of Ankara and Istanbul

Source: Google Earth

Kizilay and Taksim Squares have always been the focus of ideologies who sought to forge a political identity. The political character of these two squares, in return, inevitably results in the effort of state power in national identity building. Republican ideology tried to constitute modern lifestyle and desired to spread it across the country, and the symbolic places had played a crucial role to make it realise. However, what political Islam has been doing over 20 years is not very different in ideologically. It also has tried to make itself permanent in social–political life through using urban space. In this respect, the case study of the research is discussed spatial production process of these two squares being the characteristics of the modern city, will be analysed within the concept of Lefebvre’ s triad. Further, the spatial representations and practices of them will be investigated.

Kizilay and Taksim Squares represented the spatial configuration of the newly established nation–state and reflected its political, economic and social ideals. The establishment of the Turkish

Republic aimed to build a national identity in the context of nation–state building. For this study, the reason behind the choosing these two squares as the case study is that they have always been the focus of ideologies and political struggles among them since the Republican Period. Kizilay and Taksim Squares, as being the centre of two major cities of Turkey Ankara, and Istanbul not only the physical centre where people, information, goods, traffic move across the city but also the social centre where collective memory preserved which consists of the accumulation of historical events and their representations. The visions of the Republican regime and the political Islam towards these two squares are the mirror of their ideological inclinations. Their histories are significant and primary elements for studying identity building, politics of memory, processes of nationalisation of urban space in those cities, as well as their symbolic marking.

In Ankara, constructing the national identity was shaped through the building new space which physically excluded from the old the city. The existing socio–spatial structure was excluded, and a new isolated city with the name of Yenisehir was created. However, in Istanbul existing westernised district was chosen for creating national space and national identity, and Republican elements were erected in this district. In this context, Kizilay Square in Yenisehir and Taksim Square in Beyoglu are the best examples of nation state’ s spatial project while building national identity.

After examining the role of Kizilay and Taksim Square in the formation of the nation–state, the institutionalisation of nationalist ideology and building a national identity during the Early Republican Era, it will be discussed how these two squares became the stage where political Islam attempted to institutionalise an alternative nationalist ideology with a Muslim identity.




Figure 3 The map showing the location of Kizilay Square  
Source: Google Earth



Figure 4 The map showing the location of Taksim Republican Square  
Source: Google Earth

## 4.2. National Identity Building through Kizilay Square

### 4.2.1. Kizilay Square as Symbolic Space of Republican Ideology (Early Republican Era, 1923–1950s)

During Early Republican Era, in order to cut all the ties with Ottoman and Islamic identity; Kemalist Revolution enacted several radical reforms. These fundamental reforms made the social structure and spatial organisation transform. Nation–state and national identity building process were based on the dissolution of old spaces and creating of new spaces where the ideals of the Republican regime could be easily displayed. Lefebvre (1991) argues that in order to produce new spaces, the representations of space should be emphasised. To him: “representations of space have a practical impact (and) they intervene in and modify spatial textures which are informed by effective knowledge and ideology. Representations of space must therefore have a substantial role and a specific influence in the production of space” (Lefebvre, 1991: 42).

National identity–building project was flourished through spatial practices including the architecture, urban planning and design under state–sponsored modernisation program. One of the most significant transformation regarding the spatial organisation was to occur modern public spaces such as parks, squares, people’ s house where the state’ s ideology was displayed. According to Uludag (1998), public spaces of Ottoman–Islamic cities composed of mosque courtyards, recreation area, nearby fountain, and bazaar; however, squares were still so unique to European cases. Republican ideology constructed squares as public spaces where European way of modern life tried to be introduced to society. Moreover, the Ottoman–Islamic architectural elements which did not overlap with the Republican ideals sought to be eliminated (Batur, 1998). In this respect, in modern societies, public spaces serve as “lived spaces” where

socio-cultural practices are (re)produced. Further, squares among other public spaces were used in the new city centre of the nation-state. While examining Kizilay Square, to provide a better understanding, it is necessary to consider the spatial transformation of new building capital city Ankara in the context of nation-state formation.

Ankara, conceived as representative space of nation-state was planned by German urban planner Lorcher who worked with also Ottoman Empire for planning Istanbul. He was quite familiar with the differences and conflicts between traditional Ottoman-Islamic city and modern city that the Kemalist Revolution tried to build. Thus, on the one hand with his experience and knowledge on modern planning practices he was preparing the plan, on the other hand not only using the method of zoning, ranking, ordering, hierarchy but also constructing the semantic relations and naming them, he tried to construct and conceive the capital city and its spaces. The spatial organisation of Kizilay Square which was strategically located on Ataturk Boulevard to strengthen the narration of national identity was the outcome of Lorcher's efforts on the public spaces of Ankara via the state's support. Thus, every single detail of this square regarding urban planning and architecture has its own narration to strengthen the national identity building. In this respect with its design, name, meaning, form, and function; Kizilay Square played a significant role in national identity building.

Kizilay Square, as the new city centre, consisted spatial representations of the ideology of secular Turkish nationalism. It was designed and named Cumhuriyet (Republican) Square very first time in Lorcher's plan. Following years it completed spatial and political transformation with another German urban planner Herman Jansen's plan. While creating the history of Turkey, Ankara Castle believed to be built by Hittites for military purposes, was conceived as the main spatial element of historical construction and its connection with other public spaces was strategically considered. In



Lorcher' s plan, the historical construction of the city which started with the castle spread on the radial axis connected public spaces of this narration. On one of the most significant radial axis of this construction was to Nation (Millet) Street which was running from Sihhiye–Kizilay and ending at the Kizilay Square.




Figure 5 Kizilay Square and Ankara Castle

Source: Personal Rendering on Jansen' s Plan (Gunay' s personal archive)




Figure 6 Lorcher' s Plan, 1924–1925 (left) and Jansen' s Plan, 1932 (right) Open Spaces on Ataturk Boulevard and the location of Kizilay Square

Source: METU, City and Regional Planning Department Archive




Figure 7 Lorcher' s Plan, 1924–1925 (left) and Jansen' s Plan, 1932 (right) Kizilay Square and Government Quarter

Source: Memluk, 2016

The area where Kizilay Square locates was an empty lot in the mid–1920s and pool which contains a fancy statue in the centre was erected in 1925 and this area began to be called as Havuzbasi (Batuman, 2005). This place while becoming the first recreational area where well–dressed bourgeoisie socialises, also having enough space to construct a representative square which has potential to be symbolic locus of nation state (Batuman, 2002). According to Knox and Pinch (2010) space underpins the cultures since how people behave in spaces reflect the particular cultural values. The spatial policies of newly born Republic were so aware of the fact that it, therefore while constructing spaces, the activities and the patterns of behaviour were well defined.



Figure 8 From Havuzbasi to Bakanliklar (Ministry) Area

(The place behind the Havuzbasi is the stage constructed for the Presidential Orchestra)

Source: <http://lcivelekoglu.blogspot.com/2016/03/>

These two significant spaces on the one hand, as being social space Havuzbasi where new bourgeoisie socialises; on the other hand, as being “conceived space” Kurtulus (Liberation) Square which represents the ideology of nation–state need a spatial organisation in the context of national identity building. Cumhuriyet (Republic) Square from Lorcher’ s plan was renamed as Kurtulus (Liberation) Square in the list of conditions of planning contest that Jansen’ s plan got selected. Jansen for this critical space developed a spatial strategy for the policy to produce a new public sphere as the symbol of not only the new lifestyle of the modern nation but also as the ideological meaning of modern nation–state. According to Jansen’ s plan, Kurtulus (Liberation) Square concerning this strategy was designed in the shape of a stage, defined by Guvenpark ended at Vekaletler Neighbourhood (Government Quarter), Kizilay Building and its park. The formation of the Square would ultimately be completed in a few years by erecting all the ministry buildings in the Government District except National Assembly –it would remain in Ulus till 1961 its official inauguration–.






Figure 9 Kizilay District at the end of the 1930s  
Source: Personal Rendering on Jansen' s Master Plan




Figure 10 Kizilay Square, Guvenpark, Ministry Buildings, Turkish Grand National Assembly and invisible axis  
Source: Gunay' s personal archive

Following the building of the headquarters of the Kizilay (Red–Crescent) Organization just opposite of Republic Square in 1930, the pool was removed (Batuman, 2003); and it was dully rechristened as

Kizilay Square (Cengizkan, 2002). In this point, it is necessary to consider the role of renaming practice regarding national identity building. According to Azaryahu and Golan (2001), in the 19th and 20th centuries, national toponymies were systematically constructed for nation building, state formation and national identity construction. Naming and renaming practices have been an important part of this systematic construction. For expressing themselves on urban space, ideological values take advantage of place names' symbolic role (Cohen & Kliot 1992). Republican ideology also used this tool systematically in an effective way. While naming the places, the main aim, on the one hand, was to strengthen the Republican ideology on urban space, on the other hand, was to remove Ottoman' s traces; so mostly Cumhuriyet (Republic), Ataturk, Hurriyet (Liberation) were chosen as names of symbolic places intentionally. This name change became a part of reproducing state ideology and emphasising civil contributions on space building.

Up until here, what the author argued was that in order to command over the contending ideologies, state follows some strategies like designing and naming the public spaces, deciding their architectural styles, and dictating public life. However, with the construction of Kizilay Building, the state let a semi-public organisation not only contribute to space production for national development but also propagate its ideology (Batuman, 2015). The existence of Kizilay, being non-profit, volunteer-based social service institution, and social events held by Kizilay created new publicity. More specifically, founding ideology reproduced itself through renaming, constructing spaces, and since civil contribution tried to be part of this space construction, it is obvious that on people' s consciousness, state legitimatised itself and its radical reforms.



Figure 11 Well-dressed civil servants while enjoying at Havuzbasi

Source: <http://lcivelekoglu.blogspot.com/2016/03/>



Figure 12 From Kizilay Park to Kizilay Square

Source: <http://politeknik.org.tr/mimarlar-kizilay-meydani-ankaranin-hafizasidir-silinemez/>



Figure 13 Kizilay Square from Guvenpark to Sihhiye  
Source: <http://wowturkey.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=111289>



Figure 14 Kizilay Square  
Source: <https://www.pinterest.com/pin/265219865526179109/>





Figure 15 Kizilay Building and its park

Source: <https://www.pinterest.com/pin/265219865526179109/>

Similar to other open spaces on Ataturk Boulevard, Kizilay Square with its design, surrounding area, physical and social elements became the symbol of the newly born nation–state and identity of its citizens. Kizilay Square and its landscape have never been free from ideology, yet they always transformed according to the ideological inclinations. Hoelscher and Alderman (2004: 350) put it as different interest groups try to control over spaces to form a political order since the ideology has always influenced urban landscapes. Kizilay Square on the Ataturk Boulevard is located in a narrative landscape of nation state’ s power which includes Government Quarter, National Assembly and Kizilay Building with their modern architectural and urban design. Kizilay Square was designed to represent the national past in its spatial context being the symbol of national identity through its place identity which describes as a modern space. In general urban squares with their design elements such as monuments, parks, names, built environment

convey an ideological message, so they are considered as arenas where displayed certain ideologies. Moreover, ideological messages were more overt especially in the design of Kizilay Square.

According to Batuman (2003) the last step of completing the formation of the square was achieved with the erecting Guven Monument that symbolising the combination of recreational space where modern lifestyle was introduced to the society and representational locus of nation–state where national identity was displayed according to the secular nationalist ideology. The building of the monument, on the one hand, helped to materialise the national identity and spatialise it in the public sphere, on the other hand, it could be displayed in the social space. Therefore the square became social as well as political. Following this spatial configuration, Guvenpark was designed simultaneously as creating the combination ‘square–park’ and the symbol of the political locus of the new republic and public sphere of citizens in Jansen’ s plan. The name was chosen accordingly to the statue at the centre of the park (Memluk, 2009). In the very beginning, the park was named ‘Emniyet (Security) Park’ same as the monument called ‘Emniyet Monument’ (Senyapili, 2004). However, following the Turkification of language as part of the national identity building project, the monument and the park began to be called Guvenlik (Security). In time, the name of the park shortened and became Guvenpark (Trust). The park as two equal parts was located on the invisible axis running from Ankara Castle to Ministry District (Keskinok, 2009). Ministry Buildings were located along this axis which ends with the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Memluk, 2009). Guvenpark with its name, location, and meaning played a significant role in strength the meaning of Kizilay Square.

The square and the monument celebrate the power of the state and the success of the Turkish nation. The monument in Kizilay Square called as Guven Monument, is highly visible and accessible to the public in the centre of the new capital city, conveys the subtle

and explicit message that propagandise the nationalist ideology, future aspiration for the newly established nation, power of Kemalist revolution. In a public space, it is an inescapable element of daily life visual experience and with its ideological message has a high impact on citizen' s collective memory. In his seminal article, Classen (2009) argues that since middle ages, for different ideological purposes, monuments have played a critical role while not only designing urban spaces but also dictating of everyday life practices of citizens in their experiences of remembrance and forgetting. In addition, Sargin (2004: 662) states that "the monuments were believed mainly to provide a cultural sphere for constructing a new collective ethos, indicating a continual tendency away from the political influences of the old regime...to create mythic places where authority, discipline, and power were now publicly visible and legitimate. In fact, the state elite thought that power could be mobilized best via shared perspectives and learned experiences; and, in this respect, spatialisations of monuments were the necessary constituents of all ideological expectations."

The monument in the square and the square itself were a strong message of nation's power and classical narrative of modern nation state' s representation in both form and theme. With deploying this monumental area in the very heart of Ankara aimed to be formed a national identity. In order to convey some certain ideological messages, they demanded Hanak to define the theme as police and gendarme when they proposed this monument to him. In the centre of the Guvenpark, the role of police and gendarme in reinforcing the state was displayed. Moreover, the police and gendarme willingly dying for the sake of their mission and Ataturk doing his duty were brought to the public' s eyes and consciousness (Ertuna, 2005). According to Tekeli (1998) creating a national consciousness was the most important component of a nation-building project. The state demanded that Hanak to illustrate the unshaken foundations of Turkish Republic, order and security of newly established nation-state, fearless people who took the role in the construction of Turkish

nation, happiness and the power which the Turkish nation will always have in the future (Ertuna, 2005, 7).

According to Bozdogan (2002) Early Republican Era when Turkish nationalism dominated over other contending ideologies, this monument in the heart of new capital city might be “the most pragmatic monument” which was built by Anton Hanak and Joseph Thoraka, dedicated to Turkish security forces in order to show the Turkish citizens’ respect, gratification, and sympathy towards them. On the one side of the monument, there is a figure of Ataturk flanked by four youths. The other side of the wall there are two figures that one is young and the other is old, considered as musicians according to Hanak’ s interest in music, symbolise the old and new regime with their serious expressions. These two young and old figures became the symbol of transition from the past to the future. In the foreground young figures flank, Ataturk symbolises the history of Turkish nations focused modern lifestyle with future aspirations (Ankara Enstitusu Vakfi, 2013). The reliefs on the pedestal portray Turkish villagers carrying weapons to the front line, the medical team at the hinterland, the efforts of security forces, craftsmen from various professions, artists and philosophers were portrayed. Besides these figures, date in Roman numerals and Ataturk’ s famous phrase "Turk, be proud, work hard, and trust!" (Turk, ogun, calis, guven!) took place on the monument. The emphasis of this phrase on "Turk" should be analysed considering the Kemalist revolution and its "Turk" definition. Kemalist revolution promotes “Turkish nationalism as a territorial identity” which refers to the people who live within the territory of Turkey (Karal, 1981 cited in Gulalp, 2002). Therefore with this definition, all ethnic, religious, and sect differences tried to be overcome. More precisely, the monument as an apparatus of state made it possible to combine the social and political functions of the identity building and politicising the social environment (Batuman, 2005: 37). Sargin (2004; 660–664) argues that the Republican Era, the need for monuments originates from three reasons: first, to promote secular national identity; second, to erase the Islamic,



Ottoman codes; and finally to develop an original Turkish nationalist ideology and “the monument truly manifests the empowering role of the Republican ideology by which the presentation of an official Turkish memory was easily detached from that of the Ottomans and Islam.”



Figure 16 In the foreground, Atatürk is portrayed, flanked by youth

Source:[http://fotograf-gunlukleri.blogspot.com/2012/10/1920-](http://fotograf-gunlukleri.blogspot.com/2012/10/1920-1930lar-ankarayenisehirin-kurulusu.html)

[1930lar-ankarayenisehirin-kurulusu.html](http://fotograf-gunlukleri.blogspot.com/2012/10/1920-1930lar-ankarayenisehirin-kurulusu.html)



Figure 17 In the background, old and young figures symbolise the old and new regimes; and Atatürk’ s famous phrase "Turk, be proud, work hard, and trust!" (Turk, ogun, calis, guven!)

Source:<http://www.goethe.de/ins/tr/ank/prj/urs/geb/mon/bus/trindex.htm>

According to Ayoglu (2010) with the construction of the

monument, the spatial narration of Guvenpark and Kizilay Square completed and this place became the focus of Ankara as a symbolic space. Both the monument and the park became significant landmarks. Ertuna (2005) argues that late 1930s, in order to teach the War of Independence and Turkish nationalism, the monument became a popular destination of school trips on anniversaries of the establishment of the Republic. According to Yalim (2001), the events which for anniversaries of the Republic day, celebrations, festivities, balls began to be held at this new environment and citizens became a part of nation–state building practices. All these developments should be considered in the context of the concept of invention tradition and imagined communities which emphasise that national celebrations are so significant component of national identity building practice.

Finally, Kizilay Square as the symbolic locus of the nation–state, was surrounded by Guvenpark, Kizilay Building with its park, Guven Monument, ministry buildings in the southern direction and National Assembly Building (Batuman, 2002). As Whelan (2005: 67) argues that “public buildings provide an important means of gaining access to the meaning embedded in the urban landscape” , the built environment of Kizilay Square gave the representative meaning of the square. The meaning, form, and function of the square were constructed according to the formation of national identity. Every single detail of designing issue of the square was carefully and strategically calculated for constructing the meaning for each other. Sumartojo (2015: 7) corresponding to the connection between meaning and space argues that “spatial context shapes discursive meaning” . In other words, with Jansen’ s plan, Kizilay Square became a significant public sphere where state displayed the ideology of the new republic, and introduced the socio–spatial practices of modernity to the citizens. The intersection of two main streets, Kizilay Square, was standing as the symbol of new modern nation–state, national identity, and nation. Moreover, Kizilay Square can be considered as a "monumental space" which is defined “each member

of a society an image of that membership, an image of his or her social visage. It thus constituted a collective mirror more faithful than any personal one” (Lefebvre, 1997: 33). The square regarding its meaning, design, function, contains all aspects of spatiality, the perceived, the conceived and the lived spaces. And the monument is located in the park is more noticeable to the consciousness of people than other structures around. As Lefebvre (1997: 133) argues “the monument thus effected a ‘consensus’ , and this in the strongest sense of the term, rendering it practical and concrete.” Thus, Kizilay Square wasn’ t only public space, but it served to adopt alternative life, European way of life. The national identity which was defined as modern, secular and European was reproduced on it. Sargin (2004: 662) argues that “the ordinary people of Ankara could now be invited into those imaginary urban stages where a distinctly powerful national identity as a representation of reality rather than as a simple reflection of reality was possible.”

In conclusion, Early Republican Era, the ideology of Turkish nationalism used the urban planning and architecture in constructing, displaying, and propagandising national identity very effectively through constructing Kizilay Square as a public sphere and symbolic locus of the nation–state. The social and spatial reforms of the newly established nation–state were introduced in general these squares, particularly Kizilay Square that became both the scenes and subjects of urban policy in this period. More precisely, Kizilay Square with its built environment, the government district, axis from Ankara Castle, Ataturk Boulevard, and Turkish National Grand Assembly were of prime significance in expressing the rejection of the Ottoman heritage and its capital city Istanbul in favour of a new regime, and ideology.

#### **4.2.2. Kizilay Square as a Junction (in Transition Period, the 1980s)**

This period is defined as ‘erosion of modernity’ while cities

began to lose their modern characteristics, post-modernist developments began to emerge (Tekeli, 2010: 39) with structural changes. As mentioned before, coup d'etat in 1980, Turkey experienced a structural transformation in the political, economic and social context. These changes had an impact on the spatial policies. According to Sargin (2004) conservatives gave importance to Ankara' s new spatiality in order to provide spatialisation of religious identity. Military intervention gave a chance for executing this desire, and they began to change the symbolic meaning of Kizilay Square. With the policies of the military government, Kizilay Square began to have features of junction rather than an urban square. Kizilay Square began to be "conceived space" for only vehicles by closing it for any pedestrian circulation. Spaces for vehicles are considered as dominated space (Kocak, 2008). According to Lefebvre (1991: 165) "in order to dominate space, technology introduces a new form into a pre-existing space" . Thus, dominated space means that transformation of spaces by technology or new practices. Unfortunately, the current circumstances of Guvenpark of which the significant part transformed into a bus and dolmush stops in the mid-70s, strengthened the image of the square as a junction. Moreover, with the destruction of Kizilay Building and its park which was designed as the stage of nation-state where the public sphere was created in order to introduce new national identity, this area turned into a meaningless parking lot at the end of the 1970s (Batuman, 2002). The traffic and transportation on and at Kizilay Square and Guvenpark destroyed the characteristics of public spaces to a great extent. Thus, the spatial representation of them changed through this reorganisation in this period.



Figure 18 Kizilay Park after turned into the parking lot  
Source: Batuman, 2000

Kizilay Square wasn't anymore the symbol of either the newly established nation–state or the national identity of its citizens. As a reaction to the domination of Marxist ideology in university campuses through the 1960s and 1970s (Waxman, 2000), local and central authorities focused on the new spatial policy to rebuild public sphere in order to make them turn into the stage of local/traditional values displayed after coup d’ etat. Moreover, it would help to neutralise highly politicised society. In this environment, Guvenpark became a node for the security forces. Moreover, in 1982, it was decided to monitor the prominent squares of metropolitan cities including Kizilay Square, with ‘visual surveillance system’ (Coskun 2000, cited in Batuman, 2000). Kizilay Square became a place socially controlled that made people reluctant to spend leisure time. Carmen et al. (2003: 834) argue that “public space should offer the opportunity for political display. Rarely allowed in quasi–public space, the presence of such activities is an indicator of publicness... Another indicator of publicness is whether photographs can be taken. As urban designers, architects and others are aware, property owners are increasingly

sensitive to having pictures taken” . In this period, Kizilay Square began to lose characteristics of public space with control tools of government for security concerns and political displays was banned. Batuman (2000) argues that in order to de-politicised Kizilay Square and turned it into a meaningless junction three projects were held: the renewal project of Guvenpark, reconstruction of Kizilay Building, and Kizilay Subway Project.



Figure 19 The Circumstances of Kizilay Square, Guven Monument, Guvenpark and Guvenpark Bus&Dolmush Stops (Red ones)

Source: Ayoglu, 2010

First, in 1985, Ankara Metropolitan Municipality proposed the renewal project of Guvenpark. This project had two dimensions which were beneath the park and in the park. Under the park, a one-story shopping mall was designed with its two-storey parking lot. It was proposed to redesign Guvenpark and relocate Guven Monument from its original spot. Furthermore, right behind the monument, an amphitheatre was designed. For the place where monument resides now it was suggested a clock-tower which was arranged automatically every hour display the Seymenler –local folk dancers of Ankara– with a particular song and a model of Ankara Castle

(Batuman, 2002). With this project, very significant green area of the city centre was about to be destroyed. The historical, political and socio-spatial meanings of Kizilay Square were ignored. The modern elements of it that were the symbols of national identity once would be replaced with local and traditional ones. Especially, replacing the original location of the monument with a clock-tower was the annihilation of modern identity representation. Moreover, the new location suggested for the monument was nothing but a junction (Batuman, 2000, 2002). In other words, this project by changing the modern identity of Guvenpark was aimed to turn the park into a commercial zone with local and traditional symbols. However, with the intervention of a civil contribution, the group of people who called themselves as 'Environmental Sensibility Group' objected the project and in 1986 with the opinion of experts, this project was cancelled.

Second, in 1980 Kizilay Headquarter announced an architectural competition for the new building on the site where the original building resided before it was destroyed in 1979. The project got awarded first prize was a 14 storey over-sized building which didn't fit the spatial organisation of the square in scale-wise. When the construction was completed, the shape and volume of the new building didn't only block the view of the square but also had a negative impact on the image of it. While the original building was designed, one of the main aims was to make citizens feel the nation state's power. Thus, Kizilay Square with its built environment was the symbol of national identity and representative focus of nation-state and its principles like being modern, secular, and western. However, this over-sized building made the square insignificant regarding physical appearance which also had an impact on the representative display. Batuman (2000) argues that glazed facade of the building was located facing the junction instead of facing boulevards, and this glazed facade with its mirror effect reproduces the image of the junction as a new meaning of the square.



Figure 20 Kizilay Building

Source: [http://v3.arkitera.com/haber\\_19023\\_kizilay-binasi-nin-27-senelik-oykusu.html](http://v3.arkitera.com/haber_19023_kizilay-binasi-nin-27-senelik-oykusu.html)

With this new building of Turkish Kizilay Association of which construction began in 1993 and completed in 2001, a very large part of Kizilay Square was occupied. The building finally was opened in 2011 as shopping mall which wasn't integrated with the square but just became a part of vehicles and traffic congestion.

The last project that not only changed the spatial organisation of Kizilay Square but also destructed its meaning, form, and function was the newly designed subway system. On the intersection of two major subway lines which run from the Sogutozu-Cebeci Rail System and the Kizilay-Batikent Rail Transit System, the square began to serve as a subway station while the whole area is monitored by CCTV, with the extensive control and security measurements. Even taking a photo was prohibited. During underground of the square was transforming into a transport and commercial node, the spatial formation of the Guvenpark saved by the civil initiative from any possible destruction of the renewal project of Guvenpark was influenced by this project (Cengizkan, 1990). The design of the entrance of the subway station and chimneys for ventilation destructed the whole composition. Keskinok (1998) argues that



during the construction of the subway, the historical narration of the square and its elements were ignored, the square turned into a construction site, and the entrance of subway and chimneys for ventilation were located without considering the monument and its location. Further, with the 1980s, it was obvious that the approach to the urban greenery was also changed. According to Cengizkan (1990), the green area of Ankara which was designed via the guidance of Jansen accordingly to 'Garden City' approach had strong relations with the physical elements of Ankara. One of the most significant examples of it was Guvenpark and green area of the park was dramatically decreased in this process.



Figure 21 Metro entrances, chimneys for ventilation  
Source: Google Earth

Besides these physical interventions to the square, relocating the central business district (CBD) from Kizilay to Gaziosmanpasa after 1985 took the function of Kizilay Square being CBD (central business district) away. Following this development, prestigious services like Sheraton and Hilton Hotels also chose the site at Gaziosmanpasa, instead of Kizilay. Finally in 1989 with the construction of first

shopping mall of Ankara in Cankaya, called Atakule Cankaya became another attractive place for CBD functions. Kizilay began to lose its function as being the CBD of the city, and its economic vitality also declined.

In conclusion, these three urban-scale projects; even though one of them couldn't be executed luckily, aimed to change the meaning, form, and function of the Kizilay Square. The meaning of the Kizilay Square and the Guvenpark as being the public sphere and the symbols of nation-state got damaged. The values of Early Republican Era began to vanish with the destructive interventions of authorities to the square, the park and the monument (Cengizkan, 1990; Keskinok, 1998). Following the physical destruction of the area, increasing in control with the security purposes made people reluctant to spend time but just pass by. The new spatial organisation of Kizilay Square and Guvenpark influenced social and cultural practices in their surrounding area. Lefebvre (1999: 312) argues that "when an urban square serving as a meeting-place isolated from traffic (e.g. the Place des Vosges) is transformed into an intersection (e.g. the Place de la Concorde) or abandoned as a place to meet (e.g. the Palais Royal), city life is subtly but profoundly changed, sacrificed to that abstract space where cars circulate like so many atomic particles." Kizilay Square and its surrounding environment once were "lived space" in other words "spaces of representations", yet turned into a junction dominated by vehicles and excluded pedestrians. That is, the function of the square became a junction. Space which was designed for introducing the modern lifestyle to its citizens by nation-state became a meaningless junction. According to Atabas (1994), during the 1980s with the implementation of these projects, the characteristics of public space, Kizilay Square and Guvenpark got profoundly damaged. The spatial policies which focused on the increasing publicness of the square by creating pedestrian zones connected to the square, and pedestrian-priority spaces, were left with the military intervention. Instead, the square and the park turned into a junction, and whole space began to be considered just as a

rental area. Although during this period, a discursive national identity building on Kizilay Square wasn't observed, it was apparent that the interventions to space destructed the representative elements of the national identity. The renewal project of Guvenpark and its traditional, local components might be interpreted as an attempt to build the new identity which was defined with the reference of traditional and local values. However, this project which would have demolished the existence of the park, couldn't be executed with the effort of the civil initiative. It is necessary to remind that these changes gave chances to build a new national identity with a new narration through public space. When Kizilay Square was designed, it was planned to be the main component of the city centre with its park, monument, and the surrounding environment. Every single design element served to support it being the iconic site of the nation-state and national identity. However, these changes caused it to lose modernist narration. More precisely, the whole space, once had been the representative of modernity project of the newly established nation-state, the significant public sphere with its green area, the facilities and symbolic locus of the nation-state, national identity in urban scale with its historical narratives and the significant monument until the 1950s. However decrease in the size of green area, destroying the designed elements regarding scale, material, and the holistic composition of the whole space made the square lose its meaning, form, and function. It is necessary to consider the ideological transformation in order to evaluate the changes in spatial policies. The dominant ideology of Republican Era which is called as secular Turkish nationalism, or founding ideology did not dominate the other ideologies anymore. Through those projects not only the square turned into a junction, undefined vacant area without any connection to city life; but also the collective memory of citizens destroyed. According to Tekeli (2001), this period what Turkish cities experienced was: (1) erosion of the modernisation project of secular Turkish nationalist ideology, (2) the increase in illegal construction with the migration from rural to urban, (3) cultural degeneration. More precisely, the modern, secular, western identity of Ankara

began to be destructed and transformed into another thing.

#### **4.2.3. Islamic Representation at Kizilay Square (the 1990s)**

This part deals with spatial policies of Islam-inspired party on public space and corresponding to socio-spatial changes how Islam began to be visible at Kizilay Square. Since the most significant political incident of this period was the success of Islamic-inspired Welfare (Refah) Party at local elections in 1994 and general elections following year. These results were the concrete evidence of the rise of political Islam in local and general scale.

During this period, the spatial pattern and the representative meaning of Kizilay Square became one of the main concerns of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality. In order to change the spatial meaning of Republic, Islamic ideology purposely attacked, destructed the symbols of the Republic and replaced them with local, traditional and Islamic elements. While the spaces of Ankara were losing the meaning of being the symbol of the modern national identity, the Islamic identity which was prohibited from the public sphere and restricted to the private sphere by secular Turkish nationalism, became visible on the public sphere. Sargin (2004) argues that conservative central governments and pro-Islamic local authorities gained significant political power to transform the spatial landscape of Ankara and create a new architectural approach which depends on the mimicry of the Ottoman heritage or Islamic ideology, in order to make Muslim identity visible on the spatial landscape of the city. According to Keith and Pile (1993, cited in Sargin, 2004: 663) “the city of Ankara's secular sense of time and space as well as its space-making mechanisms were now in the constant challenge; so were the Kemalist qualities of its identities and memories.”

With the populist policies of the Metropolitan Municipality, the square as well Guvenpark began to be considered as an empty place

that any peddlers, street vendors could earn in the city centre (Ertuna, 2005). Another function of the park emerged very first time in this period. With the rise of pro-Islamics in the governing elite, iftar dinners began to be introduced and institutionalised among bureaucrats during the Ramadan for the first time in the country's history (Yavuz, 2005). Following this event, iftar dinners opened up to the public in big cities' public spaces. Since 1997, every year during Ramadan for a whole month the municipality has set up a tent for Ramadan dinners at Guvenpark. Obviously, Ramadan is considered as the common religious practice of society, and Ramadan dinners make people come together and share common interests. Although there are several places for putting up the Ramadan tents, choosing Guvenpark is nothing but ideological. This park was built to represent secular, modern, and westernised national identity according to the secular Turkish nationalist ideology. These kinds of religious-based events destruct this modern identity, and they are means of building an Islamic identity on the public spaces. According to Batuman (2002), while Islamic identity became visible on the public sphere, with these kinds of events, it gained legitimacy and power. Islamic identity began to be displayed at the symbolic focus of the nation-state while harming its representative spaces. Engaging new functions to the public spaces especially religious-based ones either permanent or temporary, following the change in activities taking place at the public spaces, perception and image of them also changed. The ideology of secular Turkish nationalism and its efforts to create a national identity were undermined and made insignificant. Even though Ramadan tent is there only for one month, it changes the visual appearance of the park, the monument, and the square and undermines the significance of the whole place and the ideology behind it. Sargin (2004) argues that as part of Islamists' social engineering, municipalities hold events, commemorative ceremonies during the Ramadan and offer a free meal to urban poor. However, these religious events are not neutral containers; yet in a public space once a symbol of modern and civic Republic like squares and parks, they construct "semi-closed public tents". Moreover,

Sargin (2003: 675) states that “the commemorative ceremonies and such constructions, of course, both provide necessary means for ideological performances to fabricate radical identities and to evoke the most–desired religious memories. Of many implementations to commemorate religious events and to foster their images since the mid–1980s a recent urban construction deserves a second thought.”



Figure 22 Iftar Tent, During Ramadan at Guvenpark

Source: <http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/gundem/52115.aspx>

This period, a significant act to harm the secular, modern national identity was to change the symbol of Ankara, and this new symbol was used at every event held at Kizilay Square. As a part of the national identity building project, the symbol of the capital city was chosen from the Hittites civilisations, who settled the Anatolia in the second millennium B.C. concordantly the Pre–Islamic Turkish history that portrayed the connections ancestors of Turkish people who migrated from central Asia. The image of Hittite Sun was acknowledged as the symbol of Ankara, and the representative monument of Hittite Sun was erected on Sihhiye Square in 1978 by efforts of Dalokay who was the former mayor of Ankara from 1973 to 1977. However, in 1995 with the decision of the Municipal Council the official city symbol was replaced with the image of Atakule and a dome of a mosque in between a pair of minarets with three stars (Özer, 2003). This new symbol is the ideological representation of the mayor that is Islamic, and conservative nationalist. It became a controversial issue among professionals and the public, and a campaign against this change began. Opponents took the decision to

court. Although the court decided against the new symbol, it continued to be used until it was changed again in the 2000s.



Figure 23 The Emblems of Ankara, Hittite Sun Disc before 1995, the new one after 1995

Source: <http://www.farketmez.net/ankara-belediyesine-yeni-logo>

Another intervention in this period was to construct a mosque at Kizilay metro station which is under the Kizilay Square, although Kocatepe Mosque is very close to Kizilay Square. Especially Friday's pray, huge crowded gathered at Kizilay underground mosque to perform religious practice and because of the capacity of this small mosque lots of people have to occupy corridors where people have to pass to take the train. Besides Kocatepe Mosque, there are several masjids around Kizilay Square, people still insist to perform their pray here on Friday and the municipality does nothing anything to do solve it. This attitude of municipality can't be taken as good intention but an ideological propaganda. This large participation to Friday pray has been used publicly to support the Islamic ideology and during the 2000s it will be used as the excuse for building a mosque in Guvenpark by the Municipal authorities. Batuman (2002) interpreted it as degeneration of the secular character of public space and harming Republican symbols.



Figure 24 The Distance between Kizilay Square and Kocatepe Mosque

Source: Google Earth (Personal Rendering)

Teber (2004) argues that Kizilay Square, Guvenpark and Guven Monument were designed as being the spatial representation of the Republic, yet they are no longer perceived accordingly to original design purpose. In order to demolish the collective memory of Republican Era, current municipality administration and its ideological inclination deliberately have attacked and destructed the Republican official and civil elements through constructing the representative element of religious cult' s power and hegemony. The mosque was located at Kizilay Subway Station under the square, makes, especially on Friday, this area turn into an oppression and hegemony tool. After all these implementations, Kizilay Square became the subject of discussions due to the ongoing tensions between nation and religion. This ideological stance of the municipality harms the process of building the civic, modern, public sphere. Degeneration of the square began with the changes in the physical environment and continued with the construction of the huge Kizilay Headquarters' new building on the location of original Kizilay Building which defined the territories of the square and damaged scale of other buildings around the square.





Figure 25 Friday prayer at The Kizilay Subway Station Mosque

Source: <http://wowturkey.com/forum/viewtopic.php?p=1821279>

Besides religious-based events, during the religious holidays (Eids) began to be provided free buses to Kizilay Square, plastic balls were distributed at the square (Batuman, 2002). For the first time, the square was opened to the celebration of religious holidays. However, considering the symbolic meaning of the square, it could only be the stage for national holidays in order to remember the Independence War, the efforts of people in the process of establishing Republic. Moreover, the platform of the monument turned into a stage, dancing floor, or an area for locating speakers and amplifiers while popular music and arabesque music concerts were performed as a social event that the municipality held (Batuman, 2002). This area neither stadium nor empty lot but a significant place that has its own identity in the collective memory of public and with these kinds of populist policies it loses the symbolic meaning. Ertuna (2005) argues that the monument is beyond being only a physical outcome of secular nationalist ideology for building national identity, it is the spatial narration of Turkish Republic's modernisation history. More precisely, the monument became the subject of forgetting and remembering as Sargin (2004: 660) argues that "the monuments of Ankara must be considered as pure representations of

Turkey's political tensions in order both to 'forget' and to 'remember' distinct ideological geneses and their spatial faculties." Thus, the municipality rather holding organisations and events at this area which threaten the symbolic values of it should have given the effort to protect it according to its original spatial narration with its surrounding environment. Further, the organisations and events neither directly related to the original identity of the square nor supporting the identity of it but undermine the significance of it. It is also necessary to highlight that current spatial policies and interventions harmed the scale and proportional relations between the monument and its surrounding environment. Thus, it lost its influential role in the national identity narration. According to Keskinok (1998) since 1980s Kizilay Square and its surrounding environment turned into a construction area, without any reason. The sidewalks which are quite newly upholstered has kept being renewed without considering the waste of resources. This proves the municipality's insensitivity towards the park and the monument which identified with the capital city of the newly established nation-state, Republic and its future aspiration, national identity. Edensor (2002: 72, 73) argues that "still the most obvious and recognisable ways in which national identity is performed are at those national(ist) ceremonies with which we are familiar, the grand, often stately occasions when the nation and its symbolic attributes are elevated in public display... Such ceremonies are played out to legitimate the power, historical grandeur, military might, legal process, and institutional apparatus of the nation-state." As an alternative for Republican ceremonies like Republic Day, Victory Day; religious festivals, popular concerts began to be celebrated in public spaces. Islamic identity created its formal rituals and invented ceremonies. In two big celebrations of Islam, Ramadan feast and Muslim festival of sacrifices, free buses to the Kizilay is the effort of bringing supporters of the municipality, and the representative of Muslim identity is only for making them visible in the Kizilay Square and Guvenpark once modern and civic. Batuman (2002) argues that during the 1990s, Islamic identity imposed on Kizilay Square

decorated it like a banal festival area ironically for taking revenge on the history of the Republic.

As a reaction of these events which didn' t reflect the symbolic meaning of the Square, in 1997 Municipality of Cankaya District from Republican People Party (CHP) threw a ball at Kizilay Square similar to Republican Balls, in order to celebrate the 74th anniversary of the establishing Turkish Republic on 29th October. The mayor started to organise it four months ago from the date, and official permission from the Governorship of Ankara was taken. The public was informed for this event and finalised the preparations. Four days before the celebration, the Metropolitan Municipality of Ankara announced that they would hold another celebration at Sihhiye Square only 400–500 meters away from the Kizilay Square (Solak, 1997). However, Welfare Party and the Metropolitan Municipality of Ankara blamed not to be sincere. At newspapers some interesting titles came out the next day such as “The Welfare Party inclined towards the love of the republic makes our eyes water” which criticised this incident and showing that no one believed that this was the innocent coincidence, but an ideological conflict between secularism and Islamism. This title emphasised that an Islamist ideology which has deliberately attacked and harmed Republican ideology wasn' t sincere while celebrating the anniversary of Republican but tried to make Republican Ball insignificant with an alternative celebration.




Figure 26 The Distance between Sihhiye and Kizilay Squares

Source: <http://www.arasikackm.com/m/ankara-sihhiye-ankara-kizilay>

More specifically, the conflicts between the ideologies of Islamist nationalism and secular Turkish nationalism have taken place in Kizilay Square to build the desired identity. Thus, on the one hand, political Islam has tried to destruct the Republican places and replace them with its representative elements. Therefore, Muslim identity became not only visible in public space and legitimated its power, but also it could be constructed successfully. The modern landscape of Ankara began to be dominated with Islamic, traditional elements on the very centre of Republican spaces.

#### 4.2.4. Expression of Islamic Identity on the Kizilay Square in the Modern Context (the 2000s)

Spatial policies of the municipality in the 2000s have been the follow-up to the spatial policies of 1990s. However, with the remarkable success of AKP, the Mayor of Ankara Melih Gokcek got

more freedom to execute his surrealist projects which have been considered as a huge joke by citizens. His surrealist projects keep harming the Republican spaces and deconstructing the national identity while constructing Islamic–Ottoman identity. Moreover, this period the mimicry of Ottoman architecture attempted to be applied to Kizilay Square. With many common characteristics, the built environment intended to be imitated Ottoman architectural style, mimicry of forms and using traditional motifs with reinforced concrete. What Turkish cities are witnessing now is that how Islam relates to space in the modern context and its expression at the institutional level which give a chance to observe Islamic identity. Aydin (2005) argues that since 1980, the most prominent attitude of the municipality administrations towards the squares which integrate to historical structures as being the significant components of collective memory, which became symbolic space with their monuments, which are the means of socialisation; has been to destruct them. After the 2000s, this attitude became more concrete and radical.

In this period, very first and significant spatial intervention was to close the pedestrian ground from Ataturk Boulevard to Kizilay Square in 2003. Kizilay Square was already a junction, and the pavement on the Boulevard which maintained the continuity of open spaces became a narrow refuge. The connection between open spaces was destructed, and the square was closed from any pedestrian access through barriers and pedestrians forced to use the underpass. The last connection between citizens and the square was cut with this very unreasonable project. However, with the objections of Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) to the project, the municipality had to take a step back and remove barriers. The traffic oriented projects of the municipality which ignored the physical environment, social and cultural life of urban made citizens reluctant to use city centre. According to Bilsel (2004) this kind of infrastructure projects which encourage the ownership of automobile and discourage public transportation cause radical

interventions in existing urban centres. While Boulevard began to transform into a high way, the square is destroyed through harming the historical and symbolic value. The characteristics of Kizilay Square and Guvenpark as the public sphere of the nation–state, Government Quarter’ s entrance scene, the symbol of harmony between official and civil architectural initiatives, representative of national identity, were harmed. They became only a transition area where bus and dolmush stop occupied, metro entrance platforms located without any aesthetic concerns, and pedestrians in a rush for transportation concerns began to use.

While Kizilay Square was designed, it was considered to be the representative of modern, secular, and western identity and the people who were visible on the square had this identity. At Early Republican Era, it was the public space of bourgeoisie and the symbolic focus of nation–state. Citizens were introduced modern lifestyle and expected to adopt the modern identity. However, this period, population of suburbs who migrated from rural areas became visible at Kizilay Square. This population are mostly conservative, and supporters of the Mayor Melih Gokcek. In other words, Islamic ideology manifested itself at suburbs of Ankara first. Then, as a duty of loyalty, Melih Gokcek used every power in order to make them visible at public spaces of the city centre. He brought new uses promoting Islamic elements to Kizilay Square. Municipality gives so much effort to make them visible on the square by free buses on holidays, free concerts, events, and iftar tents etc. With the current projects, these features of Kizilay Square intentionally have been harmed. Moreover, the users of the square mostly became the blue–collar workers from suburbs of Ankara. Since Kizilay Square turned into a public transportations node, it was easy for new inhabitants of the city to reach here. New users of Kizilay Square are the representative of traditional, conservative, and Islamic identity. These masses reflect their spatial demands, the representation of the space cultures to the new formation of the square. For example, it wasn’ t a simple coincidence that this period alcohol consumption in

public spaces was banned, private areas for only families were constructed, it became an insecure place after some certain hours for women. The square continuously loses its modern appearance and with its surrounding environment turns into a place where Islamic, traditional identity was represented. The new usage of Kizilay Square for Islamic rituals has been changing the identity of place which directly relates to the identity of users.

The second project was Guvenpark Renewal Project which was proposed in 1987 yet because of the citizens' reactions had cancelled at that time, was brought to the municipality' s agenda again in 2003. The project proposed relocating the dolmush and bus stops to beneath of Guvenpark. As being another traffic-oriented project, it was subjected to the objection of TMMOB (Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects). According to TMMOB' s published notices (2005a, 2005b) this project wouldn' t attempt to reorganise the green area of the park accordingly its original meaning, form, and function. Moreover because of the underground project, there wouldn't be enough soil to grow any plant, and finally, the park would turn into a concrete area. After all objections, it was decided not to realise this project. TMMOB Chamber of City Planners (CCP) press briefing in 2003 tried to take attention on the symbolic significance of the Guvenpark and the implementations of the municipality which were the outcomes of ideological stance of the administration and the mayor. According to CCP (2003), although Guvenpark and Guven Monument have been registered as grade 1 natural site area and megalithic monument by the decision of Ankara Culture and Nature Preservation Board, today this park is occupied by buses and dolmush stops without any plan or legal decision. The board and court decisions regarding the relocating of bus and dolmush stops somewhere else were deliberately neglected and ignored by the municipality. Contrary to plan decisions, the billboards, street vendors, parking lots keep occupying the very large space of the park. In spite of all these illegal spatial interventions, Guvenpark with its 75-year city image is still one of the most important public space as

square–park and a significant component of design elements of capital city which have been the representative of national identity. Thus, with its green texture, it has to be preserved its original design accordingly. In furtherance Bilsel (2004) argues that the project of the municipality began to be discussed among scholars, technocrats, and professionals because of legal issues and ideological symbolism. It seems to be directly related to the lack of awareness of the public sphere in society and the fragmentation of the public sphere.

Another interesting spatial interference took place on the Kizilay underground station which served as the node transportation and commercial centre. In 2003, 70 large TV screens in the shopping area and 1600 small TV screens carriages of the trains were placed by the municipality (Isik, 2003 cited in Kocak, 2008). They were served as advertisements of the municipality' s works and commercials.



Figure 27 Kizilay metro station, TV screens

Source:<http://www.rayhaber.com/2018/07/kizilay-metro-istasyonundaki-sanat-duragina-ilgi-buyuk/>

Besides TV screens at Kizilay underground station, the square, Guvenpark and the monument have been occupied by advertisement billboards. These commercial based installations on the square created their spatiality and load new meanings to space. They are becoming tools to undermine and ignore the significance of the square. According to Teber (2004) the hegemonic forces, which consider the urban dwellers as consumer and customer mass, occupy and destroy



the public space through media, television and communication technologies. Moreover they transform public space into a platform where the municipality and the related ideology' s propaganda is made. More precisely, with TV screens where 7/24 show the municipality' s services, the square began to be used as an ideological tool of municipality.



Figure 28 Billboards between the Kizilay Shopping Mall and the Guven Monument

Source: <http://wowturkey.com/forum/viewtopic.php?p=1821279>

After 2010, the projects of the municipality became stranger which no one understands the true intentions of them. Very significant examples including the Gorilla and Dinosaur Models were placed at Guvenpark temporarily. At first, on 20th of April right three days before April 23 National Sovereignty and Children's Day national holiday giant Gorilla Sculpture was placed there. These kinds of holidays have been significant for the notion of the nation-state and the national identity. Several activities, events are held for children on this day. However, right next to the Guven Monument that symbolises the secular nationalist ideology to locate this meaningless giant Gorilla Sculpture with the emblem of the city of Ankara didn' t make any sense.



Figure 29 Gorilla Sculpture at Guvenpark on 20th April, 2010

Source: <https://galeri.uludagsozluk.com/r/lat-menat-ve-uzza-vs-goril-transformers-ve-dinozor-760435/>

Following it, the Dinosaur Sculpture was located just in front of the Guven Monument on the invisible axis. The public space once symbolises the secular nationalist ideology, is destructed through undermining the significance of it and showing that anything either related to the identity of space or not can be installed here. These strange sculptures do not reflect the identity of the park. Or else they do not offer a new socialisation to space. According to Batuman (2002) with these kinds of spatial interferences, the symbolic spaces of the Republican Era were deliberately undermined in order to weaken its impact on society. Only this way, collective memory can be destructed.



Figure 30 Dinosaur Sculpture in Guvenpark in June, 2012

Source: Muge Akkar Ercan' s archieve cited in Sarikulak, 2013

In 2011, the municipality had another project which proposes the renewing the facades of every building that surround the Kizilay Square. According to this project, the original facades of buildings would be replaced with Seljuk style facades. Actually, this project came into municipality's agenda in 2010, and since then municipal authorities and the owners of buildings have met several times to agree on what kind of changes would do for an aesthetic appearance front facades of the buildings. In the very beginning, it was intended to get rid of advertisement billboards on the building that created visual pollution. However, right before the elections Prime Minister promised this project and took attention to the historical background of Ankara which had connections to Seljuks. The mayor received the order and prepared this project. Ankara has been housing to several cultures. According to Yavuz (2001) in Ankara there are twelve artefacts from Seljuks, seventeen artefacts from the Roman Empire, and seven artefacts from Byzantium Empire. However, there are more than 100 artefacts from the Early Republican Era. In other words, the inheritance of Seljuk–Ottoman is not significant in Ankara. This fact was one of the most significant reasons behind it was chosen as the new capital city of the Turkish Republic. Ankara never means being the inheritor of Seljuk or Ottoman. However, with this project, Seljuk and directly Islamic identity were intended to be visible around the square. More precisely, this project represents how Islamic ideology relates to space in modern time. In order to build the Muslim identity, the representative elements of this identity are constructed through mimicry. Rather than creating a new architectural style or urban planning, imitate the historical artefacts is discursive of Islamic ideology. However, with the objections of the Chamber of Architects project was cancelled because of legal issues and excessive budget of it.



Figure 31 The Visual Representation of Municipality' s Project

Source: [http://www.spo.org.tr/genel/bizden\\_detay.php?kod=2917](http://www.spo.org.tr/genel/bizden_detay.php?kod=2917)

The same year, the mayor decided to change the symbol of the city second time. This time it was proposed Angora cat which is also known as Turkish Angora, as being the symbol of Ankara. Angora cat is a unique species to Ankara. However, as a capital city to be represented by a cat is quite unusual. To emphasising a local species on the symbols of cities might be acceptable for an ordinary city, yet to design a cat as an emblem for a representative capital city caused conflicts and interpreted as the destruction of city' s identity.



Figure 32 The Smiling Cat as Emblem of Ankara in 2011

Source: <http://www.farketmez.net/ankara-belediyesine-yeni-logo>

In 2013, as a result of spatial policies of government, Gezi Park

protests began and spread all over the country, out of 81 cities, protests were held at 80 cities. The citizens of Ankara also didn't remain insensitive ongoing protests, and in several significant places of Ankara, protests were held and Kizilay Square also one of those places. Kizilay Square had gained its political characteristic around in the 1950s. However, after the 1980s with the military intervention its political characteristic degenerated (Batuman, 2002). From 31st of May till June 19th Kizilay Square had been housing the most inspiring movement of Turkey, although the Square had been banned any political protests for a long time, with Gezi Movement it was occupied several times by protesters and clashes between police and protesters took place there. Thus, Kizilay Square after for a long time gained its political characteristic again while closed off any traffic flow. During the protests, it was only open to protesters and the police.



Figure 33 Kizilay Square from GMK to Ziya Gokalp Street in 2013

Source: <http://haberciniz.biz/kizilay-meydaninda-gezi-parki-eylemcilerine-mudahale-2089300h.htm>

Gezi Park protests have been discussed from so many perspectives by scholars. However, in this dissertation the major topic is not Gezi Park, yet it changed the historical meaning and narration of both Kizilay and Taksim Square which are the focus of this dissertation, I will give a brief discussion about Gezi Movement in Kizilay Square. Moreover how Gezi Movement relates with the national identity building at pro-Islamic ideology will be explored. In this process Kizilay transformed into the political arena where



conflict and struggle between pro-secular and pro-Islamic identity became visible. Thus, it is necessary to consider the ideological and cultural conflicts behind this movement. According to Abbas (2013) Gezi Movement in larger scale related with the ongoing conflicts and struggles among different layers of society and government. He (2013: 19) states that “political disenfranchisement intersected with society’ s aspirations with regard to dichotomies between conservatism and secularism, localisation and globalisation, and nationalism and majoritarianism.” Kizilay Square had been the arena of the Islamic ideology and politics since 1990s, with this movement square turned into a place where people criticised this ideology loudly. Abbas (2013: 23–24) argues that “in many ways what was being witnessed in Turkey was the configuration of a post-secular and a post-Islamist identity politics…the majoritarian conservatism of the AK Party is a way in which to reconfigure the memory of the Turkish nationalist project through the projection of a neo-Ottomanist, pro-Islamic and pro-democracy future, but through the lens of a glorious past.” Moreover, in his seminal book Mardin (1989, cited in Atay, 2013: 39) so many years before it happened states that “one cannot flatly deny the probability that there will arise two nations in Turkey, one secular, the other Islamic. The possibility of a violent confrontation between these two clusters seems distant but might become realistic in the future.” The confrontation between pro-secular and pro-Islamist took place on Kizilay Square where both ideologies tried to build their desired national identity.



Figure 34 Kizilay Square from Guven Monument to Kizilay Shopping

Mall (left)/ Kizilay Square from Kizilay Shopping Mall to Ataturk Boulevard (right)

Source: <https://www.sondakika.com/haber/haber-kizilay-da-taksim-gezi-parki-protestosu-4714493/>

According to surveys while only 10% of the protesters supported Gezi Movement because of environmental issues, 90 % of them stated their reason as authoritarian discourse and attitude of Prime Minister and also 85 % of them acknowledged that there is an increase in interference of people' s lifestyle (Atay, 2013). The new rules and regulations which mostly religious inspired and authoritarian caused frustrations among pro-secularist and they felt their lifestyle was threatened. Prime Minister's discourses and speeches over sensitive issues made them more frustrated and annoyed. His popular exclamations which protesters carried on their slogans, banners, and street writings were: "at Republican Era citizens were encourage to consume alcohol. Beer, raki (traditional Turkish drink) was promoted as a national drink by state, however, our national drink is yoghurt drink (ayran)." , "we do not want a drunk youth," and "go, drink at your home, not outside!" . He told them after announcing new regulations on alcohol consumption at public spaces. According to this regulation sale or serving of alcoholic drinks between 22:00 and 06:00 was prohibited. It was considered as an attempt to Islamisation of public life and restricting people' s freedom. The drink has been a significant component of the secular culture of the Republic. While Republican balls, celebrations drink was always part of it. Ataturk is known to be fond of raki. According to Zubaida (2013) Prime Minister finally found a proper ground to criticise freely Early Republican Era and applied his Islam inspired regulations after a decade of electoral success, governing as a single party, the army not a threat anymore. Prime Minister defended himself as "We do not ban alcohol. We are taking measures in order to protect our citizens and let them raise healthy children. Opponents can blame us, yet this does not prove that we are not right. In time citizens even opponents will appreciate us. Constitutional amendment package includes alcohol regulations.

We have to do it. The law which was prepared by two alcoholics has been valid so far, so why not a law that religious orders would be accepted?” Pro-secularist argued that Prime Minister referred to Atatürk with his alcoholic reference and the law that he made prepared. Erdi (2015) argues that “the restriction of alcohol consumption in some public spaces highlight not only a symbolic transformation but also a breakdown of spatial practices in a conservative manner under the rule of AKP” . Related to alcohol prohibition Zubaida (2013) states that “a central issue for the Gezi Park and Taksim protesters is that of the unrestrained building and development boom in Istanbul, razing old neighbourhoods for gated housing and shopping malls. The beneficiaries are cronies of the AKP, given access to public land and development permits. Private developments and shopping malls privatise public space and public assets. Like restricting and hiding alcohol and its associated sociability, this is part of the process of controlling, restricting and moralising public space. Erdogan responded to protesters by telling them to drink at home.” Moreover, in his article Atay (2013) argues that government is not anymore leader of civil-plural democracy but an architect in the construction of a new identity and culture in Turkey accordingly to Islamic ideology.



Figure 35 Street writings and banner related with Prime Minister' s exclamations about Atatürk



Figure 36 Alcohol was prohibited, nation gets sober/Yoghurt drink



junkie/The last beer wouldn' t be banned.

This street writings related with the prohibition alcohol consumption in public space, and Prime Minister' s speech about the alcohol.



Figure 37 Neither revolution nor shariah only respect

Source: <https://listelist.com/gezi-parki-direnisini-anlatan-83-duvar-yazisi/>

Gezi Movement also had an impact on the relations between Turkey and the Western countries regarding Turkey's European Union membership. In the very first decade of the AKP, the founder of the party Recep Tayyip Erdogan, different from other pro-Islamic parties since then, made an impression democratic, pro-western, and capitalist. However, in time his party began to lose its characteristics of being pro-western, democratic. Several chances to become closer to the EU but they could not be used effectively. For example, while Arab Spring, foreign policies of Turkey could not be effective and dialogue with Europe could not be appropriately achieved (Yorulmazlar & Turhan, 2015). This made AKP, and PM Erdogan turn his face to the Middle East. Pro-western discourses with AKP were replaced with anti-Western discourses. The attitude of PM Erdogan during Gezi Movement ruined this damaged relations. He was blamed to be Orientalist, traditional, and Islamic. Muslim identity became more visible among the government elites in this process. Moreover, Western countries criticised the excessive use of force by police during the movement. The EU enlargement commissioner said that

"peaceful demonstrations constitute a legitimate way for groups to express their views in a democratic society. Excessive use of force by police against these demonstrations has no place in such a democracy" (Morris, 2013). PM Erdogan (2013) blamed EU being the hypocrite and added that "similar protests have taken place in Britain, France, Germany and bigger ones in Greece" , that countries also used the police force in order to deal with it. However, EU has been kept using several illogical arguments to prevent Turkey' s EU membership. Turkey faced "unjust obstructions" (Morris, 2013). During the Gezi Movement, he visited some countries that Arab Spring took place. His trip provoked opponents more. However, his supporters welcomed and cheered him, when he landed to Ataturk International Airport. With this support, PM Erdogan threatened the protesters and told them to be careful, 50% of the population – referring to the religious–conservative majority according to the election results– was just waiting for his orders to go out the streets and deal with them.

Following the Gezi Movement, Guvenpark closed to the public for security reasons and occupied by police forces. To interfere in any potential political protests or meetings immediately, a group of police permanently began to stay in Guvenpark. They also surrounded a significant part of the Park with barricades which disturb the transition. According to Sahin (2018) because of the security issues and terrorist attacks, police spots became permanent, and the physical disturbance of them cut the relations between Kizilay Square and Guvenpark. In her study within the context of survey analyses, Yilmaz (2016) asked sixty people that "what Guvenpark reminds you?" and the majority told them "police park" . Until 2014, it was not allowed people to enter the park.

The pedestrian alley from Guvenpark to Parliament designed as a keystone in Jansen' s plan, expected to be walked by citizens who are at peace with the state, has been closed to the public. This significant open space, which is the spatial representation of the

Republic, can no longer be perceived in a sense it was designed. The present municipality administration harmed the collective memory of Early Republican Era through the implementations of public space accordingly to its ideological stance. Thus, while the square and the park directly became the subject of political conflicts; traditional mentalities, religious–cult norms, and the subcultures belonging to them spread all over the city (Teber, 2004).



Figure 38 The part of Guvenpark occupied by police forces

Source: <https://medium.com/comd434/bir-güven-hikayesi-güvenpark-dosyası-a9995f776bc8>

Probably the most effective incident happened at Guvenpark was the terrorist attack in 2016 that thirty seven people died and more than three hundred forty nine people injured severely (CNN, 2017). After this incident, people were so scared to even pass from this park. Moreover, for many people, park turned into a place which began to remind only their loss and suffering. The park of which was named after “trust and security” became a place where people do not feel secure anymore although police occupy the significant part of the park permanently and take measurements for any possible attack.



Figure 39 Guvenpark, the exact spot where the terrorist attack occurred

Source: Google Earth, 2018




Figure 40 Some Photos after Explosion

Source: <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/guvenpark-saldirisi-iddianamesi-kabul-edildi>

A Strange Tulip Monument on Kizilay Square was placed. Tulip has been the representative flower of Ottoman Empire. In the history of Empire, as a symbol, tulip had always been prominent. In traditional artefacts of Empire such as miniature, Ebru, tile, literature; tulip is the most common symbol. The reason behind the chosen tulip as a representative flower at the Ottoman Empire was highly related to Islamic concerns. According to Atay (1997), the letters of the tulip in Arabic includes all letters of “Allah” (God in Arabic) also, and according to “ebced” calculations they refer to same numbers. Moreover, if tulip is read backwards, it means “crescent” which

was the symbol of the Ottoman Empire (ibid). Because of all these Islam related concerns, the Ottoman Empire gave importance to tulip.



Figure 41 The Tulip Figure in Miniature, Ebru, and Tile in Ottoman Empire (in return)

Sources: <https://zdergisi.istanbul/makale/levni-ve-imzasi-35>

<https://www.pinterest.ca/pin/534591418242093389/>

<http://www.eryamansanat.com/mod/lightboxgallery/view.php?id=50>

However, Ankara is neither a place where tulip grows nor any special history tulip takes place importance. Moreover, it is not either an aesthetic monument which makes environment beautiful or practical, on the contrary, it only disturbs drivers and has the potential to cause an accident. Then, the intention of the mayor arouses curiosity, and it becomes necessary to ask what possible reason could be behind the erection of this monument on Kizilay Square. Of course, there are different motives behind this reconstructing of the symbolic urban square, yet the most significant one is the ideological inclinations like Knox and Pinch argued. According to them “powerful symbols and motifs from earlier periods are often borrowed in order to legitimise a new social order. For example, the reason behind Mussolini’ s effort for copying the symbols of Augustan Rome in Italy is to legitimise Fascist urban reorganisation.” (Knox&Pinch, 2010: 203). Finally, it is a huge success to erect the Tulip Monument which is the symbol of Ottoman and Islamic identity, on the very significant representative Square of



secular Turkish national identity.




Figure 42 Tulip Monument on Kizilay Square Daytime and Night-time

Source: Sahin, 2018 (left) and youtube.com (right)

After 36 years 1980 coup d' etat, in 2016, 15 of July Turkey witnessed another coup attempt when a section of Turkish military launched a coordinated operation in metropolitan cities to topple the government and unseat President Erdogan. The Turkish government blames Fethullah Gulen, the leader of a religious cult known as "Hizmet" (Service), which have media organisation, foundations, associations, and schools in Turkey and also abroad, for the failed coup attempt (Aljazeera, 2017). Gulen and his cult was a strong ally of President Erdogan once, and during this period several critical public positions were served to Gulen cults followers. However, their relationship began to be eroded by several incidents and finally in December 2013, within a corruption investigation AKP' s bureaucrats arrested by police officers who blamed to be Gulenist by the government. Thus, the cold war which was going on for some time between the government and Gulen cult replaced with concrete incidents that parties attacked each other. President Erdogan claimed that Gulen cult is behind all these arrests and blamed Gulen cult for forming a state within a state which is called "the parallel state structure" by the government. During conflicts between the government and Gulen cult ongoing, both sides tried to eradicate the other and the supporters from Turkish political life.

Finally, on 15 July 2016, the significant move from Gulen cult

came through as coup attempt yet it didn' t succeed. President Erdogan asked people to rally in public with this exclamation: “I urge the Turkish people to convene at public squares and airports… there is no power higher than the power of the people.. will swiftly respond to this attack” (Guardian, 2016). Following his call, hundreds of thousand unarmed people gathered in the streets and squares, in order to stop military intervention. During the ongoing clashes between the army and the ordinary people two hundred forty one people were killed, and almost two thousand two hundred were injured (Malsin, 2016).



Figure 43 The clashes between army and citizens at Kizilay Square on 15<sup>th</sup> of July 2016

Source: <http://www.enpolitik.com/haber/129063/ankaraya-demokrasi-meydani.html>

In Ankara, people gathered around Kizilay Square in order to support President Erdogan and fight against the army. The next couple of days the coup treat was over, yet almost two weeks people kept watch at Kizilay Square under the name of “democracy watch” in case of any potential army attack. Member of parliaments from AKP and Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Melih Gokcek also participated “democracy watch” in order to prove their loyalty to President Erdogan and united against the Gulen cult.



Figure 44 Democracy Watch at Kizilay Square

Source: <https://www.haberler.com/ankara-daki-milli-birlik-yuruyusu-basladi-9836903-haberi/>

In Turkey, besides Gulen cult, there are many other cults. Although Early Republican Era, they were considered as an obstacle in front of modern, secular, western identity and they were banned in 1925. Ataturk intentionally tried to prevent them from being powerful at the political arena. It was the part of the modernity project, and it is necessary to consider this incident in the context of nation-state building. However, AKP' s close relations with cults made them have power in the political arena of Turkey, and they became having a strong impact on their followers during elections. After the coup attempt, other cults' followers also participated in "democracy watch" , in order to show their loyalty to President Erdogan. However, they didn' t join this gathering like ordinary citizens, but they were in Islamic gown which was also prohibited from wearing at public spaces in 1925, in order to avoid any potential statue difference in public space. They circled a religious leader who conducted that special pray. "Democracy watch" and religious prayers were considered as the symbol of the Turkish nation' s unity and solidarity.





Figure 45 Sectarians were praising at Kizilay Square during the "democracy watch" that began with Erdogan's call after the July 15 coup attempt

Source:<http://sendika62.org/2016/09/sarayin-sorusu-elimizde-bol-bol-cemaat-ve-tarikat-var-bunlari-ne-yapalim-376382/>

After this tragic incident including Kizilay Square many symbolic places' names changed for creating commemorative places to remember the death of civilians. On 26 July 2016, Kizilay Square was dully rechristened as 15 July Kizilay Democracy Square which was later amended as for July 15th Kizilay Nation Will Square on 9 August 2016. With this name change, this incident was introduced into the everyday consciousness of the society and made them have collective memory related it. The one which dominates the other ideologies have the power to change place names in order to reproduce its power and also change the collective memory. Bardakci (2015) states that renaming practices which turn into the competition among different ideologies for engraving their names in history, have been occurred almost for the last century. He argues that if it is a way to take revenge on history, it is not only unnecessary but also inappropriate. Although in Republican history, places names have been changed because of security reasons, physical expansion of cities, ancestral ties, cultural proximity, political reasons, population of cities and land use changes (Aliagaoglu and Uzun, 2011), renaming

Kizilay Square is considered as the clashes of modern vs traditional, and religious vs secular. Chamber of Architects and Chamber of City Planners criticised this renaming and accused the municipality to demolished the identity of Kizilay Square. Chamber of City Planners (2017) argued that “as a symbolic square of Republican ideology, ‘banned’ Kizilay Square was addressed as the gathering area for the “democracy watch” by President Erdogan and declared name changing is not a basic and simple renaming issue but ideological stance. This name change can only be explained through government is comparing this resistance for coup attempt with Independence War and Battle of Gallipoli which were the outcomes of Anatolian people fight against the imperialism. However, this attitude is just only undermining the significance of the Independence War. While resisting the 15 July coup attempt, lots of civilian people unfortunately died, and for their memorial, obviously, some arrangements should be made. However, changing the symbolic names which are well accepted among every segment of society will only create new arguments and new polarisation in society by separating people. In fact, this renaming of Kizilay Square has dealt a blow to its spatial identity.” Chamber of City Planners brought to trial this name change, yet still, it is on the court.

While ongoing conflicts and contrasts related with the name change, following year government announced official commemoration program for 15 July and since then like a national day 15 July has been commemorated. In the 1990s with the leadership of Welfare Party, so many religious and Ottoman history related days like the Conquest of Istanbul or Holy Birth Week of Prophet Muhammed became to be commemorated at public spaces as an alternative to Republican commemorative days like Republic Day on 29th October, Victory Day on 30th August. According to Cinar (2001), this is nothing but the effort of building Ottoman–Islamic identity in order to replace it with secular nationalist identity.



Figure 46 Commemoration of 15th July at Kizilay Square

Source: <https://www.haberturk.com/15-temmuz-da-ankara-da-toplu-tasima-araclari-ucretsiz-2055889>

This incident brought a new dimension to the use of public space. The practices take place on urban squares changed dramatically. The Islamic practices and elements dominated the square in this process. Instead of questioning cults and their power on the political arena, conservative nationalism was honoured. The Muslim identity with its practices dominated the square during the “democracy watch” .

Recently, the desire of building a mosque at the very centre of cities are becoming so popular among conservative religious municipalities. One of the most significant examples of it Taksim Square and the contradictive mosque project in it since the 1950s (next chapter, it will be explained detailed.). Similar to Taksim Square and the building of a mosque, Ankara Metropolitan Municipality began the discussions the building of a mosque in Guvenpark. Sargin (2004: 674) related to this issue argues that “the mosque is very popular among conservative bureaucrats and the local population for it is regarded as the most prestigious religious locale.” The Municipal authority proposed a mosque project on the place where Guven Monument locates. However, it is not realised yet. Tanyeli (2010: 10–11) argues that almost the only architectural

demand of Islamists corresponding to their ideology becomes concrete tragically at the architectural level by constructing countless mosques via associations of mosque construction. Therefore, it is not wrong to conclude that Islamists who are in the political arena do not consider the urban and architectural environment that is necessary for their demanding lifestyle.



Figure 47 Kizilay Square, Guvenpark from south to north  
Source: Google Earth, 2018

To build secular, modern, western identity, Kizilay Square with its surrounding area was designed through secular Turkish nationalism. Kizilay Square served on the one hand, as being social space where new bourgeoisie; on the other hand, as being conceived to represent the ideology of nation–state which needs a spatial organisation in the context of national identity building. However, the 1980s the rise of political Islam made Muslim identity visible on the public space. In order to build Muslim identity through public spaces, Islamic ideology destructs the symbolic spaces of Republican Era which were the representative of secular Turkish identity. As a symbolic locus of the nation–state, Kizilay Square also systematically has been destroyed by Islamic ideology and rebuilt accordingly Muslim identity.




Figure 48 Analytical Framework for Kizilay Square

## Chapter 5: Case Study: Taksim Republican Square

### 5.1. National Identity Building through Taksim Republican (Cumhuriyet) Square

#### 5.1.1. Taksim Republican Square as Symbolic Space of Republican Ideology (Early Republican Era, 1923–1950s)

During the Early Republican Era, the priority was given to Anatolian cities and their reconstruction, however, the planning issue of Istanbul was also considered carefully regarding national identity building. Compared to Anatolian cities, very little investment in Istanbul was made by the state. Yet to create the national identity through national spaces; a new city centre of Istanbul was constructed based on the ideology of Turkish nationalism. According to Bilsel (2007), certain historians argue that since it was the capital of Ottoman Empire and the representative city of Islamic identity and culture, Istanbul was deliberately disregarded and debarred from public investment by the newly established nation–state. But still, the effort of state on constructing Taksim Republican Square deserves to be discussed in the context of national identity building.

In the 19th century, Pera later would become to be known as Beyoglu, began to be the very significant centre of Istanbul. The urban fabric of Istanbul was similar to European counterparts had a city centre which consisted of social facilities, educational and commercial buildings, public buildings, company buildings, banks, and services. The infrastructure of this neighbourhood was also as developed as its European counterparts. In the different layers of history, some parts of Istanbul occasionally were a westernised because of the neighbourhoods with the high population of foreigners and non–Muslims. Beyoglu was one of those neighbours (Kuruyazici, 2014). In the 16th century, the embassies of some European



countries in Istanbul chose this very beautiful place that had nice scenery with a view of the Golden Horn and the Bosphorus for building their embassy buildings. During the 16th century, foreign diplomats mostly settled in Beyoglu district, and by the 19th century, it became a place where most of the population was non-Muslim bourgeoisie and foreigners. Here, it is necessary to remind that during the Ottoman time, Beyoglu as a non-Muslim district, reflected Western culture rather than Ottoman-Islamic culture regarding socio-spatial structure. However, as the backbone of Beyoglu, Istiklal (Independent) Street known as Grand Rue de Pera or Cadde-i Kebir had buildings which were peculiar to Islamic culture. (Kuruyazici, 2014). Thus, the modernised and westernised ideals of the newly established Republic still did not coincide the existing social structure of district because of its multi-ethnic and heterogeneous features.



Figure 49 Taksim Square

Source: Google Earth

This socio-spatial heritage was the most prominent political obstacle in the context of nation-building formation that newly established nation-state had to deal with. While state tried to homogenise the society under the national identity, and control over the society, on the one hand, Beyoglu with its “uncontrollable heterogeneity” became a threat to the Kemalist revolution and its

ideology of Turkish nationalism; on the other hand, in the cafes of district the communist ideas kept spreading (Criss, 1999 cited in Batuman, 2015). After all, it is not a surprise that state chose this place as the area where it represented its power, made it political focus, and more importantly made all ethnic groups recognise its power and embrace the national identity. Since once national identity was embarked by ethnic minorities, only then the treat would vanish.



Figure 50 Istiklal Street, Tramway in 1928  
Source: Tekin, 2005

Taksim Square, a 280-year-old square in Beyoglu, was named accordingly to Maksem (the reservoir for storing and distributing the city' s water) constructed by Sultan I. Mahmut was created in 1732–1733 in order to arrange the water of Galatia–Beyoglu district. As being the morphological centre and being the gate of Beyoglu as well, Taksim Square surrounded by cemeteries on one side, a large Bosphorus grove on the one hand and mulberry fields of Mecidiyekoy on the other. In the 19th century, Beyoglu district was still limited to Taksim. The area between Maksem and the water reservoir was vacant. However, with this water reservoir, it was created a natural threshold which limited this empty area from the Beyoglu–Tarlabaşı and began to be an edge for any potential square. At the beginning of the 19th century, Artillery Barracks was constructed on the northeast side of this vacant area. The street run from the Artillery Barracks to Harbiye, Kışla (Barracks) Street, would become Cumhuriyet (Republic) Street after established Turkish Republic,



connected other districts to Taksim. Yet, it wasn't a square in terms of modern urban planning practices, but a quite large meadow that included two large barracks and a hospital (Aslan, 2014). Perhaps, this was not an interesting issue for the city with the Ottoman–Islamic identity. Since the concept of square, as being centres of neighbourhoods in European cities, was an unfamiliar and new concept for the Ottoman–Islamic cities. Instead of a square, the mosque with its backyard was designed as the centres. Until the Turkish Republic established, a square in terms of modern urban planning did not occur.



Figure 51 The place where Taksim Square locates in mid–1800s and in 1922

Source: Isozen (1987),

<https://www.tarihtarih.com/?Syf=4&Fa=2&Id=231597>



Figure 52 Taksim Republican Square in the middle and Maksem on the left side

Source: <http://www.degisti.com/index.php/archives/5439>

Taksim Square on the junction of the axis from the north side of old centre to Istiklal Street was the outcome of the nation state' s effort for national identity building. The main concern of Taksim Square was to create a modern public sphere to transform the Ottoman Islamic identity of society into western, modern and secular identity. The Square was a simple open space in the beginning and obtained an urban square character only after Republican Monument was erected in 1928. The square with the monument was conceived to convey the intended message to the public that the ideology of Turkish nationalism aimed to legitimise and recognise the new national identity in the eyes of the public. In the early periods of the Republic, the Square not only undertook public functions of Sultanahmet and Beyazit Squares but also played the role of being the symbol of the new regime.




Figure 53 Taksim Square and its vicinity

Source: Kubat (2015: 3)

The three major reasons behind the selection of the Square as the public sphere where the national identity was built accordingly to the ideology of newly established nation-state are (1) since the Square was the most westernised and modernised part of Istanbul

(Oztas, 2010), newly established republic wanted to use it for spreading modernity across the country, (2) displaying the ideology of nationalism and putting across the national identity to the neighbourhood where non-Muslim bourgeoisie highly settled, (3) during Istanbul was occupied, the enemy forces used this area because of the fact that Artillery Barracks which made Taksim associated with military occupations. The erection of the monument became evident of liberation of Istanbul from the enemy's occupation. More specifically, the non-Muslim and multi-ethnic characteristics of Beyoglu district were controversial issues of the Republican regime. This district was considered more modernised and open to reforms; however, it was also seen as a threat to the nation-building project. Republican cadre solved this controversy through building a national identity at the very centre of it on the urban square. Thus, it became possible to legitimise the modernisation project in the eye of the public and eliminate this threat (Batuman, 2015). After this arrangement, the Square on the intersection of Istiklal Street in the context of national identity building became the modern axis of Beyoglu district and the old city.




Figure 54 Plans of Taksim Square and Gezi Park by Pervititch  
Source: <http://www.mimnap.org/?p=18577&page=3>

According to Batuman (2015), the placemaking history of Taksim Republican Square happened in two phases: (1) by creating the modern public sphere where modern lifestyle and national identity were introduced to society, (2) building the representational focus of nation–state and its symbolic elements. In the process of building this square, Kizilay Square was taken as the model.

In the first phase, the most significant attempt to create a representational focus for nation–state which happened by erecting the Taksim Republican Monument after physical arrangements on and around of square. To represent the nation state’ s ideology and building national identity accordingly this ideology in the Square, the theme was defined as the Turkish Independence War and the Foundation of Turkish Republic. Italian sculpture Pietro Canonica, who made the Ataturk Monuments in Ankara, was offered to make a monument with two main scenes representing the theme Turkish Independence War and the Foundation of Turkish Republic. The landscape plan was prepared considering the ceremonies to be held in front of the monument by Italian architect Guilio Monceri. Thus, after erecting the monument, many buildings in Taksim and Artillery Barracks were reconstructed along the curvilinear border to define the circular shape of the Square. The tramway which came from Istiklal Street and passed through Barracks and reached Republic (Cumhuriyet) Street circulated through this monument. Thus, the existing of the monument and its centrality were emphasised more. The monument and the Square were designed as the stage of ceremonies held for national holidays to nourish the national identity.






Figure 55 Parade of Nurses at Official Ceremony/ Parade of School Children at Official Ceremony

Source: <https://www.tarihtarih.com/?Syf=4&Fa=2&Id=231597>



Figure 56 Parade of Military Cadets at Official Ceremony

Source: <https://www.tarihtarih.com/?Syf=4&Fa=2&Id=231597>




Figure 57 Taksim Square, Parade at Official Ceremony

Source: Bilsel, (2010: 358)

After erecting the monument, the Square gained a socio–political meaning as being a ceremonial space where the national holidays and national–political events, Republican Days parade are held, and it began to be addressed with the name Taksim Republican Square. According to Kuruyazici (2014), the Taksim Republican Square has been a very significant focus of the social life from the beginning. However, when it began to host the Republican Day parades, national ceremonies and commemorations, protests and demonstrations, only then, it became the symbol of modernity, secularity, and democracy. The Republican Monument had characteristics of monumental space that refer to national unity. In that prospective, it was a “conceived space” as the spatial representation of the nation’ s power.

The monument was designed as four facade monument. On the front side, Ataturk within civilian dress, with other commanders that played a significant role of Independence War, soldiers, and public were symbolised the newly established Republic. On each of the two lateral facades, some soldiers hold Turkish flag, and on the one lateral facade there is a veiled woman’ s face living in captivity which symbolise the period before Republican Era, other side there is an unveiled smiling woman’ s face that symbolises the contemporary woman after establishing a nation–state. Like other monuments, the emancipation of secular image from religion emphasises with the two figures of veiled and unveiled women in this monument. On the back side, the Turkish War of Independence was represented, and Ataturk was depicted within his military garments. The images got discursive meaning through the monuments and they contributed to Ataturk becoming a cult, and his thoughts and ideas reaching the masses. With this monument, on the one hand, Independence War of Turkish was focused, the effort of Ataturk and his followers was appreciated, on the other hand newly established nation state’ s future aspiration, modern Turkish women were displaying in the stage of the representative public sphere where modern lifestyle was introduced to society. The first time through a figurative narration, Ataturk and the new regime were introduced to the society. Moreover, according

to Yaman (2011), not only republican ideals displayed at the very significant location of the old capital city but also perhaps the most crucial representation happened regarding the victory against the Ottoman past. The military force and the power of the newly established nation–state were visualised at the most cosmopolitan and central district of last capital city of Ottoman Empire through the construction of this monument. More precisely, different from Ankara, in Istanbul newly established nation–state tried to display its power at significant spaces of Ottoman Empire in order to transform Ottoman related spaces into Republican spaces, and also with its future–oriented aspirations to get the consent of citizens and legitimise its power in the eyes of the public.




Figure 58 Opening ceremony of the Taksim Republican Monument on 8th August 1928

Source: <http://eskiesvaplarim.com/taksim-meydani-1930lar/>



Figure 59 Taksim Republican Square in 1930s

Source: <http://eskiesvaplarim.com/taksim-meydani-1930lar/>

Following the erecting of the monument, the area called

Talimhane being zoned for development just opposite of the Barracks on the left of Cumhuriyet Street. With the construction of 5–6 storeyed apartments between the roads that intersect one another vertically, the present day Talimhane district was born. After a while, in front of these buildings, another building was constructed accordingly to matching with the curvilinear border to define the circular Square. While the first two floors of this building where shops and working places located were recessed, the third floor was protruding to create well-known Kristal Club (Kuruyazici, 2014). Finally, the Square not only took the form of a proper, well-defined square but became an open space which surrounded by buildings.



Figure 60 Taksim Republican Square and Kristal Casino in 1940s

Source: <https://www.istanbulium.net/2012/02/taksim-meydan-ve-cevresi.html>

The effort of Mayor Lutfi Kirdar and Henri Prost' s plan started to the second phase of placemaking for Taksim Republican Square. In this stage, Taksim Republican Square surrounded one of the most significant Ottoman Empire heritage, Artillery Barracks constructed for military purposes. Because of the socio-political incident at Ottoman time, this building was quite damaged. After that, it wasn' t used for the military purposes. In 1921, the yard of the Barracks transformed into a football stadium, and national matches began to be held there. However, in time the Barracks became more damaged, and with Prost' s plan, it decided to be demolished.






Figure 61 Taksim Republican Square and Artillery Barracks in 1930s and Demolition of Artillery Barracks in 1939

Source: <http://eskilerden.tumblr.com/post/54013323426/İtfti-kırdarın-belediye-başkanlığı-döneminde>



Figure 62 After destruction of Artillery Barracks' three facades (only the facade nearby Cumhuriyet Street remained)

Source: Istanbul Cultural and Natural Heritage Preservation Board Photograph Archive

This phase mostly shaped around, on the one hand, the demolition of Artillery Barracks and Talimhane; on the other hand, the construction of Taksim Municipality Casino and Inonu Promenade which later began to be called as Gezi Park. These three projects can't be evaluated without ideological stance. Taksim Municipality

Casino with its high standards as an alternative to Kristal Casino of which standards were considered as low, located on the spot of the Intercontinental Hotel today, was opened on 29 October 1939 at Republic Day. It served as the place where bourgeois and mostly tourists had western style food and entertainment. Moreover, balls, tea parties and many other activities which are considered as part of the modern lifestyle were held there.




Figure 63 Taksim Municipality Casino

Source: <http://baronvonplastik.blogspot.com/2015/02/>

Three years after opening the Taksim Municipality Casino, the construction of Gezi Park was completed on 30 August 1942 at Victory Day. Both Taksim Municipality Casino and Gezi Park were opened on very significant national days. This wasn't a coincidence but on purpose as the official ideology of the time. Following to the official parades at Taksim Square, Taksim Municipality Casino hosted balls. Gezi Park was completed the spatial narration of national identity building at Taksim Square. It was designed as the public sphere of nation-state where modern lifestyle is introduced to citizens accordingly to the secular nationalist ideology. After this, like Kizilay Square, Taksim Republican Square also have its square-park.

Gezi Park and Taksim Municipality Casino were together social space as components of Taksim Square and its urban practices. Taksim Square with the monument, park and the casino as the “conceived space” , indicated a spatial representation of modern identity and its spatial practices of leisurely activities.



Figure 64 Gezi Park in the 1940s

Source: <http://www.bilgiansiklopedisi.net/genel/kareler/taksim-gezi-parki-1944.html>




Figure 65 Gezi Park and Taksim Municipality Casino

Source: Bilsel (2010, pg. 358)

In this phase Taksim Republican Square had two functions: (1) being representative space of nation-state, (2) housing national



ceremonies and commemorations. Another function heaved into sight in this phase. Pro-state rallies made Taksim Republican Square transform a political arena (Batuman, 2015). As a part of the national identity building project, state-supported rallies for controlling over ethnic differences were used for dominating public space with nationalist elements. Regarding identity issue, Wagon-Lits incidence started one of the biggest demonstrations. The company's non-Turkish working policy got the reaction from the students, a massive demonstration began at the Square and continued with the attack of students to the company building (Unal, 2002).



Figure 66 Wagon Lits Incident in 1933

Source: <http://eskilerden.tumblr.com/post/54013323426/lıtfi-kırdarın-belediye-başkanlığı-döneminde>

Batuman (2015) argues that these nationalist political demonstrations had ideological bases in the context of national identity building. Having nationalist ceremonies, nationalist political demonstration at the ethnically divided neighbour through dominated over public sphere was the reflection of the desire to control over differences which became the most significant obstacle preventing the state from creating a homogeneous nation in terms of identity. Different from Kizilay Square, from the beginning Taksim Square has

its own political discourse regarding national identity building. After all, the square had a meaning of three components. One is being the representative elements of the nation–state, second is being the modern public sphere, and third is being the political stage. These three components of meaning nourished the national identity building project of state.

To sum up, although the Square is a 280–year–old square, only with the establishment of the new nation–state it gained a new identity through reconstruction within the framework of a new modern urban planning principle. Besides, its socio–spatial transformation many of buildings which define the square have undergone major changes and many have been destroyed over the years according to dominant ideologies, and created explicit or implicit impact on the meaning, function, and form of the square. Behind all these physical interventions of ideologies on the square, the main aim was to build their desired nation and national identity. More precisely, the Republican cadre desired to visible in the imperial capital of Istanbul. Thus, it was planned to construct an urban square with a monument that would convey the ideology of the nation–state.

### **5.1.2. Taksim Square as Banned Public Space (1980–1990s)**

In time, Taksim Square became a symbolic space for grassroots movements. In the very heart of the city of Istanbul, Taksim Square serves as the stage on which ideologies become visible and legitimate in the public eye. The official purpose behind the construction of Taksim Square has gained another meaning; being the arena of power struggles. The struggle over the square occurred in different modes. Distinct ideologies have tried to dominate the square through temporary events like demonstrations, protests rallies, and permanent–temporary physical changes. Different representations and identification which attempt to change the character of the square have tried to be controlled. At the end of the 1960s and 1970s,

Taksim Square hosted several violent fights among leftist and rightist demonstrators, or students and police which ended with several death and injured. Especially with the incident of 1969 when leftist students organised an anti-imperialist rally which is also known as Mustafa Kemal rally to protest against the visit of the Sixth American Fleet to Turkey. When they arrived at Taksim Square, police were already there, and rightist was ready to support the police against the leftist. After clashes, two protesters died, and hundreds were severely injured. According to Baykal (2000), this incident would be interpreted as the very first conflict between seculars and Islamist. After eight years from this incident, in 1977 on Labour Day, people including leftist political organisations, students, workers were at Taksim Square for Labour Day. This time after clashes, thirty-three people dies, hundreds were injured. After these incidents since Taksim Square became associated with ideological struggles, it was closed to any protests or demonstrations. Even after the Square closed to any demonstrations or protest rallies, it has remained as a symbolic space and political arena where those can gain or lose the victory in the subconscious of ideologies.



Figure 67 Taksim Square in 1986

Source: Istanbul Encyclopedia, 1994 (cited in Yalcin, 2011)

In 1980, coup d' etat occurred. Similar to Kizilay Square, Taksim

Square also got impacted profoundly from this military coup. As I mentioned before, although the square was closed to any protest rallies and demonstrations during the 1980s, it was recalled as a resistance area in the political history of Turkey. Most of the projects couldn't be executed this period because of the political climate, yet the most significant physical changes in Taksim occurred via the Mayor Bedrettin Dalan who was famous with the destruction of the historical pattern of Istanbul. He also involved the demolition of so many historical buildings in Tarlabasi in order to build Tarlabasi Boulevard just next to Taksim Square in 1986 (Keyder, 1996). Kristal Casino was also destructed in the same year. Moreover, at the end of the 1980s, beginning 1990, Istiklal Street attempted to be pedestrianised (Erbey, 2017). These two projects, the opening of Tarlabasi Boulevard and the pedestrianisation efforts of Istiklal Street, damaged the whole area regarding perspective and scale. Thus, the damage in the vicinity of Republican Monument had the impact on the perception of the square. It turned into an undefined, empty place rather than a representative focus of nation-state or political arena of grassroots movements (Erbey, 2017).



Figure 68 Taksim Square and AKM in 1986.

(The monument still was there, yet it lost its perspective. Ataturk Cultural Centre (AKM) is on the left.)

Source: Guler soy, 1986

A comprehensive discussion of the relations between the ideological initiatives related to economic model and their reflections on the urban context is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, to give a better understanding to the circumstances of the country and their impact on Taksim Square, it is necessary to remind that during mid-1980s Istanbul became the subject of global city discussions, as a part of a marketing efforts. According to Bartu (1999:32), Istanbul was marketed as “the East in the West and the West in the East” and “gateway to the Orient” . In this representation, the multi-layered past of Istanbul regarding its history, culture and identity was not considered. However, it is a significant ideological struggle how these layers of these kinds of cities are represented in the space. Therefore, Taksim Square became the focus of different ideologies about how different cultural heritages, identities, and past would be referred. After the 1980s, debates related to Taksim Square mostly shaped around contested ideologies and their power struggle among building the national identity.

### **5.1.3. Taksim Square under the Pro-Islamist Administration (1990–2000s)**

The most significant change in the political climate of the Turkish Republic was the success of the Welfare Party at local and general elections in this period. Especially, the success of the Welfare Party taking the seats of Beyoglu District and Istanbul Metropolitan City was considered as a historical moment. In the definition of Turkish national identity Istanbul has a significant place in both secular nationalist ideology and Islamist nationalist ideology. Therefore, secularists believed that Istanbul under the rule of the pro-Islamist party would become the representative of Islamic identity and Turkish national identity which is defined as secular, modern and western would be damaged through the Islamic visibility in public sphere. According to Bartu (1999), the debates on local elections in 1994 shaped the identity issue. Recep Tayyip Erdogan (the present–



day president) was elected as the mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan City in 1994. Mayor Erdogan from pro-Islamic party covenanted to resurrect the Ottoman-Islamic identity to the city of Istanbul and right after elections, in order to keep his promise, he developed urban design projects for cultural heritage sites (Baykal, 2005). According to Bora (1999), Islamic ideology has two symbolic approaches for the city of Istanbul: one is to construct Ottoman-Islamic hegemony over the space and second is to symbolise Islamic justice and pluralism. Bartu (1999) argues that with this result, according to secularist Istanbul wouldn't be Istanbul that they know anymore, and Beyoglu would be the public space where transformation was most evident than anywhere else. Under the rule of Islamists Istanbul became the representative of Ottoman-Islamic civilisation and contrary to Ankara, Istanbul was highlighted as the centre of "real" Turkish nation. Istanbul is open not only to the local but also to the global audiences. Thus, any ideological display in Istanbul would be more effective than it would be in any other city. Cinar (2005) states these phenomena as building and displaying of national identities in global locations rather than local will help them to be visible and gain legitimacy and recognition because of the global gaze. Welfare Party contrary to other parties did not embrace the global city project but focused on the Ottoman identity with the slogan "conquest of the city the second time" concerning "real owners of the city". Moreover, Bora (1999) argues that the global city project and Welfare Party's political rhetoric conflicted and they built their alternative version of the global city. Thus, the municipal authority began to reconstruct the city of Istanbul as cultural capital or alternative version of the global city.

Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the socio-spatial transformation of Taksim Square in the context of building cultural capital city project of Islamist nationalist ideology. According to Bartu (1999), the struggle over Beyoglu reflected mostly the conflict of identity between who we are and who we were. In this respect what Welfare Party did was to transform Taksim into the object of Islamic

and Ottoman nostalgia to show that Turkish people were Ottoman once. In this process, the Municipal authority began to emphasise that the identity of Istanbul should reflect its Islamic features. To highlight its Islamic identity, the idea of building a mosque at Taksim Square again came into their agenda (Bora, 1999). Erdogan as the mayor of Istanbul said “this is the point of attraction of Istanbul’ s tourism. The person who comes there should be able to tell that he has arrived in an Islamic city...As we succeed in uncovering the historical and cultural texture of our city, its Muslim character will become apparent to the visitors” (Tayyip Erdogan, Yeni Zemin March 1994 cited in Bora, 1999: 49). In order to give a better understanding, it is necessary to remind the circumstances of 1990s Taksim Square and its surrounding environment. Taksim Square as being the locus of secular nationalist ideology with its monument and structures were the significant nationalist urban landscape where official ideology was displayed. On the heart of it, Republican Monument as the symbol of national identity was there. Moreover, Ataturk Cultural Centre (Ataturk Kultur Merkezi, AKM) as a significant structure including concert–exhibition halls, theatres where modern art exhibition or cultural events such as opera, ballet, symphony orchestra were held. According to Cinar (2005: 113) “AKM stands as a monument of official Turkish modernity that recognises and adopts the standards of European high culture as the universal norm of civilisation.” Thus, secularists had a great deal of sensitive towards the square and its spatial organisation. However, as much as secularist’ s sensitivity, Islamists also highly attached to the built environment of the square. As an Islamic element to build a mosque which came to their agenda around the 1950s was insisted this period also.

The ideological struggle between secularists and Islamists over the building mosque at Taksim Square dates back to 1950s. Throughout the last six decades, the idea of building a mosque at Taksim Square had found supporters although secularists within the state and civil society strongly were opponent to the project. Both supporters and opponents of this project have their reasons.

Opponents of this project argued that since Taksim Square is a significant Republican landmark and the representative of modern, secular, and western identity; any related religious element would be inappropriate here. More precisely, this project is a deliberate way of challenging to national identity which is defined as modern, secular and western. However, supporters of this project argue that “true” identity of the city of Istanbul is embedded in the Ottoman–Islamic heritage and in order to make visible this identity, it is significant to construct the mosque in the very heart of Istanbul. According to Baykal (2005) rather than practical reasons, the debate over the mosque project has always been the “political–symbolic” implications.

This period, the mosque project agenda of the municipality began again. Three months after Mayor Erdogan came to power in 1994, city council proposed a project of building mosque in Taksim Square. On the one hand Islamists promoted this project as one of the largest and tallest mosque in the Middle East, on the other hand secular media had a strict campaign against the project, asserting it as “unfeasible,” “ideologically motivated,” “destructive to the environment,” “aesthetically repulsive,” and “damaging for tourism” (Cinar, 2005). However, the Cultural and Natural Heritage Conservation Board insisted on the archaeological excavation for any evaluation. After archaeological excavation, it was discovered that there were not only the remains of 18th–century water channels but also traces of late Byzantine and Ottoman periods. Therefore, the board decided that an evaluation could not be made according to the conditions of temporary restructuring and a plan should prepare with a holistic approach in the urban design scale for Taksim Square. Therefore, any possibility of building a mosque behind the Maksem was gone entirely. However, following the previous attempts to construct a mosque at Taksim Square, city council came with a new project proposal. According to this new project, the mosque as an Islamic Cultural Centre was planned to construct at Gezi Park which is just nearby the Taksim Square. Because of the elevation difference,

Gezi Park overlooks the square and the monument. This location of Gezi Park was considered as a chance for dominating the square by Islamists.

The leader of Welfare Party Necmettin Erbakan in a meeting with Welfare Party's mayors told that: "people demand a mosque at Taksim Square. We won't construct it at the periphery of the square but right in the Gezi Park" (cited in Baykal, 2000). However, the Chamber of Architects objected mosque project. They argued that the square and the park are the symbols of Republic and they interpreted this project as an antagonistic approach of Islamists towards the Republican heritage and identity. According to White (2000), the square which was surrounded by Republican elements like Ataturk Cultural Centre housing the display of western modern art such as opera, ballet; yet building a mosque in Taksim Square would be a deliberate insult to this spatial narration of secular nationalist ideology. Cinar (2005: 117) argues that "the controversy over the Taksim Mosque project was over Turkey's national identity. What was at stake in this dispute between secularists and Islamists was whether or not Turkish national identity would incorporate and use Islam as a self-defining mark. The adamant secularist reaction against the project reflected the reluctance of secularists against granting Islam a visible presence in the Turkish national identity. On the other hand, the aggressive promotion of the project by Islamist circles reflected a desire to insert Islam into national space both the nationalised space in Taksim Square and the conceptual space of the nation wherein the national identity was formulated. Therefore, the Taksim Mosque became an attempt to inscribe Islam upon secular-national space, and emerged as the articulation of the Islamist version of nationhood as part of an alternative nationalist ideology that designated the national space of Taksim Square as the appropriate place to establish itself as a contending nationalist project."

In this process, Gezi Park became the public space where Islamic

identity, elements and traditions are visible in the eyes of the public. It was also a way of legitimising the Islamic ideology. Because of the location of park, it seemed to be a better option for displaying ideological content of Islam since the Square is dominated with the secular element of monument. Mayor Erdogan told that at the cultural centre which would be built in Gezi Park there would be seminars related with Islam and Islamic life, conferences which Muslim countries were welcomed and Islamic arts would be performed. During the waiting period of building the mosque, Gezi Park hosted several Islamic events, cultural programs, and various activities. Every Ramadan, Beyoglu Municipality sets up iftar tents in Gezi Park and also many activities like concerts, exhibitions were held. Following these arguments, on 29th May 1996 at Taksim Square, the Conquest of Istanbul Day was played and further events to celebrate this Ottoman–Islamic related historical day were held through the organisations of city administration of Istanbul and National Youth Foundation which is an Islamist NGO (Non–Governmental Organisation). That day, in a theatrical way, the conquest day was played at Taksim Square by a group of men who dressed in Ottoman military clothing.




Figure 69 29th of May, 1996, celebration of Conquest of Istanbul Day at Taksim Square

Source: Cinar (2001: 374)

One of the most important tactics of political Islam for dominating public space and making Muslim identity visible is to arrange Islamic ideology related gatherings, meetings, commemorative programs, events etc. at Republican spaces as an alternative to Republican

national holidays. Sargin (2003) argues that celebrations, festivities and events for remembering religious days or historical Ottoman days which traditional garments become prominent, became part of radical remembrance of political Islam. Islamist ideology celebrates an alternative history based on the Ottoman–Islamic identity which secular nationalist ideology tried to cut any ties with. Cinar (2001: 365, 379) puts it as “these Islamist performances of history serve to construct an alternative national identity which is Ottoman and Islamic, evoking a civilization centred in the city of Istanbul, as opposed to the secular, modern Turkish Republic centred in the capital city of Ankara...The commemoration of May 29 also addresses broader questions about the making and contestation of national identity through daily practices in public life... the celebration of May 29, 1453, as a part of national history has unset effects on the official constructions of national identity” . Moreover, these tensions became more concrete in 1996, Habitat II, the Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements which took place in Istanbul. From all over the world, several participants from NGOs, universities, media including foreign and domestic, state officials would visit Istanbul for two week period, and both secularists and Islamists tried to use this broad participation on promoting “true” identity of Turkish nation and Istanbul. It is not surprising since the discourse of Islamist ideology about Istanbul has been shaped on the Islamic and Ottoman identity regarding creating the global city concept for the city of Istanbul.




Figure 70 Habitat II, Conference Valley, Conference and Parallel

The city administration also tried to take advantage of this event by promoting Istanbul to global gaze by focusing on the closer areas to conference venue at Beyoglu District and Taksim Square. Although city administration wasn't the official host, parallel events were held by them. These events mostly focused on promoting the Ottoman–Islamic identity of Istanbul which was considered as true national identity. Islamists argued that secularist perception of global Istanbul rejects its history and identity while embracing the Hittite and Sumerian civilisations. They organised alternative events and meetings at Gezi Park which was so close to Conference Venue. Gezi Park once again became the site for Islamists' activities.



Figure 71 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Newsletter Special to Habitat II

(Left corner Mayor Erdogan appears to plant a tree. On the bottom, the title is “Islam is peace and love” .)

However, with the National Security Council –kinda military intervention– the hegemony of Islamist ideology tried to be decreased by initiating several measures in 1997. While Welfare

Party was closed, its leaders were banned from politics including Mayor Erdogan. The rest of politicians from Welfare Party established another pro-Islamic Party with the name of Virtue (Fazilet) Party, and they won over the local elections again in metropolitan cities including Istanbul. By the time according to measurements of National Security Council Taksim Mosque project was cancelled and following it new city administration from Virtue Party proved their loyalty to Republican ideals with the sign right across from the Republican Monument which was written on it: “75th Anniversary–Long live Republic–Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.” Thus, with the removal of Erdogan from Mayor, although practically same party members established another pro-Islamic party, their discourse of Ottoman–Islamic identity seemed to be left and related events, seminars were cancelled.



Figure 72 Opposite to the Republican Monument, the sign placed by the city administration to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Republic in 1999

Source: Cinar (2005, 118)



#### 5.1.4. The Representation of Political Islam on Taksim Square (the 2000s)

With the decision of National Security Council, Recep Tayyip Erdogan was prisoned and banned from politics for life–long in 1998 because of the fact that the poem he read at a public meeting. That poem was “The minarets are our bayonets, the domes our helmets/ the mosques our barracks and the faithful our army” (Batuman, 2013: 1098). However, with a change in the law, his ban was removed on, and released from the prison. In 2001, Islamists split into two factions: fundamentalists and relative moderates. Recep Tayyip Erdogan led to relative moderates and established AKP. The very first election it joined was in 2003 and he became the Prime Minister with the success of AKP. Regarding the national identity, the vision of AKP is the nation in Islam rather than the nation itself (Batuman, 2016). More precisely, since the 1980s the national identity defined through the synthesis of Turkishness and Islam became more visible with AKP.

The Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality was Ali Mufit Gurtuna from Virtue Party. The local elections held in 2004, Kadir Topbas from AKP was elected. Similar to the Mayor of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Melih Gokcek, Kadir Topbas also continued his political career as mayor until 2017 when President Erdogan asked him to resign. This period spatial policies mostly shaped around neo–liberal economic policies and ideals of the Islamic nationalist ideology and direct interventions of President Erdogan. This period the electoral successes of central government and local government from the same political party coincided and began a new process that wipes out the power struggle between central government and local while bringing the cooperation between them. During this period, conflicting projects such as building Taksim Mosque, rebuilding Artillery Barracks etc. were approved rapidly through either dismiss the opponent members or change the member

of decision maker boards. According to Batuman (2016: 340) while the rise of Islam as a trans-national political force in globally, blending Islamism with global market as a way to alternative reference for trans-national Islam which is compatible with the Western world and also the authentic way to Islamic representations are the successes of AKP. Moreover, Unsal and Kuyucu (2010) argue that neoliberal Islamism dominated this period while urban space became a significant means of capital accumulation with the spatial policies of pro-Islamic AKP. According to Islamist nationalist ideology, Istanbul and its planning practices had always been so substantial regarding creating cultural capital, yet within AKP the planning practices of Istanbul became a potent tool to take revenge from secular Turkish nationalism. The city administration, on the one hand, has tried to destroy the Early Republican spaces, on the other hand, has rebuilt the Ottoman Empire' s heritage. Tanju (2007) argues that modernity project of secular Turkish nationalism excluded Islam from the public sphere and alienated Islamists while building public spaces which are the symbols of the nation-state. Thus, Islamists are not visible on the public spaces of Republic. Islamists try to make itself visible on public spaces through defying, destructing Republican spaces and building alternative spaces.

In other words, what Early Republican ideology tried to do was to put distance between the Turkish nation and Islamic civilisation; yet what political Islam has done lately is to use these two words metonymical. The ties with Ottoman Empire which were broken in 1923 with the Turkish Republic, established again and the efforts of westernisation replaced with the efforts of being Muslim world' s leader (Batuman, 2016: 323). However, the architectural approach of AKP, unfortunately, can' t go beyond the imitation of Islamic-Ottoman architecture. More precisely, spatial policies of Islamist AKP not only focus on eradicating the symbolic spaces of Republican ideology but also serve as an instrument in rebuilding an alternative national identity concerning the elements of Islam-Ottoman. Batuman (2016) puts this phenomenon as, during the 2000s, mimicry

as a state project of Islamism targeted to rebuild the golden age of the glorious Ottoman Empire in today' s circumstances at urban space. According to Aslan (2014), Taksim Square hosts the conflicts of two ideologies; on the one hand, neo-Ottomanist and Islamists who do not like the image of Atatürk and Republic history much, but define itself through the resuscitating the Ottoman history; on the other hand, secularists who consider the square as the symbol of nation-state, national identity and try to protect it from any contested ideology's intervention. In order to give a better understanding of what happened in Taksim Square in this period regarding identity building, related projects will be discussed in detail.

The first Taksim Pedestrianisation Project which covers Gezi Park, Siraselviler and Istiklal Street, AKM (Atatürk Cultural Centre) as a pedestrianised zone to connect Gezi Park and Taksim Square without any vehicular traffic was introduced to the public in 2007. It was aimed to take the vehicle traffic underground and separate pedestrians and vehicles. However, the coexistence of pedestrians and cars did not cause any problems; on the contrary, it feed the vitality of the square. The project created only a vast undefined area and harmed the perspective of the monument. Moreover, after so many years since it was banned to any political demonstrations or rally protests, Taksim Square was opened to the May 1 celebrations in 2010 and 2011; yet unfortunately, it was banned again with the excuse of pedestrianisation project construction.



Figure 73 Taksim Pedestrianisation Project

Source: <http://wowturkey.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=129005>



Figure 74 Taksim Square before and after the project

Source: <http://www.arkeologlardenregist.org/aciklama.php?id=6>

In 2011, PM Erdogan announced that two new dimension added the project; (1) a ‘neo–Ottoman architectural style’ the replica of Artillery Barrack including a shopping mall and luxury residences on the place where Gezi Park locates would be constructed, (2) the bus stops, traffic flow around the square would move to beneath of the square, and the monument would be removed. All these projects have not been executed, yet it caused the Gezi Movement. The negotiations between the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and the Taksim Solidarity Group had been continued for one year; however, they couldn’ t meet on the middle ground. On 27th of May, the destruction of the wall of Gezi Park and uprooting the trees made the real democratic debate for Gezi Park impossible. Thus, the only option for environmentalist activists was to occupy the Gezi Park to protect it and also make their existence visible. The prevalent tendency of municipalities related to public spaces is to decrease social, political or cultural importance of public spaces by replacing their multifunctional features with a principal traffic function or privatise them. Demonstrators were there to announce their opinions about the demolishing Gezi Park and building Artillery Barrack, yet in time it turned into declaring their disturbance about the party in power especially the oppressive attitude of PM Erdogan and demanding freedom. The increase in the number of shopping malls and the decline in the number of parks, squares, open spaces have been already controversial issues among urban planners, architects, and activists who criticise this transformation. Therefore, the destruction decision of Gezi Park which is one of the significant public

space in the very heart of Istanbul created a tremendous impression on not only professionals but also on public. In the very beginning, a few environmental activists gathered to stop the demolition. However, it caused clashes between police and activists and the disproportionate use of force of police made the public support Gezi Movement no matter their political view was. Moreover, it attracted the attention of press, social media and spread all over the country.



Figure 75 Gezi Movement Protests at Taksim Square

Source: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-gezi-olaylari-turizm-icin-kayip-pembenar-detay-seyahattatil-1727664/>



Figure 76 AKM during Gezi Movement

Source: <http://malatyahabersaati.com/malatya-gezi-parki-davasinda-iddianame-hazir/>





Figure 77 Gezi Park and its vicinity

Source: Google Earth, 2018




Figure 78 Taksim Pedestrianisation Project

Source: <http://www.arkitera.com/etiket/1478/taksim-yayalastirma-projesi>



Figure 79 Taksim Square, replica of Artillery Barracks

Source: <http://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/148631-gezi-parki-na-civi-dahi-cakilamaz> on 19.12.2016



Original Artillery Barracks main entrance

Images from the Project of Replica of Artillery Barracks

Figure 80 Artillery Barracks original (left) and replica (right)

Source: Istanbul Cultural and Natural Heritage Preservation Board Photograph Archive



Figure 81 Artillery Barracks

Source: <http://www.arkitera.com/haber/19644/taksim-meydaninin-yeni-gorselleri-ortaya-cikti>

Although it was a local resistance one of the most significant reasons that the Gezi Movement supported by all over the country was to identity conflict between secularists and Islamists. There are so many papers, researches, thesis, debates related to the Gezi Movement in the context of environmental policies, neo-liberal incursion in the space, architectural style etc.. However this study focuses on the issue of building Ottoman-Islamic identity as an alternative national identity through destructing the Gezi Park, Taksim Square, removing the monument, and building replica of Artillery Barrack from Ottoman time. Gulersoy (1986: 23) argues that the construction of the monument started the conflict between secularists and Islamists. According to her rather than the monument's architectural style, its existence in the very centre of Istanbul was the sign of the abandonment of the Ottoman-Islamic tradition. Ottoman Empire did not need any parade ground happens around a monument which is European tradition because belief in Allah requires no material thing as a symbol in the centre. Islam as a religion, prohibits any monuments which remind people of any related religious icons. As a natural outcome of this belief, the projects of Taksim Pedestrian Project and Artillery Barracks do not portray any monument in the square at all. The Mosque project at Taksim Square also was proposed with similar intention which is to make invisible any secular, modern, western element and replace it with or dominate it through the Islamic element. Esen (2012) attributes these projects as a catalyst of the Gezi Movement and through these projects political power strikes a significant blow to the spatial organisation of Taksim.

Perhaps, building the replica of Artillery Barrack was one of the most ideological interventions among the projects proposed for Taksim Square. Besides its physical restrictions on the pedestrian



flow and the usage of public space, the ideological dimension of it regarding representation wise caused debates among technocrats, scholars, professionals, and the public. To destruct the Gezi Park and build the replica of Artillery Barracks according to the Islamist nationalist ideology is kind of confrontation of Islamists with secularists. Oncu (2007: 235–236) argues that this project is part of rebuilding the national identity, and she puts it as: “Many of the ancient monuments and heritage sites that symbolise the unique attractions of Istanbul in transnational markets refer back to layers of contested memories, dislocations and serial destructions that have been a part of nation–making. The designation of particular sites in the material fabric of the city (and not others) as 'historical treasures' has been accompanied by intense political debate, calling forth competing interpretations of different epochs in the city's history. More broadly, the mobilisation of Istanbul's imperial legacy to articulate future aspirations for a 'global' future have challenged the modernist imagination of the Republican past” . Specific to Taksim Square, Artillery Barracks with its architectural style of the previous era would be the representative of Islamic–Ottoman identity in the very centre of the global city.

Here the problem is both Islamist nationalist ideology and secularist nationalist ideology perceives and represents the history of the Ottoman Empire as a whole. While secularist nationalist ideology denies the entire Ottoman Empire as the dark age, Islamist nationalist ideology accepts and aggrandises it without any criticism. Both of them do not consider the different layers of 600–year history. To deny or accept and aggrandises without questioning each layer of Ottoman Empire’ s history caused first the destruction of Ottoman historical elements and then rebuilding it. Each ideology proposes radical projects for Taksim Square to dominate over other distinct ideologies through demolition and construction. Thus, Taksim Square turned into an arena representing the power of ideology (Yildirim, 2014).

The second project is Taksim Mosque Project of which the first phase (1950s–1990s) was discussed in the previous part. It mostly shaped around the debate of the project between secularists and Islamists. The discussions ended with the close of Welfare Party. However, with the great success of AKP and the banned politician Erdogan becoming Prime Minister started the debate on Taksim Mosque project again, yet this time they succeed in building a mosque. According to Batuman (2013), the spatial demand of Islamists mostly has been shaped around the mosque as a symbol of their political power, so they are quite enthusiastic about building a mosque at Taksim Square which is very symbolic spaces of secular nationalist ideology. Here it is necessary to remind that with spatial policies of AKP each year almost 1000 new mosques are built all around the country and older mosques replaced with Ottoman replicas and Mass Housing Administration built 480 mosques between 2005 and 2013 which means mosques became social spaces in newly built residential areas (Batuman, 2016). However, none of these mosques caused this much debates that Taksim Mosque did. According to Ekinçi (2012, cited in Ozsoy, 2017) during recent years, in Turkey especially in Istanbul perhaps every day another mosque construction has begun yet only Taksim mosque has caused debates and conflicts. Moreover, even though almost all of those mosques have constructed without a plan, or often at a green space or a park or mostly their first floors are designed as shop like a rent project. The explanation of this conflict is undoubtedly related to Taksim Square and its historical and spatial narration. In spite of the enormous social opposition and legal obstacles, Islamists who want to build a mosque in this square are still and constantly insisting because they aim to harm the identity, lifestyle, social values and cultural heritage that Taksim Square represents.

During his time as the Mayor of Istanbul, PM Erdogan was the sincere supporter of the mosque building project at Taksim Square, and he brought the project onto the agenda again in 2011. Right after PM Erdogan' s speech about the mosque, in 2012 the plan for

Taksim Mosque was proposed. The architect of this proposal argues that he did not copy the architectural style of mosques from Ottoman time, but developed his own style in the context of mosque debates going on between secularists and Islamists. He told that “I tried to find common ground between secularists and Islamists. Thus, on the one hand, I consider the Islamic elements, on the other hand, I developed modern architecture and design for the mosque. I even did not name it as Taksim Mosque but Mosque of the Republic & Museum of Religions” (Anonymous, 2013). With this project, the architect Ahmet Vefik Alp got award International Union of Architects in 2012. However, PM Erdogan rejected this proposal for being too modern. According to Batuman (2015), PM Erdogan himself is a fan of neoclassical architecture which displays as mimicry of Ottoman architecture. PM Erdogan insisted in neoclassical architecture since he aimed to make Islamic identity a brand.




Figure 82 Project Proposal for Taksim Mosque Project in 2012

Source: Anonymous, 2013

According to Batuman (2016), Islamic ideology uses the architectural mimicry to form the synthesis of Turkishness and Islam in the context of national identity building. Moreover, Sargin (2004) argues that architectural mimicry is a political apparatus creating

counter memories and historical images that can replace Republican identity with the Islamic one. According to him (2004: 674): “the replica of the very Ottoman architecture is surely the visible legitimization of pro-Islamic identity and the monument is its theatrical stage on which counter memories and histories can now be explicitly represented...Now the orthodoxy of Ottoman architecture is believed to be the best political means to cultivate counter memories and replace the secular elite's constructions that are also invented traditions and imaginary narrations (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). For the conservative power block, the memory crises since the 1920s, therefore, could be defeated only by establishing counter memories, and the spatialization of historic images seemed to be the best political apparatus.”

In 2011, Beyoglu Municipality prepared two projects in scale 1/1000 and 1/5000. However same year, Cihangir Embellishment Association (Cihangir Guzellestirme Dernegi) and Galata Association filed charges against Beyoglu Municipality, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and Ministry of Culture and Tourism. In 2013, the court accepted cancellation of the plans unanimously. Beyoglu Municipality objected to a court decision and applied higher status court which reverses the cancellation judgment. In 2017, the project of Sefik Birkiye and Selim Dalaman was accepted by Istanbul number II Regional Committee for the Conservation of Cultural Assets. More precisely, the legal procedure that was the biggest obstacle of building a mosque at Taksim Square also completed with the approval of Istanbul number II Regional Committee for the Conservation of Cultural Assets. The building spot was defined as behind the Maksem.




Figure 83 The Project of Taksim Mosque

Source: <https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/iste-taksim-camii-projesinin-son-hali-444075.html>




Figure 84 The place where Taksim Mosque locates (before and after construction)

Source: <https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1382553-proje-ortaya-cikti-iste-cami-yapilince-taksim-gorunusu/15>

After Taksim Pedestrianisation Project, iftar dinners also have been moved to Taksim Square right opposite of the monument. According to Sargin (2004), these kinds of religious activities and events legitimise the Islamic ideological performance and serve for building radical identities. Moreover, Erdi (2015) attributes that the construction of a mosque on the very strategical places, performing related Islamic ideology events and activities highlight not only a symbolic transformation but also transformation in spatial practices in a conservative way. In other words, the visibility of Muslim identity

through public displays of Islamic practices became much more natural this period. Finally, Taksim Mosque as the spatial expressions of religious identity became a symbolic claim to acceptance and recognition of Muslim identity in Taksim Square.



Figure 85 Taksim Mosque at Ramadan, in 2018

Source: <https://www.yenisafak.com/ramazan/taksim-meydaninda-kurulan-iftar-sofralarinda-bulustu-3332403>

Following the acceptance of the mosque project, the destruction of Ataturk Cultural Centre (AKM) of which history rooted to Early Republican Era, began to be prepared. In his plan prepared in 1936–37, Prost also proposed a Theatre House in Taksim Square to complete the spatial narration of the modernity project. In 1946, a project was developed by Turkish architects and construction began. Because of some technical and budget issues, the construction could be completed in 1969. In the beginning, it was considered only as Opera House, yet in the construction process it turned into a cultural centre and was opened as Istanbul Culture Centre (Istanbul Kultur Sarayi) (Can, 2014). According to Batuman (2015), the building is an excellent example of the modernist architecture.






Figure 86 Project for AKM

Source: [https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/\\_QICpxKJ8--mLg](https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/_QICpxKJ8--mLg)

mLg



Figure 87 Newspaper, next day of opening ceremony

(Title is “from now on Istanbul has also its culture centre” )

Source: [https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/\\_QICpxKJ8--mLg](https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/_QICpxKJ8--mLg)

mLg

In 1970, Istanbul Culture Centre burnt down and it could not be used anymore until 1978. After completing the reconstruction, it was reopened with the name Atatürk Culture Centre. AKM as a symbol of

Republican era with its modern architectural style and being the representative of displaying modern, western art, has always been a target for Islamic ideology. From time to time, Islamists proposed to demolish it. With the political power of AKP, the attempt to destroy the building became agenda again in 2005. In 2005, Minister of Culture and Tourism proposed the destruction of the centre for being completed its economic life and replacing it with a giant structure which serves as trade and congress centre. However, because of the widespread opposition from NGOs, art and architecture platforms, protests through the press made this decision cancelled. They opposed to this decision, and they argued that before taking any decision related with this centre, the qualities of AKM like being a part of memory and identity of spatial practices of Republican-era should have been considered rather than giving priority to its economic life. In 2007, Istanbul number II Regional Committee for the Conservation of Cultural Assets registered the centre as first-degree monumental structure. In 2008, after restoration project prepared for the centre, it was closed to audiences and since then waiting for restoration.



Figure 88 AKM, after closing for restoration

Source: <https://projedetaylari.com/yeni-akm-projesi/>

In 2010 Istanbul was announced as the European Capital of Culture. Political power used it as an excuse to demolish the building



and asked Sakarya University to prepare a static report with the expectation of supporting destroy decision, yet the decision didn't support the destroy (Erbey, 2017). Nevertheless, the debates continued for a long time. Since the Gezi Movement in 2013, the building had been used by the Istanbul Police Headquarters. Same year one of his speech PM Erdogan told that “I hope AKM will be demolished. We are going to build a spectacular culture centre in Baroque architecture. Yes, we are going to build also a mosque. I will not ask permission from anyone.”



Figure 89 New Culture Centre Project

Source: <https://projedetaylari.com/yeni-akm-projesi/>

Batuman (2015) argues that Taksim Square with its vicinity and important structures like AKM, Gezi Park, Municipality Casino were designed as instruments of national identity building. According to him in order to create politically conscious citizens, nation-state developed modernity project as a social engineering project. The reason behind the Islamic ideology's desire to demolish the AKM was to harm and undermine the modernity project of secular nationalist ideology. After AKM destroyed, what kind of building would be constructed or what kind of services would be offered does not matter at all. The important thing was to get rid of any symbolic place of secular nationalist ideology since AKM was the symbol of the Republican era and representative of nation-state's power. Although there were so many opposition, finally, in 2018 May, the

demolishing of AKM was completed.

Lastly, alternatives to Taksim Square, Yenikapi Square and Maltepe Square were developed. In the very beginning of AKP, there was massive opposition from military and judiciary towards AKP (Batuman, 2015). In order to deal with this opposition, democratic rights were emphasised at the agenda of AKP. As a matter of fact that this issue, Taksim Square was opened for the May Day parade in 2010 after 33 years. Next three years, May Day parade took place at Taksim Square until it was banned again with the construction excuse and announced that it was just a temporary ban. However, PM Erdogan denied it and told that he had plans to build two new squares in Istanbul (Batuman, 2015).



Figure 90 Taksim Square and the location of two new squares

Source: Google Earth, 2018

<https://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/yenikapi-meydani-2-milyona-hazir/haber-294001>

<https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/maltepe-miting-alani-1-mayis-a-hazirlaniyor-213902.html>

It is necessary to remind that at Taksim Square, 15 July coup

attempt was protested in 2016 and commemorated following years without any police brutal or political obstacle. Alternative commemorations, celebrations on the square serve to create alternative historical narrations which are a very significant part of the building and legitimising national identity. Accordingly to different readings of the past, the present political debates constantly change.



Figure 91 Taksim Square on 15th July 2017

Source: <https://www.sabah.com.tr/yasam/2017/07/06/kizilay-15-temmuz-demokrasi-ve-milli-birlik-gununde-meydanlarda-olacak>

Building alternative squares for Taksim Square is the ideological inclination of AKP. Behind it, there is a hostile attitude towards the historical, spatial narration of Taksim Square and with these attempts, it is tried to be undermined and harm the Early Republican effort and Republican ideals and values. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the reason behind to construct two squares with so many efforts and capital. These two squares are isolated from anywhere. They are surrounded by sea and high ways, literally no connection with life. It is so difficult to reach there by public transportation. For any special events or activities of AKP, the municipality serves free buses; however for any alternative events held by opponents do not get the same support. In other words, these squares are just built for serving

to strength AKP' s political power while opponents were discouraged through urban facilities and they lost the very significant square they can be visible.




Figure 92 Analytical Framework for Taksim Republican Square (Personal Rendering)

## Chapter 6: Findings of Case Studies

This study investigates the role of ideologies in the social construction of spaces as it relates to building national identities. In developing countries, the concepts of a nation and national identity are socially constructed. Moreover, space is a social product which is intricately linked to ideology. In fact, it is a common practice to construct nation and national identity through the use of space. In this process, public spaces have always played central roles. This study examines urban squares because they are the most public spaces.

The case studies of Kizilay Square and Taksim Square are important in the urbanisation history of Turkey in the context of national identity building. In this context, national identity was built through the production process of these two squares and how they became representative symbols of the nation–state. They were both constructed for serving as the representative spatial configuration of nation–state and subsequently were both reconstructed for offering an alternative narration of history. They have also been the centre of ideological struggle and conflicts.

Those struggles act like a catalyst that makes the spatial pattern of squares transform in order to build the desired social order. The most common ideological struggles in Turkey are the struggles between traditional and modern, old and new, Islam and secularism, and left and right. The two case study squares have witnessed each such struggle at different times. The first time period was the Early Republican Era when the Turkish Republic tried to construct its concept of the nation state and national identity through spatial practices. In this era, secular Turkish nationalism dominated all other contending ideologies. The tension between traditional vs modern, old vs new, and Islam vs secularism was highly visible in the process of constructing the national identity. The state dominated the urbanisation process and a holistic approach was adopted. European architects and urban planners were invited to develop the cities and

investments focused on the Anatolian cities rather than Istanbul, the last capital city of the Ottoman Empire. Ankara was declared the new capital city and developed according to a design by Herman Jansen, a German architect. In his plan Kizilay Square was designated as the symbolic locus of the nation state and the premier public space of modern society. It became the representative symbol of a modern, secular, and Westernised national identity. The primary planning principle was designed to serve nation–state building.

However, Republican cadre needed to build a symbolic locus of the nation–state in Istanbul also. The area where different ethnic groups lived was chosen, and Taksim Republican Square was created with this effort. While developing it, Kizilay Square was taken as an example. Republican Monument in the very centre of Taksim Square was the representative of the nation–state. Both squares were the places where nation–state introduce modern lifestyle to its citizens in this period. The national identity was defined as secular, modern, and Westernised in this era. These two squares played a significant role in declaring this identity to citizens. State accordingly to its ideology, construct those squares corresponding to reflect this ideology and built national identity through them. The processes of creating the Kizilay and Taksim Squares were constructed by way of modern urban planning implementations and the effort of creating national architecture. As Lefebvre (1991: 42) argues “spatial textures which are informed by effective knowledge and ideology. Representations of space must, therefore, have a substantial role and a specific influence in the production of space.”

Next period begins with the military coup that happened in 1980. In this period, national identity was redefined through Turkish and Islam synthesis. The main aim was to realise the depoliticisation of society. Islam was considered as an apparatus of the depoliticisation by state. Thus, public spaces which had political meanings, radically transformed into meaningless spaces. Kizilay and Taksim Square are prominent examples of this effort. Both squares had gained political

identity especially at the end of the 1970s. To depoliticise those squares, spatial policies were used significantly. They were closed to any demonstration, protests, etc. Moreover, they began to be watched through CCTV. At the beginning of this period, squares turned into junctions—their characteristics of being public space diminished. Following the 1980s, 1990s the rise of political Islam has affected all political climate of Turkey. In this period, Islam began to be visible in the public sphere. Islamic and traditional practices of society were opened up to public eyes. Further, Islamic related architectural elements, styles were created by imitating the Ottoman Empire. Mainly, the increase in the mosque construction became common spatial policy almost in every city. Mosque, similar to Ottoman Empire time, became the principal element of the public spaces. After the 2000s, with the massive success of AKP in elections, building mosque at very significant Republican spaces began to be normalised although a considerable part of society was opposed. The effort of Republican cadre to neutralise the public space from any related religious identity turned into a race that no open space without mosque with the AKP. Tanyeli (2010: 10–11) argues that almost the only architectural demand of Islamists corresponding to their ideology becomes concrete tragically at the architectural level by constructing countless mosques via associations of mosque construction. Therefore, it is not wrong to conclude that Islamists who are in the political arena do not consider the urban and architectural environment that is necessary for their demanding lifestyle. Further, Cansever (cited in Kocak, 2008: 95) remarks that since the mosque was constructed like a castle as a symbolic expression of Muslim identity, Republican regime considered mosque as a focal point of resistance.

Although they have similar spatial development in time, since they locate in the two competitive metropolitan cities of Turkey, their development is quite impressive. Since Taksim Square locates in Istanbul which is considered as cultural capital city representing the Ottoman identity defined as true identity of Turkish people by



Islamists, has always been the very ideological space itself. Islamists want to construct their historical narration through spatial narration, and Taksim Square has always been the very first space they tried to dominate. To excavate Ottoman identity, Istanbul is the right place to begin. Ankara as being the representative city of secular nation–state, Islamists tried to construct their representative city, and as being the last capital city of Ottoman Empire, Istanbul became reasonable choice. It has always been easier to transform a built place than to construct a new one. Moreover, it helps to wipe collective memory out related to the hostile one. After all, Taksim Square has become the arena where secularist and Islamist power struggle takes place. However, in time, its identity has transformed corresponding to socio–economic and cultural circumstances of the country.

Hence, this dissertation aimed to answer first if squares as social products have transformed through ideological inclinations for constructing national identity and second by this objective, it is intended to investigate the spatial transformations of the Kizilay and Taksim Squares. Both the theoretical framework and case study indicated that in the process of identity building, public space is the subject of this construction. The most important finding and surprising as well, is discovering that any social construction always needs other social constructions to realised itself. What I mean is, national identity construction in developing countries is a socially constructed concept, moreover, building national identity is not possible alone without other socially constructed things. Public spaces as another social productions plays a significant role in the construction of national identity. Moreover, the production of space is not free from power struggles, and ideological conflicts. Public spaces have been the subject and also object of this construction. Public spaces are not only the place where national identity is constructed but also the place where this identity transforms. Massey (1985: 12) suggests that “space is a social construct–yes. But social relations are also constructed over space, and that makes a

difference” . His point is that spatial structures influence the social structures and process, yet it appears differently in distinct areas. Thus, space is not only a social product, but it has the potential to produce its social relations. The meaning, structure, and function of these squares have transformed both within the institutionalisation of socially dominant ideologies and also through conflicts and struggles of those dominant ideologies.

Moreover, the conflict over spaces according to the Lefebvre’ s conceptualisation of space’ s triad tried to be explored. In this respect, Kizilay and Taksim Square in the Early Republican Era as “perceived spaces” comprised a significant part of the built environment and reflect the features of modern cities. Moreover, they were “conceived spaces” as a spatial representation of the nation–state and Republican regime. Lastly, they have been “lived spaces” where social and cultural practices took place in everyday life. Trust (Güven) Monument and Republican Monument within the squares comprised the “monumental spaces” that providing a sense of belonging a nation, pointing to the national identity. Güvenpark and Gezi Park were conceived as public spaces which symbolise the power of nation–state in Kizilay and Taksim Square. Further, since both parks were “conceived spaces” as the spatial representation of the power of the Republican ideology through social and cultural practices of them, they can be considered as “space of representation” . With the rise of political Islam, those spaces began to lose their meaning and experienced change in their forms and functions. In this period, Kizilay and Taksim Square first had lost their public space characteristics and had transformed from a meeting place into a peopleless space that is a “perceived space” comprising of a junction where vehicular and pedestrian traffic flow as a result of the spatial policies. While they were constructing, the built environment and buildings were considered carefully, as Lefebvre (1991:223) argues “buildings have functions, forms and structures, but they do not integrate the formal, functional and structural 'moments' of social practice.” Moreover, the balance

between building and the structure of squares tried to be protected. However, with new spatial enforcements in this period this balance has changed. According to Lefebvre (1991: 223), “the balance of forces between the monument and the building shifted.” Newly constructed buildings substituted the structural elements of squares. For instance, Taksim Mosque, according to Lefebvre’s triple conception, can be considered as a “monumental space”. The mosque is located right behind the Republican Monument, and it is sensed more vividly than other buildings in the square. Further, the mosque can be argued as a “space of representation” against secular nationalism. In this sense, it can be argued that Taksim Mosque, on the one hand, deformed the monumental characteristic of Taksim Square, on the other hand, gained the features of the monument itself. Therefore, though the monumentality of the mosque transcended the monument; functions, forms, meaning, and structures of the mosque cannot be adopted in the existing spatial practices. More specifically, the new modes of spatial practices defined with the modernisation project of Republican regime through offering European type of public spaces like squares, parks, etc., have been replaced with the new modes of spatial practices of Islamic ideology through constructing new public spaces like mosques. That is one of the most important measures of the Islamist against the secular ideology of the Early Republican Era has been the Taksim Mosque Project, conceived as a “space of representation”, indicating the political power of the Islamist.

In conclusion, Kizilay and Taksim Square have been both products and apparatus of ideologies in the Early Republican Era as well as in the period when political Islam rise. The squares were created as public spaces representing the Republican ideology and the monuments in them refer to national identity in the Early Republican Era. However, they were constantly (re)organised and became destitute of their meaning and symbolised Islam related identity recently.

Table 2 Meaning, Urban Function, Spatial Form and Conflicts of Kizilay and Taksim Squares

	Meaning	Urban Function Activities	Spatial Form /Physical Settings/Structure	Conflict Between
1923–1950	The symbolic locus of the nation state. The social space for citizens.	Public space (concerts, cinema and theatre facilities, celebration ceremony for national days, commemorative ceremonies, marches) Indicating the power of new established nation state	A significant monument A park–square concept At the intersection of significant boulevards. Kizilay Building and its park Well defined built environment	The socio–spatial heritage of Ottoman Empire & the values and ideals of modernity project of newly established nation state Modern vs Traditional Old vs new
1980–onwards	1980–1990 Lost its political identity and public space characteristics Turn into a junction	An informal scene for political struggle Central location for bus stops, and metro, A junction A space where people reluctant to spend time but just pass by.	The Guvenpark Rehabilitation Project The construction of Metro station Barriers located along the Ataturk Boulevard Deformation of spatial organisation.	Secularists & the Islamist
	1990–2000 Islam became visible	Celebrations (new year etc.) that were planned by the municipality or the government.	Religious symbols and practices on urban public spaces	Secularists & the Islamist
	2000–onwards Domination of Islamic elements and symbols.	An informal scene for oppositional demonstrations A place where religious practices take place	Religious symbols and practices on urban public spaces Name changes	Secularists & the Islamist

Table 3 Transformation of National Identity and Kizilay and Taksim Squares

	1923–1950	1980– onwards		
		1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–onwards
Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares	the symbolic locus of nation–state the public space of modern society these two components of meaning nourished the national identity building project of state.	lost their political identities turn into junctions	The modern landscape of cities began to be dominated with Islamic, traditional elements on the very centre of Republican spaces.	Transforming into the political arena where conflict and struggle between pro–secular and pro–Islamic identity became visible.
National Identity	National Identity was defined as modern, secular, Westernised.	National Identity was redefined through Turkish and Islam synthesis.	Islamic identity became visible at public sphere.	Acceptance and recognition of Muslim identity in Kizilay Square and Taksim Republican Square.

Table 4 Lefebvre' s Triad for Production of Space and Re–interpretation of Kizilay and Taksim Squares

	Conceived Space Representations of space	Perceived Space Spatial Practices	Lived Space Representational space	Monumental Space
1923–1950	<p><b>Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares</b> were conceived as the city centres and as public spaces with political and social life. They were both spatial representation of the Republican ideals, political power of the Republican regime and ideology.</p> <p><b>Guvenpark and Gezi Park</b> were 'conceived spaces' as the spatial representation of political power of the Republican ideology and in terms of social and cultural practices they are alike to 'space of representations' .</p> <p><b>Trust and Republican Monuments</b> were conceived spaces symbols of the state power</p> <p><b>All of them</b> were conceived as spatial representations of national identity.</p>	<p><b>Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares</b> are 'perceived spaces' as representing characteristics of the modern cities.</p> <p><b>Guvenpark and Gezi Park</b> were 'perceived spaces' as being public spaces of modern cities where modern lifestyle was introduced to citizens.</p> <p><b>Trust and Republican Monuments</b> were 'perceived spaces' where national ceremonies were held.</p>	<p><b>Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares</b> were 'lived spaces' as public space with their social and cultural practices.</p> <p><b>Guvenpark and Gezi Park</b> were 'lived spaces' as social, cultural urban practices.</p> <p><b>Trust and Republican Monuments</b> were 'lived spaces' with their social practices.</p>	<p><b>Trust and Republican Monuments</b> can be considered as the 'monumental spaces' , providing a sense of collectivity and membership, pointing to the national unity (Lefebvre, 1991: 220).</p>

1980– onwards	1980–1990	<b>Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares</b> became ‘conceived spaces’ for vehicles and closed for pedestrians. <b>Guvenpark</b> begin to be considered as ‘conceived spaces’ where bus and dolmush stops occupied, metro entrance disturbs its design.	<b>Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares</b> begin to be ‘perceived space’ turning into a intersection of vehicular traffic which excluding pedestrians.	<b>Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares</b> as ‘lived spaces’ turned into a crossroads dominated by traffic.	
	1990–2000	<b>Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares</b> became ‘conceived space’ where Islamic ideology displayed.	<b>Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares</b> as ‘perceived space’ turned into spaces where Islamic practices became visible.	<b>Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares</b> as ‘lived spaces’ begin to be lived spaces’ where Islamic social and cultural practices reproduced.	
	2000–onwards	<b>Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares</b> became space of representation against Republican. Islamic elements begin to be conceived as spatial representations of the Islamic ideology.	<b>Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares</b> became spaces where Islamic elements are perceived more visible than other symbolic elements of Republican ideology.	<b>Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares</b> became spaces where Islamic elements became part of physical environment and on lived space as social cultural practices.	<b>Taksim Mosque</b> took place the Republican Monument’ s role as being the monumental space. In Taksim Republican Square, Taksim Mosque is more visible than any other building.

## Chapter 7: Conclusion

### 7.1. Concluding Remarks

This study discusses the national identity building process as it relates to the use and repurposing of urban space, which results from ideological conflicts. Turkey, a developing country which struggled to establish a legitimate government and forge a national identity by following the Western model, constitutes the context of this dissertation. The discussions and analysis have examined how national identity is constantly changing through in concert with the use of space, specifically urban squares, which become political structures for ideologies. The spatial transformation of Turkish cities is discussed with respect to two specific squares: Kizilay in Ankara, and Taksim in Istanbul. The analysis is organized into four time periods. It begins with the establishment of Turkish Republic in 1923 until the socio-political changes of the 1950s, then the period that starts with the rise of political Islam in the 1980s, then . The roles of the contending ideologies in the modern socio-spatial organisation are explored. The national identity building of Turkey, as a vital driver of the reconstruction of those squares, is the starting point of this dissertation. These two periods are determined according to ideological conflicts on national identity building and also the use of space. Several projects, uprisings and conflicts happened in these periods, which have impacted both the identity of those squares and of the nation.

A significant concern of the dissertation is to explore the role of ideologies on the use and manipulation of the urban squares in order to serve their interests. The spatial patterns, in accordance with the identity building process, are analysed and discussed in relation to the issue of the ideological conflicts, in the context of a theoretical framework of the use of space, nation-building, and national identity formation of developing countries.



Before introducing the case study of the dissertation, I discuss the ideological conflicts that accompany national identity building, beginning with the Ottoman Empire' s modernisation and continuing through the history of the Turkish Republic. In this part the general conflicts between secularists and Islamists are presented along with the concerns of their capital city. Secular Turkish nationalism played a central role in the context of nation–state building and the creation of the national identity. It was a social engineering project that made Turks who identified themselves as Muslim during the Ottoman Empire disengage from their religious identity and begin to identify as secular, modern and Westernised. The process of identity formation reflects varying levels of tension between different ideologies which still exist, especially the struggle between Islam and secular Turkish nationalism. In contemporary Turkey, the rise of Islamism is considered a threat to the official concept of Turkish national identity.

The following chapter introduces Ankara, Istanbul and its primary squares by providing their socio–spatial and political contexts. The theoretical background of the socio–spatial analysis of the space through identity transformation is explained. The main topic of this chapter are the role of ideology and the evolving relationship between place identity and national identity by focusing on two squares in two significant cities in the history of Turkish Republic' s nation–state formation. One such city is Ankara, the capital city, which contains Kizilay Square a major space that enhanced the national identity. The other city, Istanbul, was the last capital city of the Ottoman Empire, yet it has made strides to modernise and Europeanise. In Istanbul' s Pera district, Republicans created Taksim Republican Square, intending it to be a national space and a representative symbol of Republic. The identity change in both squares is discussed through the Early Republican Era and the rise of political Islam. In these two periods, the changes in the identity of squares regarding their physical form, structure, function, and meanings are discussed as they relate to changes in the national identity.

The first time period, from 1923 to the 1950s, spans the establishment of the Turkish Republic to the Multiple Party System. The spatial policies of the state in the context of national identity building are especially important at this time. The second time period, from the 1980s to 2018, marks the beginning of the rise of political Islam and contemporary Turkey, and is analysed through the spatial policies of municipalities and the state, especially as it relates to the reconstruction of national identity as a synthesis of Islam and Turkish nationalism. In some ways, the two squares in Ankara and Istanbul illustrate the wider context of nation formation, national identity building, spatial patterns, and the social organisation of Turkey. However, the case studies have focused on how ideology manifests in the urban squares in the use of space while constructing the national identity. In regards to national identity building, the two time periods studied are critical to understand spatial policies and ideological conflicts. On the one hand, the Early Republican Era was dominated by secular Turkish nationalism, and oversaw modernization, especially as seen in European imagery in architecture, urban planning and design. This created a modern, secular, Westernised identity. On the other hand, the period of political Islam, beginning in the 2000' s, was characterised by Seljuk and Ottoman imagery in architecture and urban planning in order to reaffirm a Muslim identity. This had been banned from the public sphere during the secular period. This study, then, discusses the transition from an empire to a secular system, its effects on the built environment, and the identity of the citizens as seen in the public sphere. In the Early Republican Era, traditional and religious influence waned; the traditional order of Turkish society had been spatially transformed. Then, the rise of political Islam brought a new transformation of society. Although the governing system of the Turkish Republic is still secular, the national identity is independent from the government. and can be interpreted as a reflection of social transformation.

The case studies explore ideologies and their spatial organisation. In the Early Republican Era, the actions of renovating national architecture and declaring a new capital city were symbolic of its governing ideology. Ideology was also reflected in the spatial patterns of urban squares and urban planning and design. When political Islam began to gain influence, Ottoman and Seljuk styles in architecture were clearly visible in public spaces. This was reinterpreted as an attack to harm the republican nature of the spaces. In other words, besides the architectural, urban planning, and design inclinations of the ruling class, the intellectual atmosphere of the country reflected the circumstances of the country in general and specifically city of Ankara, Istanbul. Within these circumstances, one can comprehend the process of the production and transformation of a public space into a more modern one, and then into an Islamic one. In the beginning, Kizilay and Taksim Squares were representative of the manifestation of the Republican ideology. Yet their modern developments and national architecture were replaced with Islamic elements, which are evident of the ideological struggle between Islamist and secularists with respect to space. Space, society, spatial policies of power, the resistance tactics and strategies of social movements, and citizens' perceptions are explored. It can be concluded that ideological conflict is not a just political issue: it is narrated through spaces. More specifically, the perception and construction of ideology become tangible in spaces.

In order to better understand the connections between the transformation of spaces and the socio-cultural and political circumstances of the case study cities, every spatial aspect is examined in detailed. The intricate urbanisation and spatial history of Turkey is full of uprisings, ideological conflicts and struggles, so it is necessary to consider any circumstances that affects those connections. Moreover, the European type of modernity brought by secular Turkish nationalism and then the ancient Seljuk and Ottoman Empire imagery of political Islam, both brought radical transformations of public spaces in Ankara and Istanbul. The

resulting impacts on their physical and social structures are explored.

Throughout the study, the role of ideologies in the formation of spaces for constructing the national identity in Kizilay Square and Taksim Square are highlighted. The spatial manifestation of ideological conflicts, the tensions between secular and Islamic and old and new are clear in the spatial transformations of these squares and this transformation reflects the changes in symbolic representations and identities. These ideological struggles, conflicts, and representations are expressed in everyday life as well.

## **7.2. Further Implications**

In the formation of Turkish spaces and society, ideologies with aspects of Turkish modernisation in the context of national identity building have played a pivotal role. The traditional and religious structure of the Ottoman Empire evolved to a modern and secular nation–state with the establishment of Turkish Republic, and then the rise of political Islam altered the spatial trends again. The approaches taken with respect to architecture and urban planning and design have constantly changed accordingly to ideological inclinations.

This study analyses the spatial transformation of public spaces loaded with ideological conflicts. Ankara provides an ideal case for such a study, since it was designated as the capital city of a newly born republic and has changed drastically throughout the history of Turkey. Multiple factors, such as secularism, Islamism, and the tensions between modernism and tradition have been reflected in the spatial patterns of public spaces. Moreover, as the last capital city of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul also offers a significant case for this study. The efforts of Republicans to construct a modern square in the very centre of the old capital city, which previously represented the Ottoman Empire and the Islam religion, is quite interesting in terms of spatial transformation. Through analysing two periods with a

socio-spatial and political point of view, this study elucidates the role of ideology on the use and manipulation of space.

Nation formation in developing countries and the institutions of states with relation to their ideological inclinations can be studied within the context of Ankara and Istanbul. Tools beyond those for the construction of national spaces, such as those regarding the inventions of traditions related to the legitimisation and domination of space, is beyond the scope of this study. Spatial issues in the context of the research could be explored within more comprehensive theoretical and empirical frames of study. Various major issues related to the discussion of ideology and space could be considered within the context of national identity building. This could form a basis for research of similar cases in Muslim locales undergoing modernization with regards to the conflicts between Islamism and secularism. In Muslim countries, national identities are constantly renegotiated accordingly to their political relations, ideological conflicts, and other circumstances. Trends in Turkish identity building are similar with other Muslim countries and are constantly in flux. Further, in order to construct a nation or a national identity, the use of space has had significant effects on political power and ideologies. These, in turn, affect national spatial patterns. Moreover, due to various socio-political and economic motivations, the transformation of public spaces has dramatically accelerated. The collective memory of the society and the city weaken, and each ideology brings a different narration for the past while rebuilding the city again and again.

Further, not only for Muslim geographies, but also any country which experienced the formation of nation building can be the focus of these kinds of spatial discussions. In this sense, on the one hand Korea Republic and its capital city Seoul give a strong base for nation formation study, on the other hand, with a similar effort to Turkish Republic, the Gwanghwamun Square is the outcome of Korea Republic's effort of nation building. In this respect, Gwanghwamun

Square with its monument of Sejong the Great who was the pioneering king of creating Korean current, modern alphabet; the built environment which consists of city hall, national museums, Gyeongbokgung Palace representative edifices of the Joseon Dynasty, has been one of the most significant symbol the Korea Republic. Besides its physical environment and design effort, the function and the meaning of the Gwanghwamun Square have always reflected the socio-cultural and political circumstances of the country. Since it was constructed, the Gwanghwamun Square has witnessed so many events, protests, and demonstrations that impacted on the socio-political climate of the country. For example, the memorial to Sewol ferry disaster, Candlelight protest against to Government' s corruption held at the Gwanghwamun Square. It can be concluded that through examining the Gwanghwamun Square, the nation-formation of Korea Republic can be analysed.

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## Appendices

### Summary in Korean (요약본, 국문초록)

이 논문은 민족정체성을 구축하는 공간의 생산 과정 속에서 이데올로기의 역할을 탐구한다. 이를 위해 연구 지역을 크즐라이 광장과 탁심 광장으로 선정했는데 두 군데 모두 공화당 정권 당시 세속적 민족주의 이데올로기의 상징적 공간이었으며 이후에는, 종교를 상징하는 공간으로 변모했다. 또한, 이 두 광장의 형식, 기능 및 의미가 이 곳에서 일어난 폭동, 사회 운동, 정치적 긴장과 합의 등에 따라 변해왔기 때문이다. 초기 공화당 시대의 지배적 이데올로기는 민족 정체성과 민족 의식을 구축하는 것과 같은 국가적 목표 달성을 위해 기념비를 세우고 이 기념비에 애국적 상징성을 부여함으로 민족 정체성을 구축해 나갔다. 터키 공화국의 수도인 앙카라는 새 정권을 대표하기 위해 다양한 모습으로 디자인되어 왔다. 더욱이 이스탄불은 오토만 제국의 옛 정권을 대표하는 도시로 재설계되었고 오토만 제국-이슬람 유산은 의도적으로 거부 당했다.

특히, 앙카라의 크즐라이 광장과 이스탄불의 탁심 공화당 광장 탁심 광장은 당대 지배적인 이데올로기가 국가 정체성을 재형성하며 남은 대표적 유산이다. 1923년부터 1950년대까지 초기 공화당 정권의 세속적 터키 민족주의가 다른 대립적인 이데올로기를 지배했다. 이 당시 국가와 종교는 분리되어 국가가 주체적으로 공간을 건설했고 국가의 역사와 정체성을 해석하는 헤게모니적 지위를 주장했다. 1980년대 이슬람이 정치세력으로 부상하면서 이슬람 이데올로기가 지배적이게 되었다. 터키와 무슬림의 혼합적 정체성을 민족 이데올로기에 반영하여 광장을 재구성하려 했지만, 건축 환경은 급격히 변화하게 되었다. 이 점으로 비추어 봤을 때, 국가 정체성을 구축하기 위한 경험은 서로 대립하는 이데올로기의 경쟁 전략으로부터 비롯되었다 할 수 있다. 역사

중에서도 특정한 부분이 더욱 부각되기 위해 기념비를 포함한 도시 광장은 지워지거나, 잊혀지고 특별히 기억되고 있다. 이 논문은 민족정체성이 도시 광장을 통해 어떻게 작동하는지, 그리고 그러한 공간과 풍경이 민족정체성을 어떻게 반영 하는지를 논의하고자 한다. 공간 정책에 반영된 민족정체성이 표현되고 수행되며 공간의 사용과 구성이 어떻게 달라지는지를 보고자 한다. 본 논문은 민족정체성, 이데올로기와 공공 장소의 공간적 생산이 어떻게 중첩되어 있으며 연결되어있는지 밝히고자 한다. 첫째, 공간적 맥락에 의해 담론적 의미가 형성된다. 이러한 관점에서 볼 때, 광장 경관과 공간의 담론이 개인을 국가와 연결시키는 데 사용이 되고 있다. 둘째, 이데올로기는 사회를 지배하기 위한 도구로 공공 공간에서 지속적으로 발현되고 있다. 마지막으로 도시 광장의 공식적이고 실제적인 사용은 지배적인 이데올로기를 강화하고 경쟁하는 이데올로기를 약화시킨다. 본 논문은 민족이데올로기로 정의되고 공포되는 두 광장의 재건 사례를 통해 논의를 이어가고자 한다.

**키워드:** 이데올로기, 공간의 생산, 민족정체성, 공공공간, 세속적 민족정체성, 이슬람 이데올로기

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## Summary in Turkish (Oz)

Bu tez ulus kimlik insasi sirasinda ideolojilerin mekan uretimindeki rolunu arastirmaktadir. Bu baglamda, Kizilay ve Taksim Cumhuriyet Meydanlari ulus kimlik insa edilirken Cumhuriyet ideolojisinin ve rejiminin sembolik alanlari olarak tasarlanmalari, izleyen yillarda ise dini ve geleneksel kimligin one ciktiği mekanlara donusmeleri sebebi ile ornek calisma alanlari olarak secilmistir. Bununla birlikte bu iki meydan bir cok ayaklanmaya, sosyal harekete, politik gerilime sahne olmus, bu nedenle de form, islev ve anlam baglaminda ciddi donusumler gecirmistir. Erken Cumhuriyet Donemi egemen ideolojisi, ulus kimligi ve ulusal bilinci insa etmek, yurtsever tarihi anmak ve ululamak icin kent meydanlarini anitlarla taclandirirken, calismanin ornek alaninin ilk kismini kapsayan ve Turkiye Cumhuriyeti' nin baskenti olan Ankara kentinin yeni rejimin temsil mekani olarak tasarlanmasi adina bircok girisimde bulunulmustur. Calismanin bir diger kenti olan Istanbul ise, Osmanli Imparatorlugu' nun bir diger degisle eski rejimin ve ideolojilerin temsilcisi olmasi ve ayni zamanda Osmanli–Islam mirasinin da varisi olmasi gibi nitelikleri goz ardi edilerek yeniden tasarlanmaya calisilmistir. Daha ozelde ise Ankara'daki Kizilay Meydani' nin ve Istanbul'daki Taksim Cumhuriyet Meydani' nin, egemen ideolojinin ulus kimligi yeniden insa ettigi donemlerin mekanlari oldugu soylenebilir. Tarihsel bir inceleme saglandiginda ise Erken Cumhuriyet Doneminde, 1923' ten 1950'lere kadar sekuler Turk milliyetçiligi diger ideolojilere egemen olmus, devlet ve din birbirinden ayrilmis; devlet, ulus mekani insa ederek ulus tarih bilinci ve kimligi olusturulmaya calismistir. 1980' li yillara gelindiginde ise siyasi Islam' in yukselisiyle birlikte, Islam ideolojisi egemen olmaya baslamis, diger ideolojilere baskin gelmis ve ulus kimlik Turk ve Musluman olmak uzerinden yeniden insa edilmeye calisilirken ayni zamanda yapili cevre de onemli olcude degismis, donusmustur. Bu bakimdan ideolojilerin ulus kimligi olusturmak icin mekan uretiminde rol almasi cercevesinde teze konu olan iki ideoloji ve bunlari

stratejileri calisma boyunca tartisilacaktır. Diger bir ifadeyle, kent meydanlari ve anitlar bu surecte bazi tarihsel anlatilari digerlerine onculemek, bazilarini unutturmak, bazilarini animsatmak uzere kullanan onemli araclar olarak konumlanmaktadır. Bu tez ulus kimliklerin kent meydanlarini nasil etkiledigine ve meydanlarin peyzajlarinin kimlik kurgusunu nasil yansitildigina isaret etmeye calisacaktır. Bu isaret etme hali ideolojilerin mekansal politikalar uzerindeki rolunu de temsil etmektedir. Bu acidan tez, ulus kimlik, ideoloji ve mekanin uretimi arasinda ortusen argumanlari bir araya getirmeye calismaktadır. Oncelikle, soylemsel anlam, mekansal baglamda kurulur. Buradan hareketle, kent meydanlari peyzaji ve mekansal anlatisi ile bireyleri ulusa baglar. Ikinci olarak ise ideolojiler kamusal alanda cemiyeti kontrol altinda tutmak icin mucadele verirler. Sonucta kent meydanlarinin resmi ve pratik kullanimlari egemen ideolojinin gucunu pekistirirken diger ideolojileri yok sayar. Bu argumanlar ornek calisma alanlari ile desteklenirken, odak noktasi ideolojilerin ulusal kimlikleri tanimlayip yayarken kent meydanlarini nasil (yeniden) insa ettigi olacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler :** ideoloji, mekanin uretimi, ulus kimlik, kamusal alan, sekuler Turk milliyetçiligi, Islam ideolojisi

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